Murphy v. Webster

Citation131 Mass. 482
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Decision Date21 October 1881
PartiesPatrick Murphy & others v. Henry R. Webster & others

Argued March 18, 1881 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Essex. Petition in equity, under the Gen. Sts. c. 18, § 79, by ten taxable inhabitants of the city of Lawrence, for an injunction to restrain the mayor of said city from drawing his order on the city treasurer authorizing him to pay from the funds of the city certain sums of money to twenty-two persons claiming to be police officers, to restrain the treasurer from paying said sums, and the twenty-two persons from receiving them. The case was heard on the petition answer, agreed facts and evidence, by Morton, J., who reported, for the consideration of the full court, and for the entry of such decree as might be deemed proper, the following case:

In 1881, the municipal year began on January 3. There was then on duty a police force of twenty-eight regular police officers and night watchmen, who had been duly appointed at the commencement of the preceding municipal year.

On said January 3, the mayor and aldermen duly held a meeting, at which police officers could have been legally appointed or removed. At this meeting, the mayor presiding and putting the vote, an order was introduced and acted upon, as appears by the following copy of the record: "City of Lawrence. In board of aldermen, January 3, 1881. 'Ordered, that the police force including all regular officers be and are hereby discharged. This order to take effect twelve o'clock, noon, January 4, 1881.' In receiving the order, the mayor stated that he should not present the order to be voted on to take effect, but if the board desired to arrive at an expression of opinion he would offer the order for that purpose, and desired the board to carefully consider its action, as from it might follow litigation. The order was then adopted by a yea and nay vote. Aldermen Dyer and Smith voting 'no,' and Aldermen Danforth, Doe and Saunders voting 'yea,' Alderman Dolbier not voting. The mayor then announced that the adoption of the order had no effect upon the police force, who would remain upon duty until properly removed, as I refuse to concur in your action. The creation of an officer requiring coordinate action of the mayor and aldermen and the discharge of an officer would require the same action of a coordinate authority."

At the same meeting the mayor nominated and the aldermen confirmed one hundred and three special police officers, who were called "special officers" by the mayor at the time of their nomination, and were named "special police officers" on the record. Under the ordinances of the city, the mayor had the power to order such of these officers as qualified to regular police duty, with their consent. Between January 4 and 17, 1881, sixty-six of these special police officers were duly qualified. These officers were not appointed with any regard to their qualification for regular police officers and night watchmen; and it was not the intention of the power appointing them that they should be called into such service except temporarily in case of a legal vacancy upon the police force.

At a meeting of the mayor and aldermen held on January 17, 1881, the mayor presiding and putting the vote, the following order was adopted: "Ordered, that the pay of the police appointed by his Honor, Mayor Webster, and confirmed by the board of aldermen for the current year, or who may be hereafter during the current year so appointed and confirmed, shall be two dollars and twenty-five cents for each day's service of ten hours, performed by them when assigned to duty, and at the same rate for any extra time in which they shall be employed; and that no person, except those appointed and confirmed as above, shall be entitled to receive any pay for services rendered by them in the performance of police duty." At the time of the passage of this order, the mayor neither concurred nor non-concurred therein, deeming it a matter upon which he could not vote.

The persons whose pay is in question in this case were duly appointed regular police officers in 1880, and were serving as such on January 3, 1880. On January 4, 1881, the mayor requested these persons to continue to serve the city in the capacity of regular police officers and night watchmen, with which request they have faithfully complied down to the filing of this petition. Previously to such request the mayor had not nominated either of said persons for regular or special police officers, and, at the time of such request, he contended that they held over as police officers, and that the orders of January 3 and 17, 1881, (which were communicated to them,) so far as they aimed at the removal of said officers, or the depriving them of compensation for services as police officers, were inoperative and void.

At the meeting of January 17, the person who was city marshal in 1880 was nominated and confirmed as city marshal for 1881, and between January 17 and the date of the filing of the petition, the mayor has nominated and the aldermen confirmed five regular police officers, all of whom the mayor assigned to duty, and these were the only regular police officers nominated down to the filing of the petition. None of them were nominated in the place of any of the persons whose pay is in question in this case.

The mayor, at the time of the filing of this petition, had issued his order on the city treasurer to pay the officers in question the amounts claimed by each, the same being for services rendered as regular police officers and night watchmen in said city during the entire month of January 1881, and the treasurer of said city intended to pay the same at the date of filing this petition. These claims were approved by a majority of the committee on accounts, the proper committee of the city government for approving claims of this class; and the sums charged were customary and reasonable. It was admitted that they were in any event entitled to be...

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27 cases
  • In re Opinion of the Justices
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 27, 1939
    ...of the Senate and of the House. ‘The power to appoint and the power to remove officers are in their nature executive powers.’ Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass. 482, 488;Attorney General v. Varnum, 167 Mass. 477, 480, 46 N.E. 1;Driscoll v. Mayor of Somerville, 213 Mass. 493, 494, 100 N.E. 640;Sti......
  • Stiles v. Morse
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1919
    ...judicial. The power to remove an officer in the public service is in its nature executive, when considered by itself alone. Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass. 482. When, as essential prerequisites to the exercise of that power, there must be a formulation of specific charges as grounds for remova......
  • Adie v. Mayor of Holyoke
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1939
    ...to appoint, in the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary." State v. Dahl, 140 Wis. 301, 303. Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass. 482. Attorney General v. Varnum, 167 Mass. 477 , Sponogle v. Curnow, 136 Cal. 580, 585. State v. Chatfield, 71 Conn. 104, 112. State v. A......
  • Collins v. Selectmen of Brookline
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 31, 1950
    ...61 N.E.2d 8, 11, and cases cited. The exercise of the power of removal of a public officer is an act executive in its nature. Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass. 482, 488; Attorney General v. Varnum, 167 Mass. 477, 480, N.E. 1. The argument is pressed that a removal effected after a hearing upon c......
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