Murray v. D.R. Horton, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 December 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 4:15-cv-00191-RBH
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Roger Murray and Judith Murray, Plaintiffs, v. D.R. Horton, Inc., Defendant.

Roger Murray and Judith Murray, Plaintiffs, v. D.R. Horton, Inc., Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 4:15-cv-00191-RBH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

December 30, 2015

ORDER

This lawsuit stems from an accident where an electric cooking range tipped over, causing a pot of boiling water to spill and severely burn Plaintiff Roger Murray. He and his wife, Plaintiff Judith Murray, filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, South Carolina, on December 9, 2014. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-20. Defendant D.R. Horton, Inc. was served on December 15, 2014, removed the action to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship on January 14, 2015, and filed an answer the same day. ECF Nos. 1 & 4. Defendant filed an amended answer on April 27, 2015, after being granted leave to do so by this Court. See ECF Nos. 22 & 23. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 26, 2015. ECF No. 27. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on July 13, 2015, and Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiffs' response on July 23, 2015. ECF Nos. 28 & 29. The matter is now before the Court for resolution of Defendant's motion for summary judgment.¹

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., Md., 789 F.3d 407,413 (4th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 413, but the Court "cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015).

Moreover, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "A dispute of material fact is 'genuine' if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party." Seastrunk v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 3d 812, 814 (D.S.C. 2014). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

At the summary judgment stage, "the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). Summary judgment is not warranted unless, "from the totality of the evidence, including pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, the [C]ourtbelieves no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 385 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Facts²

Plaintiffs Roger and Linda Murray contracted with Defendant D.R. Horton, Inc. for the construction and purchase of a new single-family residence located at 223 Marbella Drive in Murrells Inlet, South Carolina.³ Complaint, ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 6-7. New kitchen appliances were installed during construction, including an electric stove/oven cooking range. Id. at ¶ 7; ECF No. 28 at 5. After the range was installed, it remained in the same condition and location, and Plaintiffs never moved it. Complaint at ¶ 12.

On November 26, 2014, in preparation for their Thanksgiving meal, Plaintiffs were boiling water in a pot atop the stove. Id. at ¶ 9. Mr. Murray noticed the oven light was no longer working, so he opened the oven door to replace the lightbulb. Id. at ¶ 9-10. While Mr. Murray was leaning inside the oven to install the bulb, the range tipped forward, causing the pot atop the stove to overturn and spill boiling water on his body. Id. at ¶ 10. He sustained severe burns, including third-degree burns covering at least fifteen percent of his body, and sought immediate medical attention. Id. at ¶ 11.

On December 9, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant action based upon Defendant's alleged failure to install an "anti-tip bracket" on the rear foot of the cooking range. Id. at ¶¶ 13-15. Plaintiffs alleged the lack of an anti-tip bracket created a latent and unreasonably dangerous condition that proximatelycaused Mr. Murray's injuries, and they asserted the following causes of action: (1) negligence and gross negligence; (2) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; (3) negligence per se; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (6) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act;⁴ and (7) loss of consortium. Id. at ¶¶ 14-52. As part of their negligence per se claim, Plaintiffs attached to the complaint a copy of the manufacturer's installation instructions for the range.⁵ See id. at ¶¶ 30-31; ECF No. 1-1 at 20 ("Exhibit B"). The instructions describe the anti-tip bracket, explain it must be "securely attached to the floor" and connected to the rear range foot, and contain a "Tip Over Hazard" warning that death or serious injury can occur if a user applies "too much force or weight to the open door without the anti-tip bracket fastened down properly." ECF No. 1-1 at 20.

Besides the above facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant has provided (in support of its motion for summary judgment) a copy of the certificate of occupancy for Plaintiffs' residence. ECF No. 27-2 at 4. The certificate of occupancy was issued on December 4, 2006—eight years and five days before Plaintiffs filed their complaint. Id.

Discussion

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that the South Carolina statute of repose bars this lawsuit because Plaintiffs' claims arise from a defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property. ECF No. 27-1 at 2-4. Defendant contends the cooking range was an improvement to real property and, relying on the certificate of occupancy, claims no factual dispute can exist as to thedate of substantial completion of the improvement—i.e., installation of the range—to Plaintiffs' residence. Id. at 2.

Conversely, Plaintiffs assert the statute of repose does not apply because the range was not an improvement to real property. ECF No. 28 at 2-5. Plaintiffs maintain that because the range was not affixed to the floor with an anti-tip bracket, the range was not permanent and therefore did not constitute an improvement under South Carolina Pipeline Corp. v. Lone Star Steel Co., 345 S.C. 151, 546 S.E.2d 654 (2001). Id. at 2-5.

Section 15-3-640, the statue of repose at issue here, requires that a personal injury action based on the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property be brought no later than eight years following substantial completion of the improvement. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (Supp. 2015). The statute provides in relevant part:

No actions to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvement. For purposes of this section, an action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property includes: . . . (3) an action to recover damages for personal injury, death, or damage to property; . . . [and] (9) an action against owners or manufacturers of components, or against any person furnishing materials, or against any person who develops real property, or who performs or furnishes the design, plans, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, or a repair to an improvement to real property.

This section describes an outside limitation of eight years after the substantial completion of the improvement, within which normal statutes of limitations continue to run.

. . . .

For any improvement to real property, a certificate of occupancyissued by a county or municipality, in the case of new construction or completion of a final inspection by the responsible building official in the case of improvements to existing improvements, shall constitute proof of substantial completion of the improvement under the provisions of Section 15-3-630, unless the contractor and owner, by written agreement, establish a different date of substantial completion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (Supp. 2015). The purpose of section 15-3-640 is to confer a substantive right on developers to be exempt from liability after a certain time period. Holly Woods Ass'n of Residence Owners v. Hiller, 392 S.C. 172, 182, 708 S.E.2d 787, 793 (Ct. App. 2011); see also Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 404, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993) ("A statute of repose creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time."). Unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose creates an "an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists...