Murray v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 January 1925 |
| Docket Number | 36319 |
| Citation | 201 N.W. 595,199 Iowa 1195 |
| Parties | MARY MURRAY, Appellee, v. PREFERRED ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED APRIL 8, 1925.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--W. G. VANDER PLOEG, Judge.
ACTION upon a policy of accident insurance, to recover for the death of the insured. The facts are stated in the opinion. From a judgment upon a directed verdict for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.--Reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
Miller Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus, for appellant.
Clark & Byers, for appellee.
The appellee is the beneficiary named in a policy of accident insurance, and sued to recover $ 10,000, the amount the policy provided would be paid to the beneficiary in case the insured, Robert Murray, lost his life directly, and exclusively of all other causes, from bodily injury effected solely through accidental means. The petition alleged that the death of the insured was caused by a gunshot wound inflicted by some person to the plaintiff unknown. The appellant's answer denied that the insured came to his death solely through accidental means; alleged, as a complete defense, that he had made a false statement in his application for the policy as to his occupation; and tendered back the premium paid; and further alleged that, prior to his death, he had changed his occupation to one more hazardous than that stated in his application, and that, under the terms of the policy, appellee was, in no event, entitled to recover more than the amount of insurance the premium paid would have procured for one engaged in the more hazardous occupation. In a reply, appellee alleged that the agents of the insurer were fully and truthfully informed as to Murray's duties, before and at the time of the making of the application; and that whatever classification of duties and occupation appeared in the application was written therein by such agent after the insured had given the agent a full and correct statement of his duties; and that, because of such knowledge and the acceptance of premium for the insurance, the insurer was estopped from questioning the statements in the application.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court overruled a motion by appellant for a directed verdict in its favor; and, on motion of the appellee, withdrew from the consideration of the jury the defenses so made by appellant, and instructed the jury to return a verdict for appellee for the full amount of the policy. Error is assigned in various forms on these rulings. The conclusion we have reached, after a careful examination of the record, requires us to consider only the ruling withdrawing the defense that the insured had made a false statement in the application for the policy, in respect to his occupation and duties.
The insured, Robert Murray, the son of appellee, was shot and killed while guarding certain prisoners, whom he had assisted in arresting, at a house some few miles out of Council Bluffs. He was, at the time, employed as a special agent for the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company. He visited the place where he was killed, in company with other special agents of railway companies and certain peace officers, one of whom held a search warrant authorizing a search of the place for intoxicating liquor. He was, at the time, in the line of his employment, and had accompanied the officers in the expectation or hope that the search to be made would reveal property stolen from the railway company, his employer.
At the time the policy in suit was issued, Murray was employed by the Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern Railway Company, operating an electric line. In that employment also, he was known as a special agent. The application for the policy, which became a part of it, and was largely in the form of questions, and answers by the assured, contained an express consent on his part that the falsity of any answer therein should bar a recovery under the policy, if such answer was made with intent to deceive, or materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. The policy also contained a like provision. In the application for the policy in question, Murray stated that he was employed by the Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern Railroad, and that the business of his employer was electric railroading. One of the questions in the application was:
"State fully your occupation--position, nature of business engaged in, and the duties performed?" To that he answered: "Claim agent, office duties, and traveling." These facts are not in dispute.
The application stated that the insured was employed by the electric railway company as a claim agent, and that his duties were office duties and traveling. He was at the time what is known in the railroad business as a special agent. The term special agent is not, in the ordinary meaning of the words, descriptive of the duties pertaining to the position so designated; but it is shown to have in that business a technical and well defined and understood meaning that is not at all suggested by the words themselves, in their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning. Briefly stated, a special agent in the railway service is, as shown by the evidence, a detective, charged with the duty of protecting property belonging to the company or in its possession and securing its return when stolen, and with the investigation of charges of criminal acts committed against the company, its passengers, or property in its custody. His duties are, in substance, those of a peace officer, with respect to the affairs of his employer, and have to do largely with criminal or unlawful acts against the interests of the company. He investigates the facts in other cases that may be referred to him. Under Murray's employment by the electric railway company, he was required to perform the ordinary duties of a special agent. He had a permit to, and did at times, carry a revolver, and was sworn in as a special police officer or deputy sheriff. He was not expected to make arrests, except where an offense was committed in his presence, but to present the facts to the proper peace officers, and to assist them by identifying stolen property and the like. In addition to these duties, he also performed the duties of a claim agent, with limited authority. He investigated claims against the company arising from injuries to passengers, employees, and others, and to property, and had authority to settle certain classes of claims, up to the amount of $ 200. It would seem that, in the ordinary railway service, the positions of special agent and claim agent are entirely separate; but in Murray's case, doubtless owing to the relatively smaller operations of the employing company, they were combined. It is not seriously questioned but that one engaged in the work of a special agent, and having to do largely with violations of the criminal laws, and called upon to deal with criminals, would be engaged in a more hazardous occupation than a claim agent, whose duty was to investigate and settle civil claims for damages against his employer. The term "claim agent" is fairly descriptive of the duty performed. In the schedule of occupations furnished by the appellant to its agents, that of claim agent was classified as an acceptable risk; but the schedule contained no classification of the occupation of special agent. The evidence showed that the appellant insured only persons engaged in occupations classified as preferred or select, and that, if the application had shown that Murray's occupation was that of special agent, it would not have been accepted at the home office of the appellant. Mr. Upham, the agent who took the application, testified that, if he had known that Murray was a special agent for the railway company, he would not have accepted the application for the appellant; that he could have obtained the insurance in some other company.
The application for the policy nowhere disclosed the fact that Murray, in addition to his occupation of claim agent, was also a so-called special agent, or that his duties included those ordinarily pertaining to the position of a special agent in the railway service. The answer appeared to be complete; nothing on the face of the application indicated or suggested that it was not. The statement that he was a claim agent, and engaged in office duties and traveling, was not a full answer to the question in the application. It was not untruthful, in the sense that it contained any positive misstatement; yet it was not a truthful answer to the question asking him to state fully his occupation and the nature of the business engaged in and the duties performed. Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U.S. 183 (30 L.Ed. 644, 7 S.Ct. 500). Murray's knowledge that the answer did not fully state his occupation and duties cannot be doubted. In such case, the intent to deceive will be inferred. Ley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 120 Iowa 203, 94 N.W. 568.
But it is insisted by appellee that the agent of appellant who took the application had full knowledge of Murray's occupation and duties, and gave him the classification of claim agent and that appellant cannot now be heard to question the truthfulness of...
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