Murphy v. Timberlane Regional School Dist.

Decision Date10 May 1993
Docket NumberCiv. No. 90-265-SD.
Citation819 F. Supp. 1127
PartiesKevin W. MURPHY, By and Through his legal guardians, Kevin C. and Janice MURPHY v. TIMBERLANE REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

Michael Chamberlain, Manchester, NN, for plaintiffs.

Gerald M. Zelin, Salem, NH, for defendant.

ORDER

DEVINE, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Kevin W. Murphy, by and through his parents and legal guardians Kevin C. Murphy and Janice Murphy, brings this action on appeal from a hearing officer's decision pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (1990 & Supp.1993), formerly the Education of the Handicapped Act, formerly the Education for All Handicapped Children Act) ("Act"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1990 & Supp.1993). Kevin seeks an award of compensatory education for the period between January 1, 1982, and December 31, 1983, during which defendant Timberlane Regional School District allegedly denied him special education services. In addition, Kevin seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to secure his rights under the Act. The court has jurisdiction of this action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1990 & Supp.1993), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (Supp.1993) and 1343 (Supp.1993), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Supp.1993).

For a recitation of the factual background of this case, see Murphy v. Timberlane Regional School Dist., 973 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1992).

In its order of August 26, 1991, this court granted defendant's April 1, 1991, motion for summary judgment based on a finding that plaintiff's claims were barred by the equitable defense of laches. Said order was vacated and remanded by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Timberlane, supra. Pursuant to the First Circuit's opinion, this court held a hearing on the laches issue on January 28, 1993.

Presently before the court are (1) defendant's original motion for summary judgment dated April 1, 1991; (2) defendant's February 18, 1993, motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Murphys' compensatory education claim as untimely under the statute of limitations; and (3) plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, filed on April 9, 1993.

I. The Statute of Limitations Issue
a. Defendant's Argument

Defendant concedes that

at the time this case arose, neither the IDEA nor RSA New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated 186-C1 contained a statute of limitations for requesting an administrative hearing or for seeking judicial review of the hearing officer's decision.

Memorandum of Law in Support of School District's Motion to Dismiss the Murphys' Compensatory Education Claim as Untimely Under the Statute of Limitations ("Defendant's Memo on Statute of Limitations") at 17. However, defendant contends that the court should fill this gap by following "`the settled practice'" of "`adopting a local limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.'" Id. at 17-18 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, defendant contends that the court must choose between RSA 507-B:7, which provided a limitations period of four years from the time the cause of action accrued on "Bodily Injury Actions Against Governmental Units" during the period from August 22, 1981, through May 17, 1989,2 and RSA 508:4 I, which provided a limitations period of six years from the time the cause of action accrued on "all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel," "except as otherwise provided by law," during the period from August 28, 1981, through July 1, 1986.3 See Defendant's Memo on Statute of Limitations at 18. Defendant "urges the court to borrow the shorter statute, RSA 507-B:7," contending that "it is more consistent with the policies underlying the IDEA." Id.

Defendant contends that "a cause of action under the IDEA accrues `when parents know or have reason to know of the injury or event that is the basis for their claim,'" id. at 35 (quoting Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 408 (6th Cir.1991)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 982, 117 L.Ed.2d 144 (1992). To support its interpretation of Hall, defendant cites McDowell v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 737 F.Supp. 386 (S.D.Tex.1990), for the proposition that "the plaintiff must be in possession of `critical facts' which indicate that he has been hurt and that the defendants are responsible for this injury." Defendant's Memo on Statute of Limitations at 35 (citing McDowell at 389). Defendant contends that, based on Hall and McDowell, the court must find that plaintiff's compensatory education claim "accrued when Kevin was out of school," id., which defendant characterizes as "between January 1982 and October 1983," id.

Plaintiff did not seek a due process hearing until August 22, 1989. Therefore, if the court were to accept defendant's reasoning in its entirety, it would conclude that the plaintiff's action is barred by RSA 507:B-7.

b. Defendant's Breach of a "Procedural Safeguard"

As the First Circuit recognized in its opinion, during the period of the Murphys' dispute with Timberlane over the propriety of the 1981-82 IEP, Timberlane was bound by N.H.Code Admin.R.Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b (Aug. 1981),4 pursuant to which it was "required to initiate administrative procedures to obtain permission from a hearing officer to implement the IEP." Murphy, 973 F.2d at 17. As the First Circuit noted, "No such procedures were ever initiated by Timberlane." Id.

The promulgation of Rule Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b was authorized pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), which provided:

Any State educational agency, any local educational agency, and any intermediate educational unit which receives assistance under this subchapter shall establish and maintain procedures in accordance with subsection (b) through subsection (e) of this section to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate education by such agencies and units.

(Emphasis added.) Further, the stated purpose of the Act was

to assure that all handicapped children have available to them, within the time periods specified in section 1412(2)(B)5 of this title, a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).6 In light of the above, the court concludes that Rule Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b constituted a "procedural safeguard", 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), embodying the Act's purpose of "assuring that all handicapped children have available to them, within the time periods specified in section 1412(2)(B) of this title, a free appropriate public education...." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). Had Timberlane complied with this procedural safeguard, it would have initiated the same administrative hearing and judicial review process it now seeks to nullify by invoking RSA 507-B:7. See and compare Rule Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b (quoted supra) with N.H.Code Admin.R.ch. Ed. 1127 (Aug.1981) and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b).

In its opinion, the First Circuit found that the failure to comply with Rule 1125.01(b) (3)-b diminished Timberlane's standing in equity to invoke the defense of laches. Murphy v. Timberlane, supra, 973 F.2d at 17. Specifically, that court stated:

We are troubled by Timberlane's attempt to fault the Murphys for their failure to file for a due process hearing when, although the parents are entitled to request a hearing if they disagree with an IEP, state regulations impose upon Timberlane not only the right, but the obligation to do the same.

Id. (emphasis in original).

This court is equally troubled by Timberlane's current attempt to capitalize on its own failure to comply with the Act, as reinforced by New Hampshire law, at the expense of both Kevin and the legislative goals underlying the Act. In particular, the court notes that, rather than complying with Rule 1125.01(b)(3)-b and implementing the putatively appropriate IEPs in question, Timberlane has sought only to ensure that no hearing on the merits of this case ever takes place. Clearly, the procedural safeguards of section 1415 and its progeny in the form of Rule Ed. 1125.01(b)(3)-b were intended to thwart such behavior and to prevent the occurrence of situations such as this, where more than a decade has passed since the initial IEP dispute, while the merits of that dispute still remain unaddressed.

In DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the Supreme Court, in addressing the appropriate limitations period for suits brought under both section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act, discussed its general approach to the issue of applying state statutes of limitations to actions brought under federal law:

As is often the case in federal civil law, there is no federal statute of limitations expressly applicable to this suit. In such situations we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at all; rather, our task is to `borrow' the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source. We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law. `The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of familiar legal principles.' Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
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