Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank
| Decision Date | 05 March 1906 |
| Citation | 77 N.E. 693,191 Mass. 159 |
| Parties | MURPHY v. METROPOLITAN NAT. BANK. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
D. V. McIsaac and P. D. Morris, for plaintiff.
James E. Cotter, Conrad Reno, and Jos.
P Fagan, for defendant.
The plaintiff had on deposit in the defendant bank, subject to be drawn by check, the sum of $3,419.75. He drew a check for that amount, payable to the order of James J. Brown, and delivered it to one Moore, an attorney at law then in good repute, who purported to represent Brown in negotiating a loan to be secured by a mortgage on Brown's real estate. A note and mortgage for $3,500, purporting to be executed by Brown, were delivered by Moore to the plaintiff, and by him passed to a client for whom he was transacting the business. Moore took the check to the defendant bank, and caused it to be certified, and then he went with it to the Federal Trust Company, a banking corporation, and had an interview with the president, with whom he hand been acquainted for many years and introduced to him a companion, as the James J. Brown named in the check. The check bore the indorsement 'James J. Brown,' and Moore also indorsed it, and it was cashed by the trust company. In due time it was transmitted to the defendant through the clearing house, and was paid. In fact James J. Brown had deceased on December 26, 1899, nearly nine months before these events occurred, and the signatures which purported to be his were forgeries. Moore absconded in September, 1902, and these forgeries were discovered not long afterwards. The evidence as to all material matters was uncontradicted. The defendant admitted that there were sufficient funds in the bank to meet this check, and that the check was presented and paid, and charged to the plaintiff's account. It also admitted that the death of James J. Brown occurred on December 26, 1899, and introduced in evidence a certified copy from the records of registration of births, marriages, and deaths, which showed this fact. There was no evidence of the existence of any other James J. Brown, and there was much uncontradicted evidence that this person was the one intended by the plaintiff in making the check, and in all his negotiations with Moore in reference to the loan. The suit was brought to recover the amount of this check, upon a declaration containing four counts, stating the alleged liability in different ways.
Upon the admitted facts that the defendant had this money belonging to the plaintiff, and paid it out upon this check the burden is upon the defendant to show that the payment was to the person named in the check, or that the plaintiff was guilty of such negligence in regard to the payment as precludes him from recovery. The plaintiff did not participate in the acts or conversation attending the payment of the check. The uncontradicted testimony shows that from first to last he dealt with Moore, as the attorney of James J. Brown, and that Moore at no time represented the plaintiff in any way in the transaction. Moore received the check as the representative of Brown, and in procuring the payment at the trust company pretended to be acting in the interest of Brown, and not in the interest of the plaintiff. James J. Brown was represented to the plaintiff as the owner of the real estate proposed to be mortgaged, and the plaintiff caused the title to be examined, and found it standing in his name, and free from incumbrances. He also found that the property was of sufficient value to secure the payment of $3,500, for which, according to Moore's statement, Brown wished to mortgage it. He had no reason to doubt that Brown was living, and that the note and mortgage duly executed in his name were genuine securities. It is too plain for question that the James J. Brown named in the check was the person whom the record showed to be the owner of the real estate described in the mortgage, and that the only payment authorized by the drawer of the check was a payment to him. In that respect the facts are different from those in the cases relied on by the defendant, in which the dealings were with an impostor, who assumed a false name, and the check was intended for the person with whom the drawer was dealing, while the fraud was in the representation that he was another person whose name he assumed. Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N.E. 619, 55 Am. Rep. 471; Dunbar v. Railroad Corporation, 110 Mass. 26, 14 Am. Rep. 576; Metzger v. Franklin Bank, 119 Ind. 359, 21 N.E. 973; Crippen v. American National Bank, 51 Mo.App. 508; Meridian National Bank v. First National Bank (Ind. App. 34 N.E. 608, 52 Am. St. Rep. 450; Meyer v. Indiana National Bank (Ind. App.) 61 N.E. 596. It is true that the payee was not then living, and that it was impossible to make a payment to him in person; but the death of the payee of a check to whom the drawer has sent it, before it reaches its destination, does not enlarge the rights of the drawee in regard to payment. Nor does his death, unknown to the drawer, before the check is drawn, enlarge the drawee's rights. In such a case, the check is either payable to no one, or it may be collected by the executor or administrator, according to the circumstances attending the making and delivery of it. In this case there is nothing to warrant a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff in not seeking Brown in person, or verifying Moore's representation that he was living. Nor does it appear that Brown's death affected in any way the defendant or the trust company, to induce the payment of the check upon the forged indorsement. The fraud could have been perpetrated in exactly the same way if Brown had been living. The only difference would have been that the danger of early discovery would have been greater. The ordinary rule is well established that a banker on whom a check is drawn must ascertain at his peril the indentity of the person named in it as payee. It is only when he is misled by some negligence or other fault of the drawer, that he can set up his own mistake in this particular against the drawer. National Bank of North America v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441, 8 Am. Rep. 349; Danvers Bank v. Salem Bank, 151 Mass. 280, 24 N.E. 44, 21 Am. St. Rep. 450; Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196, 25 Am. Rep. 67 and cases cited; Dedham National Bank v. Everett Bank, 177 Mass. 392, 395, 59 N.E. 62, 83 Am. St. Rep. 286; Welsh v. German American Bank, 73 N.Y. 424, 29 Am. Rep. 175; Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371, 12 L. R. A. 791, 22 Am. St. Rep. 821; Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562, 34 Am. Rep. 325. We are of opinion that the plaintiff was guilty of no negligence, in connection with the making or payment of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mulcahy v. Hodgdon
...at best, the admission of the dog's past pleasant temperament did not prejudice Mulcahy. See generally Murphy v. Metropolitan Natl. Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 163-165 (1906) (appellant failed to carry its burden of proof, therefore any erroneously admitted evidence was harmless). Mulcahy's second......