Murray v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1992
• Docket Number: CA-UB,No. 1,1
• Citation: 173 Ariz. 521,844 P.2d 1171
• Parties: William W. MURRAY, Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, an Agency, and Digital Equipment Corporation, Appellees. 91-092.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1171

844 P.2d 1171

173 Ariz. 521

William W. MURRAY, Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, an Agency, and Digital Equipment Corporation, Appellees.

No. 1 CA-UB 91-092.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department B.

Dec. 10, 1992.

Redesignated as Opinion and

Publication Ordered Jan. 12, 1993.

William W. Murray, in pro. per.

Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Bonnie E. Elber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec.

Twitty, Sievwright & Mills by Janet L. Feltz, Phoenix, for appellee Digital Equipment Corp.

OPINION

EHRLICH, Presiding Judge.

William W. Murray appeals from a determination by the Appeals Board of the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("DES") that he is disqualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Murray was employed for over 13 years by Digital Equipment Corporation as an electronics engineering technician at its Phoenix plant. Digital decided to reduce its work force nationwide. To encourage employees to leave voluntarily, it presented a Transition Financial Support Option Program ("program") to all 600 employees in the Phoenix plant with a goal that 235 employees would accept the proposition. The program offered employees a lump-sum settlement in an amount based upon an employee's years of employment and current weekly pay, continuation of some benefits such as medical, dental and life insurance for specific periods of time, and out-placement service for six months. Employees were informed that while there would be no layoff or plant closure, there would be reclassification and reorganization of work which could include restricted opportunities for future pay increases, reductions in pay and elimination of positions.

More than 245 employees, including Murray, accepted the program. Murray then filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits.

A DES deputy determined that pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. section ("A.R.S. s") 23-775(1) and Ariz.Admin.Code ("A.A.C.") R6-3-50135(H), Murray was disqualified for benefits because he had left Digital voluntarily without good cause. Murray sought reconsideration of the determination, which was denied, and the matter was forwarded to the Office of Appeals. Following a hearing, the Appeal Tribunal set aside the determination, finding that Digital had initiated the separation by its motivation to reduce its work force and failed to provide stable employment. Digital then petitioned for review. The Appeals Board set aside the tribunal's decision and concluded that Murray's separation from Digital was a voluntary quit. This decision was affirmed upon review. A timely application for appeal to this court followed and was granted.

DISCUSSION

Murray submits on appeal that he accepted the program because of a work slowdown and an unpleasant working environment. The state responds that he is not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily accepted the program without fear of losing his job and failed to establish that compelling personal reasons forced his resignation. The issue on appeal is whether Murray's separation from Digital qualifies as a quit or discharge. See A.A.C. R6-3-50135(A)(1).

We accept the Appeals Board's findings of fact if they are supported by any reasonable interpretation of the record. E.g., Avila v. DES, 160 Ariz. 246, 248, 772 P.2d 600, 602 (App.1989); Prebula v. DES, 138 Ariz. 26, 30, 672 P.2d 978, 982 (App.1983). However, we decide whether the board properly interpreted the law. E.g., Munguia v. DES, 159 Ariz. 157, 159, 765 P.2d 559, 561 (App.1988), citing Prebula, 138 Ariz. at 30, 672 P.2d at 982.

The Appeals Board found that Murray elected to leave Digital because he had a poor working relationship with his supervisor and had been dissatisfied with working conditions in his group for up to three years prior to his separation. The board additionally found that Murray did not seek professional assistance for the mental stress allegedly caused by employment and that continuing work was available after his termination date. It considered Murray's separation to be a voluntary quit. It then addressed whether the reason for his resignation disqualified him for unemployment insurance benefits, ultimately concluding that Murray had left without good cause because he failed to establish either that working conditions were so intolerable as to constitute good cause for leaving employment as defined in A.A.C. R6-3-50515 or a compelling personal reason for volunteering for layoff as required by A.A.C. R6-3-50135(H)(2). He therefore was ineligible for benefits.

The board's factual findings are supported by the record and not disputed. Further, it properly interpreted the applicable statutes and administrative regulations in concluding that Murray's separation was a voluntary quit without good cause disqualifying him for unemployment insurance benefits. See A.R.S. § 23-775(1).

In deciding whether Murray initiated the separation and whether he left for compelling personal reasons, the board relied on A.A.C. R6-3-50135, which provides in pertinent part:

H. Volunteering for layoff. When an individual volunteers or submits his name to be considered for a layoff or furlough due to a reduction in the work force, a decision must be made as to who initiated the action.

1. When an employer determines that a layoff is to occur and then inquires as to whether there are individuals who will volunteer for the layoff, the separation is a discharge for nondisqualifying reasons.

2. When an employee requests or volunteers for layoff status prior to any specific announcement by the employer and the employer acts upon the...