Murphy v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1927
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 577
• Citation: 22 Ala.App. 163,113 So. 623
• Parties: MURPHY v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

113 So. 623

22 Ala.App. 163

MURPHY v. STATE.

8 Div. 577

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 30, 1927

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lauderdale County; Charles P. Almon Judge.

Walter Murphy was convicted of possessing a still, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Bradshaw & Barnett, of Florence, for appellant.

Charlie C. McCall, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKEN P.J.

Charge 3, refused to defendant in this case, is an exact copy of charge 29 in the case of Crisp v. State (Ala.App.) 109 So. 282. This charge was given approval in the Crisp Case in connection with other charges. That part of the opinion in the Crisp Case reads as follows:

"Charges 17, 24, 27, and 29 each state correct propositions of law and should have been given."

This court fell into error in the approval of charge 29, and the Crisp Case, supra, is hereby expressly overruled to the extent of the approval of charge 29. Said charge reads as follows:

"The court charges the jury that the law presumes that the defendant has testified truthfully in this case, and that it is your duty to reconcile his testimony and the testimony of all the other witnesses in the case with the presumption that he is innocent, if you can reasonably do so."

As stated, refused charge 3 in the instant case is identical with above-quoted charge. It was properly overruled in this case, for the law raises no presumption either one way or the other as to the truth of the statements made by witnesses while testifying in a case. The credibility of parol testimony is a question of fact for the trying body to determine, and any instruction from the trial judge, by which such a question is put to the jury as a matter of law, is an infringement by the court of the peculiar province of the jury. In other words, the question of the degree of credibility of an individual witness, or of all the testimony in a case, is wholly for the jury to decide, and, as stated, the law raises no presumption that a witness while testifying under oath speaks the truth. 28 R.C.L. 660; Stix v. Keith, 85 Ala. 465, 5 So 184.

In the case of Harris v. State (8th Div. 578), 113 So. 318 present term, this court said:

"There is no presumption that a witness while testifying is telling the truth. The credibility of witnesses while testifying in a case is for the jury."

In Nelson v. Warren, 93 Ala. 408, 8 So. 413, the court said, relative to the latter clause of charge 3 (which read as follows: "And it is the duty of the jury to believe the testimony of said Nelson, in the absence of evidence or facts tending to show his testimony to be false"):

"The last clause [of said charge] is a palpable invasion of the province of the jury. The law has fixed no such artificial standard for measuring the credibility of oral testimony."

The juries are the exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence, and a charge which substantially instructs the jury that the evidence given by a witness is presumably true fetters the free judgment of the jury and infringes upon their peculiar and exclusive province to weigh such evidence. Reeves v. Skipper, 94 Ala. 407, 10 So. 309.

In Welsh v. State, 96 Ala. 92, 97, 11 So. 450, 451, the court said:

"There is a sort of presumption of the truth of declarations against interest which the law adjudges as the basis of admissibility. There is also a sort of legal presumption that statements made under the sanction of an oath or of approaching dissolution are true, and this presumption is the basis of the admissibility of sworn testimony and dying declarations. But it extends no further than this. When this office of the presumption has been performed, it ceases to exist. It no longer attends upon evidence when it was gotten before the jury. Once there, it must stand upon its own inherent force and reasonableness, and

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