Mustafa v. Yuma Reg'l Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 11 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | CV-21-00161-PHX-ROS |
| Parties | Yulius Mustafa, Plaintiff, v. Yuma Regional Medical Center, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Plaintiff Yulius Mustafa (“Plaintiff” or “Dr Mustafa”) has sued Defendants Yuma Regional Medical Center (“YRMC”) and two of YRMC's employees Dr. Bharat Magu and Dr. Robert Trenschel (“individual defendants”). Plaintiff argues he qualified as an employee of YRMC under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C § 4311, and that Defendants thus violated USERRA and the Arizona Employment Protection Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(iii), by terminating Plaintiff's employment while he was deployed with the United States Army. Defendants argue Plaintiff was an independent contractor, rendering those two statutes irrelevant. Pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's employment classification, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all five of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons below, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, and Defendants' is granted.
BACKGROUND[1]
YRMC operates a hospital in Yuma, Arizona. (Complaint, Doc. 1 ¶ 11; Answer, Doc. 6 ¶ 11). At time relevant to this suit, Dr. Magu was the Chief Medical Officer and Dr. Trenschel was the Chief Executive Officer of YRMC. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 6 ¶¶ 3-4). Plaintiff, a hospitalist who performed work for YRMC through a variety of agreements, serves as a member of the Army Reserves. (Doc. 1 ¶ 14; Doc. 6 ¶ 14).
From 2005 to 2016, Plaintiff worked as a hospitalist for YRMC through agreements with various staffing agencies. (Doc. 30 at 72 (Aff. of Dr. Mustafa)). As relevant here, Plaintiff's final agreement with a separate staffing agency company ended in 2016. When that agreement ended, Plaintiff had a choice either to be identified as an employee of YRMC or as an independent contractor. (Doc. 30 at 42-43 (Mustafa Deposition at 58-59) (“Mustafa Depo.”); Doc. 31-6 at 14-16 (YRMC 30(b)(6) Deposition at 55-57) (“YRMC Depo.”)). Plaintiff discussed his options with an accountant, who advised him that a 1099 Independent Contractor arrangement was more beneficial for tax purposes than a traditional W2 employee arrangement. (Mustafa Depo. at 84-85). Plaintiff ultimately opted to be labeled an independent contractor, and he formed a single member Professional Limited Liability Company named 1ID Vanguard, PLLC for the purpose of entering into an agreement with YRMC. (See Mustafa Depo. at 70).
Plaintiff and YRMC entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (“ICA”) on October 1, 2016. (Doc. 30 at 161; Doc. 31-8). The ICA specified the arrangement between Plaintiff and YRMC was “non-exclusive in nature.” (ICA at § 1.1). The ICA also specified that Plaintiff had the “right to establish the days and hours during which [he would] provide . . . services” but that his schedule was “subject to approval by [Defendants].” (ICA at § 1.2). Plaintiff would not be “guarantee[d]” a minimum number of hours, shifts, or patients at YRMC. Id. Plaintiff would be paid on an hourly basis. (ICA at § 2.1). Plaintiff's patients' medical records, along with “all fees and funds owing or collected for Services provided by [Plaintiff]” and “any other monies or accounts receivable for Services” would be “the property of YRMC.” (ICA at § 1.5). Additionally, YRMC would (ICA at § 1.7). YRMC agreed to provide Plaintiff with professional liability insurance beginning on his first day of work and ending when the ICA terminated. (ICA at § 3.1).
Critically, the ICA stated its term “commence[d] on October 1, 2016” and would “continue through a term mutually agreed upon, but not longer than three (3) years, unless YRMC and [Plaintiff] agree[d] mutually to amend the terms.” (ICA at § 4.1). The ICA specified Plaintiff was an “independent contractor.” (ICA at § 8.1). Lastly, the ICA stated, “Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to dictate Physician's practice of medicine, delivery of direct patient care or independent judgment,” and that Plaintiff “shall have complete control over the diagnosis and treatment of patients.” (ICA at § 11). However, Plaintiff's work with patients had to “be consistent with any written rules and regulations promulgated by YRMC and, if applicable, the facility(s) dealing with the general treatment of patients.” Id.
In July 2019, Plaintiff was deployed by the Army to the Middle East for approximately 8 months. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15). On October 1, 2019, by its own terms, the Independent Contractor Agreement between YRMC and Plaintiff expired. (ICA at § 4.1). On February 27, 2020, Plaintiff learned his deployment would end soon. (Doc 35-1 at 33). On February 29, Plaintiff emailed YRMC staff to notify them he would be returning to work as soon as March. (Doc. 35-1 at 35). YRMC staff met with Plaintiff in early March 2020 and informed him the ICA had expired a few months earlier, and they would not be renewing the contract. (Doc. 35-1 at 40). Neither individual defendant was present at that meeting. Id.
Plaintiff filed suit in January of 2021, asserting five claims: (i) violation of USERRA for failing to reemploy Plaintiff after his military deployment; (ii) violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(vii) for terminating Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for his military service; (iii) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iv) aiding and abetting; and (v) tortious interference with a business expectancy or contractual relationship. Plaintiff seeks, among other things, an order declaring Defendants' actions were unlawful and requiring Defendants to place him “in the position he would have occupied but for Defendants' unlawful actions,” and compensatory, punitive, statutory, and liquidated damages.
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party must then point to specific facts establishing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court should not weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 248.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, “the court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” Echanove v. Allstate Ins. Co., 752 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1107-08 (D. Ariz. 2010) (quoting Fair Housing council of Riverside Cty. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)).
USERRA was enacted in 1994 “to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result from such service.” Belaustegui v. Int'l Longshore and Warehouse Union, 36 F.4th 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1)). The statute thus requires “the prompt reemployment” of eligible servicemembers upon the completion of their military service, and it further prohibits “discrimination against persons because of their service in the uniformed services.” 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(2)-(3). Indeed, “[a]n employer violates USERRA if an employee's membership or obligation for service in the military is a motivating factor in an employer's adverse employment action taken against the employee, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership or obligation.” Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2008).
“USERRA does not provide protections for an independent contractor.” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.44(a). Thus, a threshold question is whether Plaintiff was an employee protected by USERRA or an independent contractor who was not. The USERRA regulations establish “[i]n deciding whether an individual is an [employee or an] independent contractor, the following factors need to be considered:
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