Murray v. State
| Decision Date | 23 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-109,92-109 |
| Citation | 855 P.2d 350 |
| Parties | Donald MURRAY, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel; Bill Combs, Asst. Public Defender; and Donald L. Fuller, Legal Intern, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen.; Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen.; Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Paula Messer, Student Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program, for appellee.
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.
Appellant Donald Murray appeals from his conviction for involuntary manslaughter in violation of Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-105(a)(ii) and (b) (1988).
We affirm as modified.
Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether wilful[ ] and wanton conduct by law enforcement agents in purposely failing to inform Mr. Murray of the reasons for his arrest in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 4(c) invalidates the arrest and requires suppression of statements attained during the illegal arrest?
II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter?
III. Whether the trial judge failed to make a determination of defendant's ability to pay prior to ordering restitution and assessing penalties to be paid to the Wyoming victim's compensation fund?
Appellant and the victim worked together on an oil rig located near Granger, Wyoming. The men were good friends who had known each other since 1983. On September 30, 1991, they completed their shift on the oil rig at approximately 6:30 p.m. They began drinking shortly thereafter, and eventually went to the Cowboy Bar in Mountain View. While they were at the Cowboy Bar, the victim and Appellant started arguing about one of their co-workers. Appellant left the bar before the argument could escalate into a physical confrontation. He proceeded by himself to Pete's Bar where he ate pizza and continued drinking. At about 10:30 p.m., Appellant drove home.
At eleven o'clock that same evening, the victim had his cousin drive him to Appellant's house so that he could retrieve his work clothes which were in the back of Appellant's truck. As the victim's cousin drove down Appellant's driveway, she observed a flash from a gun barrel. While continuing on down the driveway, she saw and heard additional shots being fired and noticed Appellant standing on his porch holding a handgun. The victim exited the vehicle, identified himself, and explained to Appellant that he just wanted to get his work clothes. Appellant yelled " '[g]et off of my property' " to the victim. He fired three additional shots from his porch, two of which landed near the victim's feet. The victim again identified himself and started walking toward Appellant's truck. Appellant left his porch and walked toward the victim until they were approximately six feet apart. The victim said: " 'Just let me get my work clothes and we'll leave.' " Appellant repeated the command to get off his property. The victim said, " " turned around, and had started walking back towards the car when Appellant fired three or four additional shots. One of the bullets ricocheted off a rock and passed through the victim's right thigh, severing his femoral artery and femoral vein. The victim also suffered a relatively minor bullet wound to his right buttock. The doctor who performed the autopsy was unable to determine whether the two wounds were the result of a single gunshot or multiple gunshots.
The victim hopped back to the car after being shot. His cousin drove him to Pete's Bar which was located approximately two miles from Appellant's house. The victim's cousin and one of the bartenders placed the victim on the pavement in the bar's parking lot and elevated his leg with a stool. Another bartender telephoned 911. The ambulance arrived about half an hour after the 911 call had been placed. When the ambulance arrived, the victim's vital signs were normal, and his level of consciousness indicated that he was in "great shape." The emergency medical technicians thought that the victim had lost only a minimal amount of blood. In reality, he had lost a massive quantity of blood during the time that it took to drive from Appellant's house to Pete's Bar. The victim lost consciousness shortly before reaching the hospital, his breathing became difficult, and his pupils dilated. The EMTs and the emergency room physicians were unable to resuscitate him.
Appellant was arrested and initially charged with second-degree murder. The deputy county and prosecuting attorney subsequently reduced the charge to involuntary manslaughter. A jury found Appellant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and the court sentenced him to serve a term of not less than eight years nor more than fifteen years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Appellant filed a timely appeal with this Court.
Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed any statements he made while he was under arrest because the law enforcement officers violated W.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(3) (revised effective March 24, 1992). Before its revision in 1992, that rule provided in pertinent part:
(c) Execution or service; and return.
....
(3) Manner.--The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, but upon request he shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant has been issued.
The evidence and testimony are consistent with Appellant's claim that the officers did not comply with W.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(3)'s requirements. Early in the morning of October 1, 1991, several officers from different law enforcement agencies surrounded Appellant's house. When Appellant emerged from his house, Steve Johnson, an officer with the Evanston police department, handcuffed him and took him into custody. As Officer Johnson was handcuffing him, Appellant asked, " 'What the hell's going on?' " and " " Officer Johnson told Appellant that he was under arrest and to "shut up." Officer Johnson and the officer who transported Appellant to the jail testified that they did not inform Appellant of the second-degree murder charge and that they did not advise him that an arrest warrant had been issued. 1 The officers explained that they knew a homicide had occurred and an arrest warrant had been issued for Appellant but that they were unaware of the precise charge.
Kyle Lamb, a detention officer with the Uinta County sheriff's department, who booked Appellant into the jail, also failed to inform him of the second-degree murder charge and of the existence of an arrest warrant. Appellant asked, among other things, what the charge was, and Officer Lamb told him that he did not know. The officer testified that he did not learn of the specific charge against Appellant until the end of the booking process when he received a facsimile of the arrest warrant. Rex Gaylord, an investigator with the Uinta County sheriff's office, was also present when the facsimile arrived. According to Officer Lamb, Investigator Gaylord instructed him not to advise Appellant of the charge as he would inform Appellant. Investigator Gaylord testified that he never instructed Officer Lamb not to advise Appellant of the charge.
At one point in the booking process, Appellant also asked Investigator Gaylord to inform him of the charge. Investigator Gaylord told him that they would discuss it in a few minutes. The investigator explained that he did not discuss the charge when asked because he wanted to preserve possible evidence of gun shot residue which may have been on Appellant's clothes before talking to him. Approximately ten minutes after Appellant asked what he was charged with, Investigator Gaylord took him to the interview room where they met Kevin Smith, an investigator from the county attorney's office. Investigator Smith immediately advised Appellant of his Miranda rights. Appellant waived those rights and proceeded to offer a detailed description of the prior evening's events. Just over fourteen minutes into his statement, Investigator Smith informed Appellant for the first time that the victim had died and that he was charged with second-degree murder. Investigator Smith's reason for not immediately informing Appellant of the second-degree murder charge was that he wanted to discover Appellant's motive and intent in shooting the victim.
Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress the statements he made to the officers. He based his motion on, among other things, the officers' violation of W.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(3). The trial judge agreed with Appellant that the officers did not fully comply with the rule. However, he found that suppressing the evidence was not the appropriate remedy because the officers violated a procedural rule rather than Appellant's constitutional rights. On appeal, we will uphold the district court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress unless the denial was clearly erroneous. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo.1988).
Appellant argues that the officers illegally arrested him when they failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(3) and that all subsequent statements should have been suppressed as being fruits of that illegal arrest. Appellant finds support for his claim in several United States Supreme Court decisions which hold that a defendant's statements made following an illegal arrest are not admissible unless the prosecution can show "not only that the statements meet the Fifth Amendment...
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