Murphy v. Monday

• Decision Date: 15 February 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-CV-147-GKF-PJC
• Parties: RICKIE JOE MURPHY, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM MONDAY, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

RICKIE JOE MURPHY, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM MONDAY, Warden,¹ Respondent.

Case No. 14-CV-147-GKF-PJC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

February 15, 2017

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition (Dkt. # 1). Petitioner is a state inmate and appears pro se. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. # 13) to the petition and provided the state court record (Dkt. ## 13, 14) for resolution of the claims raised in the petition. Petitioner did not file a reply to the response. For the reasons discussed below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.

BACKGROUND

On July 10, 2012, Sgt. Darren Bristow stopped a truck being driven by Petitioner Rickie Joe Murphy after Murphy's truck made a wide turn and nearly collided with Sgt. Bristow's vehicle. Sgt. Bristow noticed an odor of alcohol from inside the truck. A records check showed Petitioner's license was suspended or revoked. Another police officer conducted sobriety tests which Petitioner failed.

As a result of those events, Petitioner was charged in Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CF-2012-3115, with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (3rd Offense) (Count 1), Failure to Yield (misdemeanor) (Count 2), and Driving With License Suspended or Revoked (misdemeanor) (Count 3). At the conclusion of a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty as charged. The jury recommended a sentence of eighteen (18) years imprisonment, two (2) years of treatment and supervision, and a $2,000 fine (Count1); a $200 fine (Count 2); and a $500 fine (Count 3). On April 8, 2013, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to 20 years, with 18 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections followed by 2 years supervision and treatment (Count 1), and to pay the fines recommended by the jury. During trial proceedings, Petitioner was represented by attorney Stanley Monroe.

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). On direct appeal, Petitioner, represented by attorney S. Gail Gunning, raised two (2) propositions of error, as follows:

Proposition 1: Appellant was denied due process of law by the definition of "reasonable doubt" during voir dire.

Proposition 2: The trial court erred in imposing a sentence on Count 1 - Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, that varied from the jury's sentencing verdict.

(Dkt. # 13-1). On January 22, 2014, in an unpublished summary opinion filed in Case No. F-2013-362, the OCCA rejected Petitioner's claims and affirmed the Judgment and Sentence of the trial court. See Dkt. # 13-3. Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari at the United States Supreme Court nor did he seek post-conviction relief in the state courts.

Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. # 1) and identifies two (2) grounds of error, as follows:

Ground 1: The trial court erred in imposing a sentence on Count 1 - Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, that varied from the jury's sentencing verdict.

Ground 2: Petitioner was denied due process of law by the definition of "reasonable doubt" during voir dire.

Id. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. # 13) to the petition and asserts that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion/Evidentiary Hearing

Before addressing the claims raised in the petition, the Court must determine whether Petitioner meets the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). Respondent concedes, see Dkt. # 13 at 2, ¶ 6, and the Court agrees, that Petitioner's claims raised in the petition were presented to the OCCA on direct appeal and are exhausted.

The Court also finds that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 184-85 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).

B. Claims adjudicated by the OCCA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides the standard to be applied by federal courts reviewing constitutional claims brought by prisoners challenging state convictions. Under the AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated a claim, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas relief only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000); Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044,1050-51 (10th Cir. 2001). "Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (citations omitted).

When a state court applies the correct federal law to deny relief, a federal habeas court may consider only whether the state court applied the federal law in an objectively reasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2002). An unreasonable application by the state courts is "not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not suffice." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003)). The petitioner "'must show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013). Section 2254(d) bars relitigation of claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts and federal courts review these claims under the deferential standard of § 2254(d). Id. at 98; Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

Here, Petitioner presented his habeas claims to the OCCA on direct appeal. Because the OCCA addressed Petitioner's claims on the merits, the Court will review the claims under the standards of § 2254(d).

1. Improper sentence (Ground 1)

In his first ground of error, Petitioner claims that the trial court judge improperly imposed a sentence that varied from the jury's recommendation. See Dkt. # 1 at 5. The record demonstrates that Petitioner's jury found him guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol After Two (2) or More Previous Felony DUI Convictions and recommended that Petitioner be sentenced to "2 yearssupervision/treatment, 18 years imprisonment and a fine of $2,000." See Dkt. # 13-6. At sentencing, the trial judge stated as follows:

I'm not really sure, as I indicated before, since the law is awfully unclear about is this a 20-year sentence with 18 in and 2 out under the rules and conditions of probation or is it simply 18 years, and perhaps if he appeals, the Court can tell us what that answer is. But the jury had found him guilty, sentence [sic] him to 18 years. I'm going to interpret this as a two-year suspended sentence following that, to do a drug and alcohol assessment, follow those treatment recommendations, but as I said, I'm not sure.

(Dkt. # 14-3 at 2). Defense counsel did not object to the trial court's imposed sentence. On direct appeal, the OCCA reviewed for plain error only and denied relief, finding as follows:

The jury's sentence recommendation was "two years supervision/treatment, 18 years imprisonment and a fine of $2,000." Under 22 O.S.2011, § 991a(A)(1)(l) any supervision or treatment must occur within the sentence. Therefore, the trial court's imposition of a 20 year sentence, 18 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections and 2 years supervision and treatment was not error as it was consistent with the jury's recommendation. See Howell v. State, 1981 OK CR 82, ¶ 9, 632 P.2d 1223, 1225 (the district court may suspend a sentence in whole or in part, but a judge may not impose a sentence different from that set by the jury). Finding no error, we find no plain error.

(Dkt. # 13-3 at 3 (citation to record omitted)).

A federal habeas court has no authority to review a state court's interpretation or application of its own state laws. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (emphasizing that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions). Instead, when conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a). Additionally, Oklahoma defines plain error as "an error which goes to the foundation of the case, or which takes from a defendant a right essential to his defense," Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 698 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), and "impinges on the fundamental fairness of trial." Cleary v. State, 942P.2d 736, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). "Oklahoma's formulation of the plain-error standard is virtually identical to the constitutional test for due process." Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2015); Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1125 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding "no practical distinction between the formulations of plain error . . . and the federal due-process test, which requires reversal when error so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). When the OCCA rejects a claim "under the plain-error standard, the decision effectively disallow[s] the possibility of a due process violation." Hancock, 798 F.3d at 1011.

The Court finds Petitioner's Ground 1 claim that the trial judge erred in entering a sentence that varied from the sentence recommended by the jury shall be denied because it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Petitioner's sentencing claim is based on the state courts' interpretation of Oklahoma law. The OCCA specifically cited state law, ...