Murray v. Smith
| Decision Date | 17 May 1912 |
| Docket Number | 17,719 - (233) |
| Citation | 136 N.W. 5,117 Minn. 490 |
| Parties | FRED H. MURRAY v. WALTER J. SMITH and Others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Petition to the district court for Ramsey county for an injunction perpetually restraining defendants as state officers from paying out funds of the state in constructing a certain rural highway under the provisions of Laws 1911, c 254. From an order, Olin B. Lewis, J., sustaining defendants' demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
State rural highway act valid.
Chapter 254, Laws 1911, providing for the establishment and maintenance of highways outside of cities and villages, and for the assessment of one-fourth the cost thereof on land specially benefited, is valid, under section 1, article 9, of the state Constitution, which requires taxes to be uniform upon the same class of subjects, but permits the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to lay and collect assessments for local improvements upon property benefited thereby, without regard to cash valuation.
Thomas McDermott, for appellant.
Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, and William J. Stevenson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.
This action was brought by plaintiff, a taxpayer, to enjoin defendants, as state officers, from paying out funds of the state in constructing a rural highway in Pennington county under the provisions of chapter 254, p. 352, Laws 1911. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiff appealed.
The sole question involved is the constitutionality of the law under which defendants propose to pay the money of the state in aid of the construction of the highway. The only feature of the law that is assailed is that providing for the assessment of lands benefited by the highway for one-fourth of the cost thereof.
Section 1 of chapter 254 provides for the construction or improvement of highways by county boards, to be known as "state rural highways," upon the approval of a petition for the same by the county board and the state highway commission, and that "the expense therefor shall be borne one-fourth by local assessment, one-fourth by the county, and one-half by the state."
Section 2 provides that such highways shall be constructed or improved by a procedure identical with the proceeding prescribed by sections 3 to 52, inclusive, of chapter 230, [pp. 305-337] Laws 1905 [R.L. Supp. 1909, §§ 2651 -- 45 to 2651 -- 95], the drainage law, so far as the same may be made applicable to the construction or improvement of highways, to the raising of money therefor, and to the assessment of benefits, one-fourth only of the cost of "state rural highways" to be met by assessment. These sections of the drainage law, in so far as applicable, are made a part of this act.
By turning to these provisions in chapter 230, Laws 1905, we find that the county board can act only upon a petition signed by six or more of the landowners whose land is liable to be assessed for the highway, setting forth the necessity thereof and that it will be of public benefit or promote the public health. The county board must approve the petition, as must the state highway commission. The assessment district is not limited, but the viewers determine the amount of benefits to the lands, to the aggregate of not more than one-fourth of the cost of the highway. Their report is made to the board, and after notice and hearing it rests with the board to determine whether the benefits have been duly assessed, and to confirm the report and to establish the highway. The assessments are payable in ten annual equal installments, with six per cent interest. An appeal lies to the district court.
We have stated so much of the law for the purpose of making clear the precise question involved, and to show that the rights of landowners are well safeguarded.
Does the fact that one-fourth of the cost of the highway is assessed upon lands deemed specially benefited make the law in violation of section 1 of article 9 of the Constitution of this state, which provides that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. "* * * provided, that the legislature may, by general law or special act, authorize municipal corporations to levy assessments for local improvements upon * * * property benefited * * * without regard to a cash valuation?" We have held that counties are municipal corporations, within the meaning of the constitutional provision, for the purpose of levying and collecting the assessments provided for by drainage laws. Dowlan v. County of Sibley, 36 Minn. 430, 31 N.W. 517; Lien v. Board of Commrs. of Norman County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N.W. 1094; McGee v. Board of Commrs. of Hennepin County, 84 Minn. 472, 88 N.W. 6. There is no difficulty in extending this ruling to the present case.
The crucial question here is whether a rural highway is or may be a special benefit to neighboring lands, as distinguished from a general benefit to the public. Plaintiff relies upon Sperry v. Flygare, 80 Minn. 325, 83 N.W. 177, 49 L.R.A. 757, 81 Am. St. 261, as answering this question conclusively in the negative. The law held unconstitutional in the Sperry case was clearly vicious. The entire cost of the highway was assessed upon lands within the prescribed limit of one mile on either side, whether the costs exceeded the benefits or not. The present law assesses one-fourth of the cost upon lands deemed specially benefited, without defining the limits of the assessment district. The 1895 law worked a great hardship upon the farmers of the state; it might easily be confiscatory. The present law is not burdensome; but one-fourth of the costs is assessed, and that is payable in ten installments. We have no hesitation in saying that the law under attack in this case is meritorious, and that it should be sustained, unless it is entirely clear that lands outside of cities and villages can receive no special benefit by the construction and maintenance of good roads.
Though Sperry v. Flygare dealt with a statute vitally different from the one before us, though particular stress is in that case laid on the fact that the law imposed the entire cost on adjoining lands, without regard to the lands benefited by the highway, yet it may well be considered as...
To continue reading
Request your trial