Murphy v. State, 18A05-0411-CR-617.
Decision Date | 22 November 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 18A05-0411-CR-617.,18A05-0411-CR-617. |
Citation | 837 N.E.2d 591 |
Parties | Agnes MURPHY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John H. Brooke, Brooke Mawhorr, P.C., Muncie, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Matthew D. Fisher, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Agnes Murphy was charged with unauthorized receipt from a voter of a ballot prepared by the voter for voting, a Class D felony,1 after she accepted a ballot in a sealed envelope from an absentee voter and put it in a mailbox. She moved to dismiss the charge on the ground the statute under which she was charged is unconstitutional, and she brings an interlocutory appeal of the denial of her motion. Murphy raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
1. Whether the statutory prohibition of unauthorized receipt from a voter of a ballot prepared by the voter for voting is void for vagueness and/or overbreadth; and
2. Whether receipt of a sealed envelope from an absentee voter and delivery of the sealed envelope to a mailbox amounts to "unauthorized receipt . . . of a ballot."
The State asserts Murphy does not have standing to challenge the statute. We agree and accordingly affirm.
In early 2003, Murphy went to Helen Hines' apartment and had Hines sign a form to receive an absentee ballot in the mail. Murphy later returned to collect the ballot. Hines gave Murphy a sealed envelope containing the ballot and Murphy put it in a mailbox to be delivered to the county clerk.
The State charged Murphy under Ind. Code § 3-14-2-16. Murphy moved to dismiss on the ground the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court granted her motion, but on the ground the State's information was defective. The State again charged Murphy and she again moved to dismiss on the ground the statute was unconstitutional. That motion was denied and the question was certified for interlocutory appeal.
We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to dismiss. Johnson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). In so reviewing a trial court's decision, we reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.
The State asserts Murphy does not have standing "to vicariously assert the claims of others not before the court," (Br. of Appellee at 5), and we must agree.
Generally, a person to whom a statute may be applied constitutionally may not challenge the statute on the basis that it may conceivably be applied in an unconstitutional manner to others not before the court. LaRose v. State, 820 N.E.2d 727, 733 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied 831 N.E.2d 739 (Ind.2005). In Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), reh'g denied, trans. denied, the Davises challenged the constitutionality of the child neglect statute. We noted vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand, and accordingly determined "The Davises are not at liberty to devise a hypothetical situation which would demonstrate vagueness[.]" Id. at 130.
The overbreadth doctrine is a limited exception to that traditional rule of non-standing, id., but it applies only to matters implicating First Amendment protections.2 See, e.g., Davis, 476 N.E.2d at 130 n. 4 (), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
In Wells v. State, 170 Ind.App. 29, 35, 351 N.E.2d 43, 47 (1976), we recognized that exception to the rule of non-standing where First Amendment rights are involved, but we noted "even then, where conduct rather than speech is involved and the appellant stands at the hard core of permissible regulation, his standing to assert facial overbreadth will not be recognized." Id.
Wells was arrested and charged with visiting a common nuisance. He was visiting a residence where an undercover officer engaged in a drug purchase. Wells contended the statute was unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth because it did not expressly provide that to be guilty of visiting, an accused must have knowledge of the illegal use. Therefore, he argued, it was overbroad in restricting freedom of assembly.
We determined Wells lacked standing to present this issue. We noted an exception where First Amendment rights are involved but held Id. at 35, 351 N.E.2d at 47. His claim of vagueness failed for the same reason: Id., 351 N.E.2d at 47.
The Wells analysis controls the case before us. First Amendment rights are implicated. Murphy does not explicitly so argue, but she asserts "voting and casting ballots as well as working to convince people as to the candidate to choose could not be more fundamental. . . ." (Reply Br. of Appellant Agnes Murphy at 2.) She relies on Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), where the Supreme Court noted:
Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively . . . for reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.
(Internal quotations omitted.)
That decision addressed both the rights of voters and the "distinct and fundamental . . . right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs." See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (). We accordingly find the statute implicates the rights of persons like Murphy "working to convince people as to the candidate to choose."
Freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment and is protected from infringement by the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Id. at 31 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964)). Under the State's interpretation of the statute, Murphy asserts, (Br. of Appellant Agnes Murphy at 14.) We accordingly decline the State's invitation to hold First Amendment rights are not implicated in the voting context.
Even so, Murphy lacks standing to challenge the statute in this specific fact situation because she, like Wells, "is clearly within the ambit of those subject to regulation." 170 Ind.App. at 35, 351 N.E.2d at 47. Just as Wells was undoubtedly in violation of the prohibition of visiting a common nuisance when he knowingly visited a residence where an undercover officer engaged in a drug purchase, Murphy accepted a ballot from a voter and was not within one of the listed categories of persons authorized to do so. We therefore may not consider her challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.3
Murphy asserts if the statute is constitutional she did not violate it: (Br. of Appellant Agnes Murphy at 12.) To criminalize receipt of a sealed envelope containing a ballot might, Murphy notes, cause a mail carrier to be in violation of the statute.
Murphy relies on the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State so they will not be enlarged "by construction, implication, or intendment beyond the fair meaning of the language used." Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ( ), trans. denied 741 N.E.2d 1252 (Ind.2000).
The State concedes penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the State, but notes they are not to be read so narrowly that they exclude cases they fairly cover. Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind.2000). It asserts, without citation to authority, that the legislature's intent in enacting Ind.Code § 3-14-2-16 could only have been to discourage voter fraud by criminalizing the knowing receipt and handling of completed ballots by unauthorized persons. The legislature could not...
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