Murray v. Town of N. Castle

• Decision Date: 02 February 2022
• Docket Number: Index 68175/17,2020-04690,2020-04691
• Parties: Dennis Murray, respondent, v. Town of North Castle, etc., appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Dennis Murray, respondent,
v.
Town of North Castle, etc., appellant.

Nos. 2020-04690, 2020-04691

Index No. 68175/17

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

February 2, 2022

Argued - October 15, 2021

D68219 T/htr

APPEALS by the defendant, in an action, inter alia, for declaratory relief and to permanently enjoin the defendant from maintaining a disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff, from two orders of the Supreme Court (Joan B. Lefkowitz, J.), both dated May 12, 2020, and entered in Westchester County. The first order, insofar as appealed from, (1) granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action, for a judgment declaring (a) that the defendant lacked the lawful authority to prefer the underlying disciplinary charges against the plaintiff and subject him to its disciplinary proceeding, and (b) that the plaintiff is immediately entitled to receive all retiree benefits set forth in a certain collective bargaining agreement, including health care coverage, payment for dental coverage, and lump sum payments for sick leave, vacation, and compensatory time accruals, (2) granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action, to permanently enjoin the defendant from pursuing disciplinary charges against the plaintiff, and (3) granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on so much of the remaining causes of action as sought injunctive relief. The second order denied the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and, in effect, for a declaration in its favor.

Keane & Beane, P.C., White Plains, NY (Jaclyn G. Goldberg and Lance H. Klein of counsel), for appellant.

Gould & Berg, LLP, White Plains, NY (Kim P. Berg of counsel), for respondent.

CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P. ROBERT J. MILLER LARA J. GENOVESI DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.

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OPINION & ORDER

MILLER, J.

We are called upon in this case to navigate the interplay between various forms of equitable relief grounded in common law doctrine, principles of modern practice under CPLR article 78 and the Municipal Home Rule Law, and certain state-level policies regarding the right to collective bargaining and the authority of public officials over law enforcement. These issues have been raised as a result of the plaintiff's complaint, the central aim of which is to prevent the plaintiff's employer from holding him accountable for the serious disciplinary infractions that he allegedly committed in the course of his official duties as a police officer.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the equitable powers and legal doctrines that he seeks to invoke in this litigation do not shield him from the consequences of his actions. The orders reviewed on these appeals nevertheless evince confusion over the applicable legal principles. Given this confusion, and the gravity of the underlying subject matter, we undertake to provide additional clarity by setting forth our analysis in greater detail. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to any of the various forms of relief sought in the complaint.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a Detective Sergeant employed by the Town of North Castle Police Department, commenced this action against the Town for injunctive and declaratory relief, and to recover damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that the Town improperly preferred disciplinary charges against him after he had applied to the New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System (hereinafter the NYSLRS) for retirement benefits. The plaintiff contended that the NYSLRS had the exclusive authority to determine when the plaintiff's employment was terminated, and that the Town lacked the authority to subject him to disciplinary proceedings after the NYSLRS had certified the effective date of his retirement.

The plaintiff also alleged that, as a result of the pending disciplinary proceeding, the Town had refused to grant him certain other rights and benefits as set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the CBA) between the Town and the North Castle Patrolmen Benevolent Association (hereinafter the PBA). The complaint asserted five causes of action against the Town,

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which is the only defendant named in this action.

The first cause of action sought declaratory relief (see CPLR 3001), including a declaration that the Town's disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff is "null and void" because the Town did not have the lawful authority to prefer any disciplinary charges or take any disciplinary action against the plaintiff after his application for retirement benefits became effective. The first cause of action also sought a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to receive all retiree benefits set forth in the CBA, including health care coverage, payment for dental coverage, and lump sum payments for sick leave, vacation, and compensatory time accruals.

The second cause of action sought to permanently enjoin and prohibit the Town from pursuing any disciplinary charges against the plaintiff, and from maintaining books or records that reflected any such disciplinary charges.

The third cause of action alleged that the plaintiff was entitled to certain medical and dental benefits under the CBA, and sought to permanently enjoin the Town from withholding those benefits from the plaintiff. The third cause of action also sought to recover "incidental damages" for sums allegedly advanced by the plaintiff to cover certain medical and dental expenses.

The fourth cause of action alleged that the plaintiff had been denied access to certain benefits by the New York State Deferred Compensation Plan as a result of communications made by the Town regarding the disciplinary charges that had been preferred against the plaintiff. The fourth cause of action sought to permanently enjoin the Town from making any such communications.

Finally, the fifth cause of action sought to permanently enjoin the Town from refusing to pay him lump sum payments for sick leave, vacation, and compensatory time accruals, to which he was allegedly entitled under the CBA. The fifth cause of action alleged that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages to compensate him for the Town's refusal to honor those provisions of the CBA.

The Town interposed an answer in which it alleged that the plaintiff, during the course of his employment as a police officer with the Town, had engaged in "serious and significant misconduct and incompetence in the course of his official duties." The plaintiff was notified in a hand-delivered letter dated September 16, 2016, that he was being placed on administrative leave, "effective immediately," while an investigation was conducted by the Town's Chief of Police

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(hereinafter the Chief of Police). The plaintiff was ordered to turn over his duty weapon and his police department shield, and he was barred from police department facilities and directed to refrain from engaging in any law enforcement activities.

After he was placed on administrative leave and notified of the investigation into his official conduct, the plaintiff, without giving notice to the Town, applied for retirement with the NYSLRS. The plaintiff later testified that his decision to retire was based, at least in part, on his receipt of the letter which had placed him on administrative leave.

On October 4, 2016, the plaintiff's retirement became effective with respect to the NYSLRS. On or about the next day, the Town received a letter from NYSLRS indicating that the plaintiff had applied for retirement with the NYSLRS effective October 4, 2016. Since the Town had not received any prior notification of the plaintiff's decision to retire, the Town, as a part of its standard practice, deemed the letter from NYSLRS a "written resignation" within the meaning of civil service rules governing the termination of service.

The Town took the position that it was authorized to disregard any written resignation submitted by the plaintiff and pursue the disciplinary charges that were under investigation at the time he attempted to unilaterally terminate his employment. Accordingly, after repeated attempts to interview the plaintiff had failed, the Chief of Police formally preferred disciplinary charges against the plaintiff on October 10, 2016. As relevant here, the plaintiff was alleged to have "engaged in an intimate sexual relationship with a [named] subordinate officer . . . that [a]ffected the performance of [his] duties." The plaintiff was charged with misconduct (50 specifications), incompetence (24 specifications), and insubordination (6 specifications) (hereinafter collectively the initial disciplinary charges). Additional allegations were subsequently set forth in amended disciplinary charges (hereinafter collectively the amended disciplinary charges).

The Town argued that the disciplinary proceeding was specifically authorized by state and local law, that its authority to subject the plaintiff to its disciplinary process was independent of any determination by the NYSLRS, and that the plaintiff could not evade responsibility for his official misconduct. The Town asserted that the plaintiff's eligibility for benefits under the terms of the CBA could be affected by the outcome of the pending disciplinary proceeding. The Town also contended, inter alia, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies that were available to him.

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The plaintiff subsequently moved, by order to show cause, to enjoin the Town from prosecuting the disciplinary charges proffered against him pending resolution of the action. In an order dated October 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the motion and issued a preliminary injunction. The...