Murphy v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 21 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 28782,28782
• Citation: 232 Ga. 352,206 S.E.2d 458
• Parties: Barbara Browne MURPHY v. Michael Vincent MURPHY, III.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 458

206 S.E.2d 458

232 Ga. 352

Barbara Browne MURPHY v. Michael Vincent MURPHY, III.

No. 28782.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 21, 1974.

Rehearing Denied June 12, 1974.

Kilpatrick, Cody, Rogers, McClatchey & Regenstein, Wm. W. Cowan, J. Rodgers Lunsford, III, Atlanta, for appellant.

John C. Tyler, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

INGRAM, Justice.

This case is before the court on appeal from the order entered by the Superior Court of Fulton County on December 26, 1973, and the corrected order of the Superior Court of Fulton County entered January 25, 1974, holding 'the alimony statutes of the State of Georgia as contained in Title 30, Sections 201 (Code of 1933); 202 (Code of Ga. of 1933); 202.1 (Ga.L.1967, p. 591); 203 (Code of Ga. of 1933); 204 (Code of 1933); 206 (Code of Ga. of 1933, Acts 1870, p. 413); 209 (Acts 1806, Cobb, 224, 225; Acts 1866, pp. 146, 147; Acts 1966, p. 160); 212 (Code of 1933), Ga. Code Ann., as amended, are unconstitutional because they violate the constitutional provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Par. III, and Art. I, Par. XXV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.'

The appellee-husband's brief acknowledges that in the case of Bugden v. Bugden, 225 Ga. 413(3), 169 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied 396 U.S. 1005, 90 S.Ct. 558, 24 L.Ed.2d 497, this court 'found the Georgia alimony statutes therein under attack to be constitutional,' but argues that subsequent to Bugden, the United States Supreme Court decided the cases of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972), which require Bugden to be overruled by this court. We do not agree. In Kahn v. Shevin, -- U.S. --, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974), the United States Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of a Florida statute which grants widows an annual property tax exemption of $500 but offers no analogous benefit for widowers. This case had not been decided at the time briefs were filed in the present case before this court, but we believe the ratio decidendi of Kahn is dispositive of the issues presented here. See also Dill v. Dill, 231 Ga. 231, 206 S.E.2d 6; and, Husband M. v. Wife M., 321 A.2d 115, decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware, April 18, 1974.

The United States Supreme Court determined the Florida statute involved in the Kahn case, providing different treatment of widows and widowers "rest(s) upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, (30 L.Ed.2d 231) quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989.' Id., p. 1737, of 94 S.Ct. The court there went on to say: 'This is not a case like Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, where the Government denied its female employees both substantive and procedural benefits granted males 'solely for administrative convenience' . . . We deal here with a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionally heavy burden.'

The court also observed in its opinion that the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman exceed those facing the man and this disparity of earnings is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. 'While the widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of her former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer.' Id., p. 1737, of 94 S.Ct.

These reasons are...