Murray v. Gray

Decision Date30 June 2020
Docket NumberNO. 2018-CA-01550-COA,2018-CA-01550-COA
Citation321 So.3d 1166
Parties Stacie MURRAY, Appellant v. James GRAY d/b/a Gray Trucking and Kevin Parker, Appellees
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: S. MALCOLM O. HARRISON, Jackson

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL EARL PHILLIPS CLAIRE K. ROBINETT, Jackson

EN BANC.

J. WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Stacie Murray was driving north on Highway 35 in Scott County when her car collided with a log truck traveling south. Murray sued the truck's driver, Kevin Parker, and his employer, James Gray d/b/a Gray Trucking, for damage to her car and personal injuries. A jury trial ended in a 9-3 verdict for the defendants. On appeal, Murray argues that the trial court erred (1) by overruling her hearsay objection to a highway patrol trooper's testimony about Parker's statement at the crash scene; (2) by admitting into evidence the Uniform Crash Report (UCR) prepared by the trooper, including a narrative and diagram reflecting the trooper's opinions about the vehicles’ paths and the cause of the crash, and by allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Murray's expert about the UCR's narrative; (3) by allowing the trooper, who was not qualified as an expert, to opine as to the cause of the crash; and (4) by allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Murray's expert about a judicial opinion and evidence from prior cases in which the expert testified or his testimony was excluded. We conclude that a new trial is required because Murray's hearsay objection should have been sustained, the UCR should not have been admitted into evidence or read during cross-examination of Murray's expert, and Murray's expert should not have been cross-examined about a court's opinion and evidence from other cases. Therefore, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On April 1, 2014, between 9 and 10 p.m., Stacie Murray was driving home from work on a two-lane stretch of Highway 35 in Scott County. Murray was in the northbound lane. Kevin Parker was driving a fully loaded log truck in the southbound lane on the same stretch of Highway 35. Parker was in the course and scope of his employment for James Gray d/b/a Gray Trucking. The two vehicles collided. Murray's vehicle struck the driver's side of Parker's truck before passing behind the truck, leaving the road, and finally coming to rest on the west side of the highway. Murray sued Gray and Parker in the Scott County Circuit Court, alleging that she suffered personal injuries and property damage as a result of Parker's negligence. The case eventually proceeded to a two-day jury trial in June 2018.

¶3. At trial, Murray testified that she was "alert" and driving with "no problems" when suddenly she saw "lights." Murray stated, "I was driving north in my lane, and I just saw lights ...." Murray was "[p]ositive" she was in her own lane when she saw the lights. The next thing that she could remember was being "disoriented" in her car on the side of the road. A man told her not to move because her car had been hit by a truck. Emergency medical technicians arrived and checked on Murray, but she did not go to the hospital that night. When she awoke the next morning, her ankle was bruised

, swollen, and painful, so she went to the hospital.

¶4. On cross-examination, Murray reiterated that she was in her lane at the time of the crash. However, she later stated, "I was driving. I saw lights. When the impact happened, I don't know anything about that. But I'm constantly driving in my lane." In addition, Murray agreed with defense counsel that she did not have a specific "memory of where this collision took place."

¶5. On redirect examination, Murray again testified that she had no doubt that she was in her lane when the crash occurred and that she never deviated into the southbound lane. However, on re-cross-examination, Murray again equivocated as to whether she was certain that she was in her lane at the moment of the crash.

¶6. Parker testified that he was driving his truck in the southbound lane of Highway 35 when Murray's car suddenly entered his lane and drove "head-on" toward his truck. The shoulder of the road was narrow, but according to Parker, he tried to avoid Murray's car by swerving to the right. Parker testified that his passenger side tires went into the grass on the west side of the road. However, Murray's car still struck the side of Parker's truck near his door. Murray's car continued to contact the driver's side of the truck, causing damage along the length of the truck before passing behind Parker's truck and coming to rest off the road on the west side of Highway 35. After the collision, Parker brought his truck to a stop along the side of the highway. Parker testified that he never entered Murray's lane and that the crash occurred entirely in his lane.

