Murray v. Sevier, CIV. A. 94-D-1266-N.
| Decision Date | 08 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 94-D-1266-N.,CIV. A. 94-D-1266-N. |
| Citation | 50 F.Supp.2d 1257 |
| Parties | Bradley E. MURRAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Helen SEVIER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Bobby Lee Cook, Cook & Palmour, Summerville, GA, Robert Blakey, University of Notre Dame Law School, Kresge Law Library, Notre Dame, IN, Randall E. Fisher, Wichita, KA, Paul B. Weeks, III, Wichita, KS, for Bradley Murray, as a member and legal representative of the Bass Anglers Sportsman Society, plaintiffs.
J. Allen Maines, Eric Lang, G. Mark Cole, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Atlanta, GA, N. Lee Cooper, Jayna Partain Lamar, Carl Stanley Burkhalter, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, AL, Joseph B. Haynes, Michael R. Smith, Letitia McDonald Brown, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for Ray W. Scott, Jr., B.A.S.S., Inc., Helen Sevier, Jemison Investment Co., Inc. aka Jemison, Inc., Karl L. Dabbs, James D. Davis, defendants.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court are the following Motions for Summary Judgment:
1. Plaintiff Bradley E. Murray ("Plaintiff") submitted his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Mot.") on February 2, 1998.1 In support of his Motion, Plaintiff also filed both a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("Pl.'s Facts") and a Memorandum of Law ("Pl.'s Br.") on February 2, 1998. On May 6, 1998, Defendant Ray W. Scott ("Scott") filed both a Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response ("Scott's Resp."). Also on May 6, 1998, Defendants Helen Sevier ("Sevier"), Karl L. Dabbs ("Dabbs"), and B.A.S.S., Inc. ("BASS") filed a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response (collectively, "BASS's Response"). Defendants Sevier, Dabbs, and BASS also filed a Combined (1) Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and (2) Statement of Uncontroverted Facts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on May 6, 1997. Defendants Jemison Investment Company ("Jemison") and James Davis ("Davis") filed both a Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and a Statement of Material Facts and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response ("Jemison and Davis' Resp."), on May 6, 1998.
2. Defendants Sevier, Dabbs, and BASS also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 6, 1998. In Support of their Motion, they also filed a Combined (1) Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and (2) Statement of Uncontroverted Facts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("BASS's Facts") on May 6, 1997. They also filed a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("BASS's Br.") on May 6, 1998. Plaintiff filed a Response to BASS's facts on July 13, 1998. Plaintiff also filed an Opposition to Defendant[s] Sevier, Dabbs, and BASS Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response, on July 13, 1998. Defendants filed a Reply on July 17, 1998.
3. Defendants Jemison and Davis also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Statement of Material Facts and Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Jemison & Davis' Br.") on July 7, 1998. Plaintiff filed both a Response to Defendant Jemison Investment Company's and James Davis' Motion for Summary Judgment and an Opposition to Defendants Jemison and Davis' Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response, on August 3, 1998. Defendants Jemison and Davis filed a Reply ("Jemison & Davis' Reply") on August 7, 1998 and a Supplemental Submission of Authority in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on August 27, 1998.
4. Defendant Scott filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Memorandum in Support of Motion on July 7, 1998 ("Def. Scott's Br."). Plaintiff filed both a Response to Defendant Scott's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and an Opposition to Defendant Scott's Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response, on August 3, 1998. Defendant Scott filed a Reply on August 7, 1998 and a Supplemental Submission of Authority in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on August 28, 1998.
After a thorough review of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be denied and that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are due to be granted.
The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Parties heretofore contested venue, but those issues were resolved by the court in previous opinions. See Murray v. Sevier, 156 F.R.D. 235, 251 (D.Kan.1994) (); see also Murray v. Sevier, 993 F.Supp. 1394, 1399 (M.D.Ala.1997) (). Additionally, the Parties have not contested personal jurisdiction subsequent to the case's transfer to the Middle District of Alabama. See generally Murray v. Sevier, 156 F.R.D. at 250 ().
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) ().
Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
In 1967, Defendant Scott left his employment as an insurance agent and began organizing bass fishing tournaments for profit.2 (Scott's May 2, 1998 Aff. ¶¶ 4-6.) Defendant Scott personally borrowed money and sold items of personal property, including his interest in a fishing tackle business and a boat, in order to finance the launching of these fishing tournaments. (Id.)
The first bass fishing tournament was held in June of 1967 at Beaver Lake, Arkansas and was entitled the "All-American Invitational Bass Tournament." (Id. ¶ 4; Scott's Ex. J.) Entrants paid $100 to participate in the tournament, and winners were given cash and trophies as prizes. (Scott's Ex. J.) Over 100...
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