Murphy v. U.S., 80-1552
| Decision Date | 18 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1552,80-1552 |
| Citation | 209 U.S. App. D.C. 382,653 F.2d 637 |
| Parties | Gerald B. MURPHY, a minor, by and through his parents and next of friends, Girlie A. Murphy and William C. Murphy, Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Louis Fireison, Bethesda, Md., for appellant.
Robert C. Seldon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles F. C David P. Sutton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellee, District of Columbia. Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee, District of Columbia.
Ruff, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Robert E. Eaton, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellee, United States of America.
Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, and MacKINNON and WALD, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.
INTRODUCTION
On November 28, 1976, during the afternoon dormitory count, a gang of inmates 1 brutally attacked, beat, and stabbed 19-year-old Gerald Murphy as he lay resting on his bed in his room at Lorton Youth Center I. 2 The attack left Murphy permanently partially paralyzed; he will never again walk unaided. 3 His parents brought this suit for damages on his behalf against the United States and the District of Columbia. 4 The complaint alleged two bases of liability against each defendant. The first count alleged that Murphy's injuries were the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants' employees' negligence. The second count sought relief on the theory that the institutional conditions which allegedly facilitated the attack constituted violations of Murphy's fifth amendment right to due process and eighth amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. At the close of appellant's case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of both defendants on the constitutional theory of liability. The court contemporaneously granted the United States' motion for a directed verdict on the negligence count, but denied the District's motion for similar relief. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict against the District on the negligence count in the amount of $161,000. The court then granted the District's motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto ("n.o.v."), and directed a verdict in favor of the District on the negligence count, thereby denying to appellant as a matter of law relief on all counts.
Appellant now appeals from three of the trial court's rulings: its decision to direct a verdict in favor of the United States on the negligence count; its decision to direct a verdict in favor of the District on the constitutional count; and its grant of the judgment n. o. v. in favor of the District on the negligence count. We affirm the first two of these rulings, but reverse the third. We find that sufficient evidence did exist to go to the jury on the question of the District's negligence in allowing the attack to take place. However, because we find that a directed verdict was warranted with respect to one of the theories of liability presented
to the jury on the negligence issue, we must remand the case for retrial rather than merely ordering reinstatement of the jury verdict. See p. 646 infra.
The criteria for granting a motion for a directed verdict and for a judgment n. o. v. are identical. 5 In each case, the motion
should not be granted unless the evidence, together with all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom is so one-sided that reasonable men could not disagree on the verdict.
Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2407, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979). When considering such a motion, all evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the (non-moving party.)" Alden v. Providence Hospital, 382 F.2d 163, 165 (D.C.Cir.1967). See also Princemont Construction Corp. v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1217, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1970). Indeed, in any case "where fair-minded people might differ as to the conclusion appropriate," id., the court must submit the question to the jury. Thus, the question before us is whether reasonable persons could have concluded on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial that either the District or federal defendants were negligently responsible for the attack that resulted in plaintiff's injuries, or that the District had violated Murphy's constitutional rights.
The appellant sued the United States for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("Act" or "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq., which renders the United States liable for injuries "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the (United States) Government(.)" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The appellant argues that the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons were negligent in two respects: first, in failing to ensure that Murphy was committed to a "reasonably safe" institution, and second, in failing to adequately supervise Murphy once he was placed in Lorton Reformatory. 6 We find both arguments unpersuasive.
The appellant argues that the section of the Youth Corrections Act ("YCA" or "FYCA") under which he was sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), 7 and 24 D.C.Code § 425 8 impose upon the Attorney General a statutory obligation to place offenders such as Murphy in "an appropriate correctional facility," Brief for the Appellant at 12, and that the Attorney General violated this obligation by "perfunctorily" assigning Murphy to Lorton Youth Center. Id. at 15. Lorton, the appellant contends, was inappropriate The appellant first argues that under 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010-15 of the FYCA, the Attorney General was obligated to evaluate Murphy and commit him to the federal youth center best suited to his needs. 9 This duty, he contends, was violated by Murphy's "perfunctory" commitment to Lorton without a formal evaluation of his needs and the institution's ability to meet them. However, we agree with the trial judge: "There is no (such) statutory responsibility (.)" Tr. 5/9/79 at 439. Congress amended the YCA in 1967 to grant District officials comprehensive control over the "maintenance, treatment, rehabilitation (and) supervision" of District of Columbia Code offenders such as Murphy by authorizing the District to construct or contract for facilities in which to house them, and granting it complete authority over those offenders sentenced to such local facilities. 10 Although the judge still technically assigns District of Columbia Code offenders to the custody of the Attorney General when sentencing them pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), 11 and the Attorney General in turn has the legal authority to designate as their place of confinement any appropriate facility, 12 local or otherwise, 18 U.S.C. § 5025 makes clear that Congress envisioned that the Attorney General would commit them to Lorton in the absence of unusual circumstances. 13 In practice, the sentencing judge recommends commitment of District of Columbia Code offenders to Lorton Youth Center, or asks the Bureau of Prisons to investigate alternative placements. In Murphy's case, no request for alternative placement was made and the sentencing judge committed him directly to Lorton Youth Center. 14 This But second, even if the Attorney General retains a general obligation under this statutory scheme to assign Murphy to an "appropriate" institution, 16 appellant failed to present sufficient evidence of the Attorney General's breach of this duty to warrant submission to the jury. Violence is unfortunately endemic to American prisons; the appellant could not and does not argue that the mere fact that some inmate assaults occur at Lorton Youth Center makes it an "inappropriate" institutional placement for Murphy. 17 Rather, he argues that the institution is "inappropriate" because the rate of violence is so high as to be "unreasonable." 18 While in some cases the raw number of assaults may be sufficient evidence of unreasonableness, in this case the number of assaults that occurred in the Youth Center and in Dormitory # 3 where Murphy lived in the year of his attack was not so high as to strike this court as per se unreasonable. 19 Moreover, the appellant adduced no other evidence at trial tending to prove unreasonableness, e. g., that these numbers were outside the range of violence normally associated with this type of penal institution, 20 or that any subset of prisoners suffered from an unusual risk of attack. 21
because its inmates were not "reasonably secure from harm" one "could reasonably expect that an armed and dangerous gang of inmates would ... be permitted to enter his room and brutally attack him." Id. at 12, 14
commitment was consistent with the plain thrust of the statutory scheme of placing District youth offenders under the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections unless the sentencing court requests otherwise. 15
Moreover, the appellant himself stipulated that he had not feared for his physical safety prior to the attack; 22 there was therefore insufficient evidence of an excessive level of inmate assaults for a jury to conclude that "terror reign(ed)" in the institution or even that there was a pervasive risk of harm to inmates like Murphy. 23 No reasonable juror could have concluded from this barren record that the rate of assaults at Lorton was so excessive that the Attorney General's placement of Murphy there violated any statutory obligation to place him in an appropriate institution. The question was therefore...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hobson v. Wilson
...issues. The evidentiary criteria for grant of judgment n.o.v. match those for grant of a directed verdict. Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 640 (D.C.Cir.1981). Neither form of relief from a determination of the facts by a jury is appropriate unless "the evidence, together with all rea......
-
Hibma v. Odegaard
...1983 such a policeman could be liable for the injuries. "Violence is unfortunately endemic to American prisons." Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 642 (D.C.Cir.1981); see also Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 472-73 (8th Cir.1984). Gang rapes and homosexual assaults are common-place and ......
-
Franklin v. District of Columbia
...v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), or willfully violated their duty of care, see Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C.Cir.1981), or that any particular member of the class suffered serious harm from inadequate medical care because of the prisoner's ......
-
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. And Development Corp.
...probable consequence of the negligent or wrongful act and ought to be foreseen in light of the circumstances." Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 648 n. 48 (D.C.Cir.1981) (quoting Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 178 (D.C.1977)). Any terrorist act, including the September 11 attacks, might......