¶7. James Hannah testified for Murray as an expert in accident reconstruction. Hannah testified that he visited the scene about two months after the crash and found a "gouge mark" in the road in what he believed to be the approximate location of the collision. Hannah admitted that the highway patrolman who investigated the wreck, Trooper Greg Lucas, did not find or photograph any gouge marks. Hannah also admitted that he did not know whether the gouge mark was actually caused by the subject crash or predated the crash. In addition, Hannah did not photograph the gouge mark during his initial visit to the crash scene. When Hannah next visited the scene—about two years later—the highway had been overlaid, and the gouge mark was no longer visible. Thus, other than Hannah's testimony, there was no evidence of the gouge mark. The defendants filed a pretrial motion to exclude Hannah's testimony regarding the alleged gouge mark. They argued that Hannah's belief that the gouge marked established the point of impact was speculative and unreliable.1 However, the trial court denied the motion and allowed Hannah to testify about the gouge mark.

¶8. Curiously, Hannah testified that the location of the alleged gouge mark indicated that the collision occurred slightly in the southbound lane—i.e., Parker's lane. Thus, Hannah

believed that part of Murray's car crossed into Parker's lane prior to the collision. In addition, Hannah accepted as true Parker's testimony that he swerved four to six feet in an effort to avoid Murray's car. However, Hannah disbelieved Parker's testimony that he swerved partially off the road because Hannah did not believe that there was any evidence at the scene or in Trooper Lucas's photographs that the log truck ever left the road. Thus, Hannah theorized that Parker's four-to-six-foot swerve must have started in Murray's lane—i.e., Parker must have invaded Murray's lane before swerving back to his right at the last moment. Accordingly, Hannah believed that Parker was at least partially at fault.

¶9. Over Murray's objections, defense counsel cross-examined Hannah regarding the Uniform Crash Report (UCR) that Trooper Lucas prepared regarding the accident. Defense counsel read directly from the UCR's narrative section, which reflected Trooper Lucas's opinions regarding the vehicles’ paths and the cause of the wreck. Also over Murray's objections, defense counsel cross-examined Hannah about the federal district court's opinion in Burnham , supra , and evidence in two other cases in which Hannah testified. These issues are discussed in more detail below.

¶10. After Murray rested, the defendants called Trooper Lucas to testify. Defense counsel asked Lucas what Parker told him about the crash when they talked at the scene, and Murray asserted a hearsay objection. Defense counsel responded, "Judge, this would be potentially an admission against interest, but this would be information obtained during the course of his investigation." The court overruled Murray's objection, and Lucas testified, "I asked [Parker] what happened. He stated to me that the car come in on him and he swerved right to avoid the car." Lucas testified that when he asked Murray what happened, "she replied she did not know."2

¶11. Lucas subsequently testified without objection that he concluded that Murray's car entered the southbound lane prior to the crash. Lucas testified that he based his conclusion on the location of debris; tires marks to the west of the highway, which indicated that Parker left the road in an effort to avoid Murray's car; the fact that Murray's car came to a final stop on the west side of the highway; and the statements of the drivers involved. Lucas's photographs of the crash scene and debris were admitted into evidence.

¶12. Finally, over Murray's objection, the UCR that Lucas prepared was admitted into evidence. The final page of the report includes a diagram and narrative that reflect Lucas's conclusions that Murray's car crossed the center line and caused the collision and that Parker's truck never crossed the center line.

¶13. Lucas was the defendants’ only witness. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the jury returned a 9-3 verdict for the defendants.3 Murray filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶14. Murray argues that the trial judge erred (1) by allowing Trooper Lucas's hearsay testimony about Parker's statement at the crash scene; (2) by allowing defense counsel to read from the UCR's narrative section during his cross-examination of Hannah and by then admitting the entire UCR into evidence; (3) by allowing Trooper Lucas to opine as to the cause of the crash; and (4) by allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Hannah about an opinion and evidence in other cases in which Hannah testified or in which his testimony was excluded. We address these issues in turn below.

I. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting Trooper Lucas's hearsay testimony.

¶15. As noted above, defense counsel asked Trooper Lucas what Parker told him at the crash...

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