Murray v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:09-CV-1822-T-27TBM
| Decision Date | 26 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:09-CV-1822-T-27TBM |
| Parties | JAMES ISIAH MURRAY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, an inmate in a Florida penal institution proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition") challenging convictions for first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a firearm, burglary of a conveyance, and grand theft motor vehicle entered in 2002 by the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Florida (Dkt. 1). Respondent filed a response to the petition (Dkt. 19). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Dkt. 24).
Respondent asserts no challenge to the petition's timeliness. The matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's claims. An evidentiary hearing is not required for the disposition of this matter. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 8(a) (2011).
On July 11, 2001, Petitioner and three co-defendants were indicted by the Grand Jury for first-degree murder, two counts of armed robbery, burglary of a conveyance, and grand theft motor vehicle (Respondent's Exh 21, Vol. I at record pages 17-21). Following a jury trial, the jury foundPetitioner guilty of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a firearm, burglary of a conveyance, and grand theft motor vehicle (Id. at 72-74). On December 5, 2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment on the first-degree murder and two robbery convictions, and five years imprisonment on the burglary of a conveyance and grand theft motor vehicle convictions (Id. at 77-91). The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences on May 28, 2004 (Respondent's Exh 3); Murray v. State, 875 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)[table].
On March 31, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post Conviction Relief pursuant to Rule 3.850, Fla. R. Crim. P. ("3.850 motion") in which he raised nine grounds for relief (Respondent's Exh 2). On May 10, 2006, the post conviction court summarily denied five of the grounds, and directed the State to respond to the remaining grounds (Respondent's Exh 6). The State filed its response on May 26, 2006 (Respondent's Exh 7). On May 30, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion to amend the 3.850 motion with four additional claims (Respondent's Exh 8). On August 14, 2006, the trial court issued an order granting an evidentiary hearing on the remaining grounds of the original motion, and denying the motion to amend (Respondent's Exh 9). On September 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying his amended motion (Respondent's Exh 10). On October 9, 2006, the court granted the motion for reconsideration, summarily denied three of the grounds of the amended motion, reserved ruling on one ground (a cumulative error claim), and directed the State to respond to the remaining ground (Respondent's Exh 11). After the State filed its response (Respondent's Exh 12), the court summarily denied the remaining ground of the amended motion (Respondent's Exh 13). Following an evidentiary hearing on September 17, 2007 (Respondent's Exh 14), on April 15, 2008, the court denied the remaining grounds of the original 3.850 motion, and the ground of the amended motion which the court hadreserved ruling on (Respondent's Exh 15). On July 10, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the post conviction court's denial of postconviction relief (Respondent's Exh 19); Murray v. State, 16 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The appellate court mandate issued on September 11, 2009 (Respondent's Exh 20).
Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition in this Court on September 1, 2009 (Dkt. 1).1 The petition raises fourteen grounds for relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this Court's review of the state court's factual findings is highly deferential. Those findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, the state courts' resolutions of issues of law-including constitutional issues-must be accepted unless they are found to be "contrary to" clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States or involved an "unreasonable application" of such precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). It is not enough that the federal courts believe that the state court was wrong; it must be demonstrated that the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable." Id. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2002).
To have a facially valid claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-parttest requires Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component. Id. at 697.
"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). "Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). As the Richter Court explained:
The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly deferential," and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; . . ." 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also, Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) () (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) () (citation omitted).
Under the procedural default doctrine, "if the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). "The doctrine of procedural default was developed as a means of ensuring that federal habeas petitioners first seek relief in accordance with established state procedures." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 891 (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d at 1313).
Pre-AEDPA decisions from the Supreme Court establish the framework governing procedural default in federal habeas cases. A procedural default will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, Petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the default. "Cause" ordinarily requires Petitioner to demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in the state court. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995).
To show "prejudice," Petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his factual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). Petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Second, Petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception is only available "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception concerns a petitioner's "actual" innocence rather than his "legal" innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). To meet this standard, a petitioner must "show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" of the underlying offense. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). In addition, "'to be credible,' a claim of actual innocence must be based on [new] reliable evidence not...
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