Murray County v. Pickering, 20489.

• Citation: 157 S.E. 343,42 Ga.App. 739
• Decision Date: 18 February 1931
• Docket Number: No. 20489.,20489.
• Parties: MURRAY COUNTY et al. v. PICKERING.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

42 Ga.App. 739

157 S.E. 343

MURRAY COUNTY et al.

v.PICKERING.

No. 20489.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Feb. 18, 1931.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Error from Superior Court, Murray County; C. C. Pittman, Judge.

Action by Murray County and others against V. C. Pickering. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

T. H. Dang and Joe M. Lang, both of Calhoun, for plaintiffs in error.

H. H. Anderson and W. B. Robinson, both of Chatsworth, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

BELL, J.

1. Under the provisions of section 386 of the Civil Code, all contracts made by county authorities "in behalf of the county must be in writing and entered on their minutes." Laurens County v. Thomas, 6 Ga. App. 568, 65 S. E. 302; Spalding County v. Chamberlin, 130 Ga. 649(1), 61 S. E. 533; Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162(1), 68 S. E. 1115; Milburn v. Glynn County, 109 Ga. 473, 34 S. E. 848. A mere oral agreement is unforceable, even though it be embodied or recited in a resolution adopted by the county commissioners and entered on the minutes. Thus, a resolution that a named attorney "is hereby employed" to represent the county in a certain cause, upon terms and conditions therein stipulated, is insufficient, without more, to constitute a binding contract between the county and such attorney, although the resolution is entered upon the minutes and the attorney signifies his acceptance of the employment by tendering performance. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 615(1), 63 S. E. 36; Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 191, 194, 62 S. E. 6S; Holliday v. Jackson County, 121 Ga. 310, 48 S. E. 947.

2, A suit filed by an attorney in behalf of a county, and thereafter sought to be dismissed by the county authorities, cannot be controlled and prosecuted by such attorney merely for the purpose of recovering of the defendant fees to which the attorney claims to be entitled by virtue of a contract between himself and the county authorities, when, as appears from the petition, such contract is unenforceable because it was not in writing and entered upon the minutes as required by law.

3. Upon application of the above principles to the facts of this case, the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and dismissing the petition as amended.

Judgment affirmed.

JENKINS, P. J., and STEPHENS, J., concur.