Murphy v. State

• Citation: 2003 OK CR 6,66 P.3d 456
• Decision Date: 21 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. PCD-2001-1197.,PCD-2001-1197.
• Parties: Patrick Dwayne MURPHY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

66 P.3d 456

2003 OK CR 6

Patrick Dwayne MURPHY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Respondent.

No. PCD-2001-1197.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 21, 2003.

Bryan Lester Dupler, Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, Norman, OK, for petitioner on appeal.

W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, David Brockman, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for respondent on appeal.

OPINION DENYING APPLICATION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF REGARDING MENTAL RETARDATION AFTER REMAND FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

LUMPKIN, Judge:

¶ 1 Petitioner, Patrick Dwayne Murphy, was convicted of First Degree Murder in the District Court of McIntosh County, Case Number CF-1999-164A, and sentenced to death. He appealed his conviction to this Court in Case No. D-2000-705. We affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence in Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 24, 47 P.3d 876.

¶ 2 Petitioner filed his Application for Post-Conviction Relief on February 7, 2002, claiming that, due to his "mild mental retardation," his execution would violate the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishments and would offend contemporary standards of decency. Petitioner's claim proved to be the test case for how this Court would proceed on the issue of mental retardation, following the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).

¶ 3 In light of Atkins, we found merit in Petitioner's mental retardation claim, raised in proposition three of his post-conviction application, to such an extent that required further attention. See Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556

.¹ We therefore remanded the case to the District Court of McIntosh County for an evidentiary hearing "on the sole issue of Petitioner's claim of mental retardation." The District Court was ordered to "determine if Petitioner has raised sufficient evidence (at trial, on appeal, or at the evidentiary hearing) of his mental retardation, in accordance with the definition set forth herein, for the issue of mental retardation to be decided as a fact question by a jury at a resentencing hearing." We defined "sufficient evidence" as "enough evidence to create a fact question on the issue of whether the Petitioner is mentally retarded, as herein defined." We then instructed the District Court to submit its written findings to this Court.

¶ 4 Before delving into the trial court's findings, we must point out that this case is unique, as most future cases will raise the issue of mental retardation in direct appeal proceedings. Our opinion on the issue of mental retardation, as set forth in Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556, will not always be an easy fit, for it was this Court's well-intentioned attempt to give guidance and instruction for all cases involving the issue of mental retardation, as best we could. The opinion sets forth our position that all defendants should be given a fair opportunity to present the issue of mental retardation, and, where sufficient evidence of mental retardation has been demonstrated, that issue must be decided by a jury.

¶ 5 At Petitioner's jury trial, Dr. Bill Sharp, a licensed psychologist, testified that he had been able to visit with Petitioner for two hours, while Petitioner was in handcuffs. During the first stage of trial, Sharp testified that Petitioner "has probably a borderline mental capacity" (i.e., an I.Q. of about 70 to 79), but Sharp's testimony primarily concentrated on Petitioner's chronic alcoholism and blackouts. During the second stage, however, Sharp testified that Petitioner scored a 67 on an abbreviated form of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, which is in the mildly mentally retarded range.

¶ 6 Nevertheless, in his testimony and written report, Sharp indicated his belief that Petitioner would ultimately fall in the low average (i.e., an I.Q. of about 80 to 89) to borderline range and that test results may have been affected by cultural concerns, Petitioner's impulsivity, and the testing conditions.

¶ 7 At trial, Petitioner received the benefit of a jury instruction telling jurors to consider, as a mitigating factor, that he suffers from mild mental retardation. Jurors were thus given the opportunity to consider all the evidence Petitioner had presented regarding his claim of mental retardation and then to decide whether or not that factor, along with other matters of mitigation, should spare his life. The jury elected to assess the death penalty.²

¶ 8 In a way, the issue here is a simpler one. The sole question is whether or not Petitioner has raised sufficient evidence to create a fact question on the issue of his claim of mental retardation. If so, the issue must be submitted to a jury to be decided at a hearing, held solely on the issue of mental retardation, as we have defined it.

¶ 9 The trial judge, the Honorable Steven W. Taylor, having heard all the evidence at trial and at the remanded evidentiary hearing answered this question with a resounding no. It is absolutely clear from Judge Taylor's order that he does not consider Petitioner to be mentally retarded under this Court's definition and the evidence presented. Judge Taylor is strongly of the opinion that a further hearing in this case would be futile.

¶ 10 Among other things, Judge Taylor found: Petitioner's alcoholism directly impacted the 67 I.Q. finding made by Dr. Sharp in the partial and incomplete test given at the McIntosh County jail; the test administered by Dr. Sharp is not reliable due to the jail conditions, the incomplete testing, recent alcohol use, and lack of confidence in the test expressed by Dr. Sharp; a later complete I.Q. test which was given to the Defendant demonstrated an I.Q. of 80; the elementary school testing did not demonstrate mental retardation, only some academic weakness; in reference to the definition of mental retardation in the Remand Order, the evidence does not fit into any of the three categories; and there is a total lack of reliable evidence of mental retardation in this case.

¶ 11 While the determinative issue is, perhaps, a close one, most of Judge Taylor's findings are fairly supported by the record, and his ultimate conclusion, that Petitioner had not raised sufficient evidence to create a fact question on the issue of mental retardation, is not clearly erroneous.

¶ 12 We agree with Petitioner that the question of "sufficient evidence" is essentially the legal equivalent of a defendant making a prima facie showing of mental retardation with his or her evidence. Prima facie evidence has been defined as "[e]vidence good and sufficient on its face; such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient." Davis v. State, 1975 OK CR 211, 541 P.2d 1352, 1354; see also Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, 4 P.3d 702, 719-20

. However, that prima facie evidence must include all prongs of the definition for mental retardation.

¶ 13 In Murphy, we defined mental retardation by dividing it into three separate prongs, as follows:

A person is "mentally retarded": (1) If he or she functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others; (2) The mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18);³ and (3) The mental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care; social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and safety; use of community resources; and work.

A defendant must satisfy each of these prongs in order to be considered mentally retarded for purposes of his or her ineligibility for the death penalty.

¶ 14 With respect to the first prong, the record clearly indicates Petitioner's intelligence does not substantially limit his ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses and to understand the reaction of others. Furthermore, with respect to the third prong, the record clearly indicates Petitioner does not have significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care; social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and safety; use of community resources; and work. As stated in the DSM-IV: Mental Retardation, "adaptive functioning" means "the person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group."⁴

¶ 15 While Petitioner has some weaknesses in controlling impulses and logical reasoning, the record does not indicate his intelligence is substantially limited, separate and apart from his excessive alcohol consumption. Furthermore, Petitioner's adaptive functioning appears fairly normal, in spite of his excessive alcohol consumption.

¶ 16 Petitioner's own expert questioned the validity of the 67 Petitioner scored on the abbreviated form of the Wechsler Scale of Intelligence, ultimately finding Petitioner was in the borderline range.⁵ Sharp had been hired by Petitioner's lawyers to look for signs and symptoms of chemical dependency and the addictive process; his focus was not mental retardation. Testing took place at the county jail, and Petitioner remained in shackles and handcuffs during the brief two-hour testing. Petitioner was "hyper" during the testing with a lot of excess motor movement. Testing occurred seven months after Petitioner was arrested, and testimony indicated cognitive deficits from alcohol could stay...