Murray v. Watervliet City School Dist.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1987
• Citation: 130 A.D.2d 830,515 N.Y.S.2d 150
• Parties: , 39 Ed. Law Rep. 741 Suzanne MURRAY, Respondent, v. WATERVLIET CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, and Marianne Rings, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 150

515 N.Y.S.2d 150

130 A.D.2d 830, 39 Ed. Law Rep. 741

Suzanne MURRAY, Respondent, v. WATERVLIET CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant and Marianne Rings, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

May 7, 1987.

Hesson, Ford & Whalen (Michael J. Hutter, Albany, of counsel), for appellant.

Justice & Justice (Stuart J. Justice, Albany, of counsel), for Suzanne Murray, respondent.

Ainsworth, Sullivan, Tracy, Knauf, Warner & Ruslander (Dennis W. Habel, Albany, of counsel), for Marianne Rings, respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and WEISS, MIKOLL, LEVINE and HARVEY, JJ.

LEVINE, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Doran, J.), entered February 10, 1986 in Albany County, which, inter alia, denied defendant Watervliet City School District's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.

Plaintiff commenced the instant suit seeking damages for a slanderous statement allegedly made by defendant Marianne Rings, a teacher, to plaintiff's daughter's seventh grade reading class. The substance of the alleged statement was that plaintiff had been a student of Rings' when she attended junior or senior high school, but had become pregnant and left school prior to the completion of her education. Plaintiff also sought damages from Rings' employer, defendant Watervliet City School District, under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The school district moved for summary judgment claiming that Rings was not acting in the course of and in furtherance of her employment at the time of the alleged statement, and Rings cross-moved for summary judgment. Special Term denied both motions. This appeal by the school district ensued. We now affirm.

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer may be held vicariously liable for a tort committed by an employee in the course of performance of his or her duties (Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 302, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 391 N.E.2d 1278), and a school district as employer is held to the level of accountability applicable to a private person engaged in business (see, Domino v. Mercurio, 17 A.D.2d 342, 346-350, 234 N.Y.S.2d 1011, affd. 13 N.Y.2d 922, 244 N.Y.S.2d 69, 193 N.E.2d 893; see also, Cherney v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of White Plains, 31 A.D.2d 764, 297 N.Y.S.2d 668; Shaw v. Village of Hempstead, 20 A.D.2d 663, 246 N.Y.S.2d 557; Gordon v. State of New York, 57 Misc.2d 731, 738-739, 293 N.Y.S.2d 376). The actionable wrongs for which the employer may be held liable include slander (Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, 67 N.Y.2d 369, 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d 965, 494 N.E.2d 70; Palmeri v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 133 N.Y. 261, 265-266, 30 N.E. 1001; O'Brien v. Bates Corp., 211 App.Div. 743, 744, 208 N.Y.S. 110). Accordingly, if Rings was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the alleged slander, the school district may be held vicariously liable for her conduct.

An act falls within the scope of an employee's duties when the employee is "doing his master's work, no matter how irregularly, or with what disregard of instructions" (Jones v. Weigand, 134 App.Div. 644, 645, 119 N.Y.S. 441; see, Riviello v. Waldron, supra, 47 N.Y.2d p. 302, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 391 N.E.2d 1278; see also, Island Associated Coop. v. Hartmann, 118 A.D.2d 830, 500 N.Y.S.2d 315). On the other hand, there is no respondeat superior liability for "torts committed for personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer's business" (Island Associated Coop. v. Hartmann, supra, p. 831, 500 N.Y.S.2d 315). The Court of Appeals in Riviello identified the factors to be considered on the scope of employment issue as:

* * * the connection between the time, place and occasion for the act; the history of the relationship between employer and employee as spelled out in actual practice; whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee; the extent of departure from normal methods of performance; and whether the specific act was one that the employer could reasonably have anticipated * * * (Riviello v. Waldron, supra, 47 N.Y.2d p. 303, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 391 N.E.2d 1278 [citations omitted] ).

The record contains evidence from which it could be found that the statement by Rings was made during a classroom discussion of a reading assignment. It can also be inferred from the record that...