Murray v. State

Decision Date07 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 1D12–5868.,1D12–5868.
Citation133 So.3d 557
PartiesKenyeta T. MURRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Bracey, III, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The State charged Appellant, Kenyeta Murray, with one count of adoption fraud and two counts of grand theft. Simply, Appellant offered to give up the same unborn child for adoption to multiple individuals.Appellant took money and other items from each, knowing she was not going to let either adopt her child. And, prosecutors claimed Appellant had done this before—at least once, if not twice.

Appellant entered an open plea of guilty. Pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, Appellant scored a nonstate prison sanction. Pursuant to the same section, though, the trial court made the factual finding Appellant “could present a danger to the public.” With that finding, the court sentenced her to three years' imprisonment.

Appellant now challenges her sentence, claiming it violates the mandates of Apprendi1/ Blakely2 because the trial judge, instead of a jury, made the written finding which increased her sentence from nonstate prison to three years' imprisonment. We disagree because (i) Appellant waived her right to rely upon Apprendi/ Blakely, and (ii) the judge's written findings were sufficient to justify the conclusion Appellant “could present a danger to the public.”

As an initial matter, a defendant may waive her rights under Apprendi.Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531. In the context of plea deals, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.... If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Waiver is the “voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Williams v. State, 932 So.2d 1233, 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); see Black's Law Dictionary waiver (9th ed. 2009) (waiver is the “voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or advantage”).

Here, Appellant's counsel told the judge he informed Appellant the sentence was entirely up to the court. Then, the judge made it clear, and Appellant understood, “there will be no trial in this case.” Appellant stated she discussed her potential ten-year prison exposure with her attorney and discussed the State's outstanding two-year imprisonment offer. Appellant signed and acknowledged understanding her plea form, which similarly advised Appellant there would be no trial. And importantly, the court explained, we will have a full sentencing hearing.... But, ma'am, do you understand, that your sentence will be entirely within my discretion, ma'am, do you understand that.” Further, the judge questioned Appellant on whether she had discussed this premise with her counsel; Appellant stated she had.

Moreover, the court discussed Appellant scoring no prison time and that the Court would have to do a factual finding for an upward deviation,” and the Court does have to have factual findings, which the Court, if it finds there is a legal and factual basis can do.” And finally, that “if the Court found there was a legal and factual basis to do so, the Court could” upwardly depart, and that “if the Court found there was both a legal and factual basis, it could do an upward deviation.” The court even stopped the proceedings to make Appellant's counsel “double verify” that she discussed the matter with Appellant and everyone understood. Consistently and repeatedly, the court specificallyexplained it would be making findings, it would be performing all further tasks, and it would be responsible, fully, for Appellant's sentence and...

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3 cases
  • Woods v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 24, 2017
    ...issue side-stepped and remain unaddressed. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 161 So.3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ; Murray v. State, 133 So.3d 557, 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; Sprott v. State, 99 So.3d 634, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ; Jones v. State, 71 So.3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ; see al......
  • Reed v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 2016
    ...no court in Florida has yet reached the issue. See Murphy v. State, 161 So.3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ; Murray v. State, 133 So.3d 557, 558–59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ; Sprott v. State, 99 So.3d 634, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ; Jones v. State, 71 So.3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). But see......
  • Agenor v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2019
    ...stipulate—that the defendant actually possessed a " ‘firearm’ or ‘destructive device.’ " § 775.087(2)(a)(1) ; see Murray v. State, 133 So.3d 557, 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("In the context of plea deals, ‘the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either......

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