Murray v. Laird

• Decision Date: 22 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 54085,54085
• Citation: 446 So.2d 575
• Parties: Fred R. MURRAY, Sr. v. Laura Bell M. LAIRD, et al.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 575

446 So.2d 575

Fred R. MURRAY, Sr. v. Laura Bell M. LAIRD, et al.

No. 54085.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 22, 1984.

K. Maxwell Graves, Jr., Meadville, W.O. Dillard, Bettie Ruth Johnson, Jackson, for appellant.

H.B. Mayes McGehee, McGehee, McGehee & Torrey, Meadville, for appellees.

Before PATTERSON, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ.

PRATHER, Justice, for the Court:

This appeal challenges the cancellation of a deed in a suit brought by six siblings against their brother, Fred R. Murray, Sr. on the ground of the fraud and undue influence exerted by their brother upon their deceased father, Eli Murray. The deed reserved a life estate in the father with remainder interest to the appellant Fred Murray, Sr. in an eighty acre tract of land. The Chancery Court of Franklin County found that Fred Murray, Sr. occupied a close confidential relationship with his father, and that the proof failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence arising from that relationship. From the cancellation of the deed by the chancery court, this appeal is sought by Fred R. Murray, Sr., assigning as error:

(1) That the trial court erred in finding that the presumption of undue influence existed under these facts; and

(2) That, assuming that the court was correct in applying the presumption of undue influence, then the trial court erred in finding that the appellant had not overcome the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the chancery court.

I.

To the marriage of Eli Murray and Lizzie Murray were born eight children: Laura M. Laird, Helen M. Delaney, Lizzie M. Arnold, Vertie M. Cothren, Nell M. Pickett, Ike Murray, Fred Murray, and Darlene M. Beck. Lizzie Murray died in 1951, and Eli Murray continued to live at the homeplace for some twenty-five years until he went to a nursing home at age 87.

In December, 1976 a trust agreement was signed by Eli Murray designating Ike Murray as trustee. Ike Murray transferred funds of his father into the trust account by a check signed by the "mark" of Eli Murray with attesting witnesses. However, upon learning that there was some disagreement from his siblings about the trust, Ike asked to be removed as trustee in January, 1977.

After the trust was terminated, Eli Murray was hospitalized. Fred Murray began using Eli's money for Eli's expenses with the assistance of his sister Helen until a dispute arose. Thereafter, the business and financial management of Eli's monies were controlled by Fred Murray upon whom Eli was dependent. Fred Murray also handled mineral leasing on the real estate.

The transaction that gave rise to this lawsuit was not the financial management by Fred, but was the inter vivos deed transfer by Eli Murray to Fred covering the land.

In this regard on October 20, 1978, Fred Murray signed his father out of the nursing home and carried him to the law office of Maxwell Graves with whom Fred Murray had previously spoken. Mr. Graves advised Fred that he would not prepare the deed until Eli's competency to sign the deed was discussed with Eli's doctor. The doctor did not see or talk with Eli on that date but stated that if Eli could hear, he could understand. Eli Murray told the attorney to prepare a deed to Fred with the reservation of a life estate in himself. The deed was read and explained to Eli Murray before he signed it by the attorney and his secretary.

The record shows that the grantor was 89 years old, a resident of a nursing home, with poor eyesight and hearing, unable to read or write, and had health problems that required surgery in recent years.

A significant fact was that the attorney did not know whether he represented the father or son, but the fee for preparation of the deed was paid by Fred Murray from his own funds. Fred testified that the transfer was his father's desire. The testimony is somewhat confused as to Fred's presence in the room at the time of the execution. The attorney testified that Fred was not present; his secretary testified that Fred was "in and out" of the office.

The deed was recorded the same day of execution, and its recordation was discovered by the other siblings during the lifetime of Eli. No legal action was taken by them except to talk to an attorney. Additionally, the existence of the trust agreement executed by Eli in 1976 was discovered by Fred before Eli's death. In 1980 Fred employed Maxwell Graves to investigate the validity of his deed in view of the trust agreement. Fred paid $500.00 for legal fees from his father's monies for this research on the direction of his father. Testimony from witnesses indicated that Eli's expressed wishes made during his life were to equally divide the land among his children.

The chancellor found the relationship of father and son to be one of a close confidential nature which gave rise to the presumption of undue influence. He further found that the presumption was not overcome by clear and convincing proof. The deed was cancelled.

II.

The law in this state on fiduciary or confidential relationships and undue influence is well settled.

This Court held that a confidential relationship did not have to be a legal one, but that the relation may be moral, domestic, or personal. Hendricks v. James, 421 So.2d 1031 (Miss.1982); Bourn v. Bourn, 163 Miss. 71, 140 So. 518 (1932). The confidential relationship arises when a dominant over-mastering influence controls over a dependent person or trust, justifiably reposed. Hendricks v. James, supra, McDowell v. Pennington, 394 So.2d 323 (Miss.1981), Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 115 So.2d 683 (1959).

Its application has been made to both inter vivos and testamentary transactions. Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 (1858) Croft v. Alder, supra, In re Will of Moses, 227 So.2d 829 (Miss.1969), (as to testamentary transactions), Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 110 So. 583 (1926) (as to inter vivos transfers).

The early 1858 case of Meek v. Perry, supra, traced the history of undue influence from our common law origins and established that in situations involving confidential relationships, a presumption of undue influence arises. That presumption could be rebutted only by showing the fullest deliberation on the part of the testator and abundant good faith on the part of the beneficiary.

The case of Ham v. Ham, supra, added an additional requirement in overcoming the presumption of undue influence in confidential relationship cases. The third requirement necessary to rebut the presumption of undue influence was to have the grantor/testator seek independent advice and counsel of a third party devoted wholly to the interests of the grantor/testator. See In re Will of Moses, supra.

Thus, our law may be summarized to state that when the circumstances give rise to a presumption of undue influence, then the burden of going forward with the proof shifts to the grantee/beneficiary to prove by clear and convincing evidence of:

(1) Good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary;

(2) Grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and

(3) Advice of (a) competent person, (b) disconnected from the grantee and (c) devoted wholly to the grantor/testator's interest. Wofford v. Wofford, 244 Miss. 442, 142 So.2d 188 (1962); Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 115 So.2d 683 (1959), Thomas v. Jolly, 251 Miss. 448, 170 So.2d 16 (1964). Our most recent pronouncement of these unwavering principles were discussed in Hendricks v. James, supra, in a detailed opinion by Justice Hawkins.

The question which the appellant here asks is the type of proof necessary to overcome the presumption. Counsel asks for guidelines from this Court; however, this Court cannot set forth guides that fit all situations. Of necessity, each case must be determined individually on its merits. The evidence of undue influence is usually circumstantial and intangible. Phillips v. Ford, 250 Miss. 425, 164 So.2d 908 (1964). Affirmative and positive proof is needed to overcome this presumption.

However, from case decisions some affirmative and positive factors emerge that may be considered as significant to overcome the inference of the presumption.

(1)...