Murray v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 27 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2022-SC-0093-MR |
| Parties | ARAMIS SALATHIAN MURRAY APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Aramis Salathian Murray was convicted of murder by a Fayette County jury and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right.[1] Murray argues the trial court erred by: (1) failing to hold a Faretta[2] hearing on his motion for hybrid representation; (2) admitting evidence obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination; (3) permitting a witness to offer opinion testimony on Murray's guilt; (4) admitting evidence of prior domestic violence; and (5) denying his claim of self-defense immunity. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Three unmarried couples lived in a residence located in downtown Lexington, Kentucky: Murray and Helen Taylor; Jason Smith and Ashley Webb; and Denzel Greer and Shaquay Leavell.[3] The relationship between Murray and Helen was volatile. On April 22, 2018, after arguing most of the day, Murray told Helen to leave the house. Ashley convinced Helen to leave with her temporarily to let the situation defuse. The two women went to a nearby bus stop. At some point, Helen returned to the residence. When she returned to the bus stop, Murray followed her. He brandished a firearm and threatened to shoot Helen and Ashley. Murray then returned to the residence.
Jason and Denzel happened upon Helen and Ashley at the bus stop. Helen and Ashley told them about the situation. Jason and Denzel returned to the residence to confront Murray. When they arrived, Murray was sitting on the front porch. Jason approached Murray while Denzel remained on the sidewalk. The confrontation ended when Murray shot Jason twice in the torso and once in the center of the forehead.
After the shooting, Murray fled the scene and disposed of his firearm. When police arrived at the residence, numerous witnesses and bystanders were present. Police obtained a warrant for Murray's arrest based upon the witnesses' statements. Murray was located using cell-phone technology and arrested soon afterward.
Detective Matthew Merker of the Lexington Police Department interviewed Murray. Murray initially denied any involvement in the shooting, but later claimed self-defense and further informed Det. Merker where he had disposed of his firearm. Murray claimed Jason had threatened him with a gun belonging to Denzel and that Denzel must have removed the gun from Jason's body after the shooting. Police did not recover any weapons from the vicinity of Jason's body following a search of the residence and surrounding areas. Several witnesses also stated Jason did not own a gun.
Murray was charged with a single count of murder. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty and received a sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
For his first contention of error, Murray argues the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Faretta hearing on his motion to allow hybrid representation. We disagree.
Throughout the initial stages of the criminal proceedings in this case Murray alerted the trial court to his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. In April 2019, appointed counsel requested a competency evaluation. Murray was transferred to the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) for evaluation, but Murray refused to cooperate. Murray also refused to allow appointed counsel any access to his medical records. Appointed counsel then sought a court order to be allowed access to the records.
On October 25, 2019, Murray appeared with appointed counsel before the trial court for a status conference on the competency issue. Murray submitted a pro se motion for hybrid representation. The trial court explained it would not entertain any motions until the competency issue had been determined. At the next status conference, a different attorney ("conflict counsel") appeared on behalf of Murray. Conflict counsel informed the trial court he would be representing Murray because Murray had filed a federal lawsuit against the Department of Public Advocacy.
The trial court determined Murray to be competent to stand trial following a hearing conducted on August 31, 2020. After conflict counsel entered his appearance, Murray neither raised the issue of hybrid counsel nor voiced any further complaints regarding his representation.
Unlike the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution which guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel or, conversely, the right to self-representation, Section Eleven[4] of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to hybrid representation. Deno v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky. 2005). Hybrid representation involves a limited waiver of the right to counsel where the defendant and his attorney essentially act as co-counsel. Id. A defendant's request for hybrid representation must be timely and unequivocal. Id. Such a request "is timely if made before meaningful trial proceedings have begun," and "unequivocal if the defendant specifies the extent of the services he desires." Id. at 758.
If a defendant makes a timely and unequivocal request for hybrid representation, the trial court has the duty to conduct a Faretta hearing. Id. At the hearing, the trial court must: (1) determine from the defendant's testimony whether the limited waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; (2) "warn the defendant of the hazards arising from and the benefits relinquished by waiving counsel;" and (3) enter findings on the record that any waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. (quoting Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 226 (Ky. 2004). A trial court's ruling on the issue of hybrid representation is reviewed de novo. King v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Ky. 2012). The improper deprivation of a defendant's right to hybrid representation cannot be deemed harmless error because "[t]he right is either respected or denied." Id. Nevertheless, "[w]hile the right to represent oneself is a structural right, its invocation does not set into motion rigid, mechanical procedures that must be followed to the letter to avoid an error." Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94 (Ky. 2012). A request for hybrid representation may be waived or abandoned. Id. conduct indicates "he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether." Id. at 93-94 (citing Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Murray cites Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 152, 160 (Ky. 2014), for the proposition, "[a] defendant cannot be expected to continue to request a hybrid form of representation in the face of a judge who has made it clear he would not permit it." Mitchell is distinguishable on the facts. In Mitchell, the defendant requested to file a pro se motion after counsel refused to file it on his behalf. The trial court informed the defendant it would not accept any pro se motions because the defendant had counsel. The trial court informed the defendant that he could proceed pro se, but the court did not recommend it. The defendant responded he did not want to represent himself or otherwise discharge his counsel, but simply desired to file the motion because his counsel declined. The trial court informed the defendant his only options were to represent himself or proceed through counsel. Counsel requested the trial court to allow the defendant to represent himself solely for the purpose of the motion. The trial court refused to accommodate the request for limited waiver of counsel. The defendant later requested standby counsel.
On direct appeal, this Court held "the trial court erred by imposing a Hobson's choice on [the defendant]: either take counsel or leave it." Mitchell, 423 S.W.3d at 159. We further concluded the defendant's subsequent request for standby counsel did not constitute a waiver of his request for hybrid representation because "it is only logical that a defendant's request for hybrid counsel would dissipate once the trial court ruled out such a manner of representation." Id. at 160.
In the present appeal, Murray timely and unequivocally requested hybrid representation. However, at the time Murray made his request, there was a legitimate issue concerning his competency to stand trial. The trial court properly declined to entertain the request for hybrid representation until Murray's competency had been determined.[5] The refusal of the trial court to entertain Murray's request for hybrid representation until the competency issue was resolved did not amount to a categorial refusal to entertain that manner of representation. Murray did not raise the issue of hybrid representation again following the competency determination and the appearance of conflict counsel on his behalf. Unlike the situation in Mitchell, the trial court in the present case gave no indication it would refuse to entertain a request for hybrid counsel at the appropriate time. Therefore, we conclude Murray abandoned his request for hybrid representation.
For his second contention of error, Murray argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We disagree.
Murray claims his allegation is preserved for appellate review through the filing of a pro se motion. At the same time Murray submitted his request for hybrid representation, Murray also filed a document...
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