Murphy v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, Llp

• Decision Date: 27 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-982 (RJL).,02-982 (RJL).
• Citation: 357 F.Supp.2d 230
• Parties: C. Westbrook MURPHY and Harold Schuler. Plaintiffs, v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

357 F.Supp.2d 230

C. Westbrook MURPHY and Harold Schuler. Plaintiffs, v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, et al. Defendants.

No. 02-982 (RJL).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 27, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David L. Rose, David M. Wachtel, Rose & Rose, P.C., Richard A. Salzman, Douglas B. Huron, Heller, Huron, Chertkof, Lerner, Simon & Salzman, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Eric M. Nelson, Winston & Strawn LLP, New York City, Thomas Matthew Buchanan, Stephen L. Sheinfeld, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

LEON, District Judge.

Before the Court are the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants' and plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs'"pattern and practice" claim. The defendants, Price WaterhouseCoopers, its U.S. Board of Partners and Principals, and twenty-one individual members of its Board (collectively "PwC"), move for partial dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. ("DCHRA"), and the Human Rights Law of New York ("NYHRL"), Executive Law Article 15, et seq., on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over several of the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants also move for dismissal of the U.S. Board of Partners and Principals as a party to this action because it is not a legal entity, and for dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims under the NYHRL for failure to state a claim. Finally, the defendants urge this Court not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' DCHRA claims because these issues predominate over the plaintiffs' federal claims.

The plaintiffs, C. Westbrook Murphy ("Murphy") and Harold Schuler ("Schuler"), move for summary judgment on their "pattern and practice" claim on the grounds that the undisputed facts demonstrate that PWC denies promotion to partner based on unlawful age-based policies. The defendants cross-move for summary judgment on several grounds, including that individual non-class defendants cannot bring such a claim, and that the claim, as a matter of law, is not cognizable under the ADEA. For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court will also GRANT in part and DENY in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and will DENY the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs'"pattern and practice" claim.

BACKGROUND

I. Statutory Framework: The ADEA, DCHRA, and NYHRL

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., ("ADEA") makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see also Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) ("Kimel"). However, the statute provides several exceptions to this prohibition. For example, it allows an employer to rely on age when it "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business..." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). In addition, an employer may also engage in conduct that would otherwise be prohibited under ADEA if such conduct "is based on reasonable factors other than age" or where the employer discharges or disciplines an employee "for good cause." 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1), (f)(3). ADEA covers individuals age forty and over, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), and aggrieved employees may bring suits in "any court of competent jurisdiction" against any employer, including a public agency,¹ for relief from violations of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). ADEA also incorporates section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"), thus permitting aggrieved employees to enforce certain FLSA provisions under ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 631.

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. ("DCHRA"), provides in relevant part, that it shall be unlawful for any employer, "wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, or political affiliation of any individual" to "[t]o fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual; or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including promotion..." D.C.Code. § 2-1402.11.

In applying the provisions of the ADEA and DCHRA, courts in this district have drawn on Supreme Court precedent regarding race and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Arnold v. U.S. Postal Service, 863 F.2d 994, 996 (D.C.Cir.1988); Mianegaz v. Hyatt Corp., 319 F.Supp.2d 13, 18 (D.D.C.2004); see also Futrell v. Dep't of Labor Federal Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 802 (D.C.2003). Courts thus apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework developed in the context of Title VII claims in evaluating age discrimination claims at the summary judgment phase. Mianegaz, 319 F.Supp.2d at 18 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were in reality a pretext for discrimination. Id. Thus, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id.

The third statutory basis advanced in the plaintiffs' complaint is the Human Rights Law of New York ("NYHRL"). Executive Law Article 15, et seq. Under the NYHRL, it is unlawful "[f]or an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Executive Law Article 15, § 296(1)(a). Section 298-a of the NYHRL provides that the statute applies to acts committed outside of New York "if such act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice if committed within [the] state." However, the statute does not provide a non-resident with a private cause of action for allegedly discriminatory conduct that occurred outside of New York by a New York corporation. Beckett v. Prudential Insurance Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995). The statute also does not provide a cause of action to a New York resident for allegedly discriminatory conduct committed outside of New York by a foreign corporation. Id.

II. Factual Background

A. The Parties

PwC is part of a worldwide organization, PriceWaterhouseCoopers Global ("PwC Global"), that is engaged in the business of providing professional services throughout the United States. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5. PwC is a Delaware limited liability corporation that is headquartered in New York. Id. According to the plaintiffs, PwC employs more than 45,000 individuals in the United States, and has approximately 2,600 individuals who are partners or principals.² Compl. ¶ 6. The firm was formed as of July 1, 1998 by a merger of Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse LLP. Def. Mem. Cross-Mot. 5. PWC was organized and operates pursuant to the PwC Partners and Principals Agreement, which sets forth the rights and obligations of the partners. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. PwC's U.S. Board of Partners and Principals ("the Board") and twenty-one individuals alleged to be members of the Board³ are also defendants in this case. The plaintiffs allege that the Board and its members "are responsible for the policies and significant management decisions of defendant PwC, including policies and practices regarding admission to partnership, and decisions as to the promotion of employees to partnership." Compl. ¶ 8.

The plaintiffs, Murphy and Schuler, are employees who have worked with the Regulatory Advisory Services practice ("RAS") in PwC's Washington, DC office. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. Murphy, born on January 30, 1940 (sixty-two years of age at the time this action was brought), was hired by PwC in 1989 as a senior manager. Id. at ¶ 13. He was promoted soon thereafter to the position of Director in the RAS practice. Id. Schuler, born on October 21, 1944 (fifty-seven years of age at the time this action was brought), was hired by PwC in 1988 as a senior manager. Id. at ¶ 12. He was promoted to Director soon thereafter, and later was promoted to Managing Director in the RAS practice. Id. Neither of the plaintiffs was promoted to partner or principal during the course of his employment. Id. at ¶ 27.

B. The PwC Partnership and Principals Agreement

The plaintiffs allege that "[a]t all material times PwC's partnership agreement, like the agreements of its predecessors, has required a partner or principal to retire in the fiscal year...