Mustard v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Decision Date: 06 February 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-cv-163 (BAH)
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER A. MUSTARD et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

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CHRISTOPHER A. MUSTARD et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-163 (BAH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

February 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, CHIEF JUDGE

This action arises out of the bombing on June 25, 1996, of the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia which housed United States military personnel. Pls.' Complaint (“Compl.”) at 1. Nineteen U.S. Air Force personnel were killed, and hundreds more were injured including servicemember plaintiff Christopher Mustard. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. The five remaining plaintiffs are family members of two injured servicemember plaintiffs in Aceto v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No 19-cv-464 (BAH), 2020 WL 619925 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2020). See also Compl. ¶ 41. These six plaintiffs allege that defendant, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is liable under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FISA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A for “provid[ing] material support and resources[,] . . . which caused, enabled, and facilitated the terrorist attack at the Khobar Towers,” Compl. ¶ 43. Although plaintiffs have complied with the FSIA's requirements for service on defendant, Iran has failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend against this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4); Return of Service/Aff. of Summons and Compl. Executed, ECF No. 14; Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 16. Plaintiffs now seek default judgment against defendant as to liability and damages. Pls.'

Mot. Entry Default J. & Take Judicial Notice of Evid. in Prior Related Cases (“Pl.s' Mot.”), ECF No. 18. For the reasons detailed below, plaintiffs' motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Prior decisions of this Court have found defendant liable for the Khobar Towers bombing: Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Heiser I”), 466 F.Supp.2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.); Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Akins I”), 332 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018) (Howell, C.J.); Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1376 (BAH), 2019 WL 2717888 (D.D.C. June 27, 2019) (Howell, C.J.); Aceto, 2020 WL 619925 (Howell, C.J.); Christie v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-1289 (BAH), 2020 WL 3606273 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020) (Howell, C.J.); Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Akins II”), 549 F.Supp.3d 104 (D.D.C. 2021) (Howell, C.J.); Blank v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-3645 (BAH), 2021 WL 3021450 (D.D.C. July 17, 2021) (Howell, C.J.); Ackley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 20-cv-621 (BAH), 2022 WL 3354720 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022) (Howell, C.J.).

In Blais and Heiser I, the Court heard evidence and witness testimony. See Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 46 n.4; Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d at 250. In Heiser I alone, the offering of evidence took seventeen days, which included examination of witnesses, including seven expert witnesses. See 466 F.Supp.2d at 250.^[1] Rimkus, Akins, and Schooley concluded that judicial notice of the findings of fact in Blais and Heiser I was appropriate, see Rimkus, 750 F.Supp.2d at 172-73; Akins I, 332 F.Supp.3d at 11; Schooley, 2019 WL 2717888, at *2, and plaintiffs here request that this Court “take judicial notice of prior findings of fact and supporting evidence imposing liability under Section 1605A (and its predecessor, Section 1605(a)(7)) on Iran for providing material support and resources to the terrorists who attacked the Khobar Towers complex on June 25, 1996.” Pls.' Mem. Supp. Mot. for Entry of Default J. & Take Judicial Notice of Evid. in Prior Related Cases (“Pls.' Mem.”) at 7, ECF No. 18-1.

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to “judicially notice” adjudicative facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute because” they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b).^[2] Rule 201 is used frequently to notice judicially factual evidence developed in other FSIA proceedings “involving the same conduct by the same defendants,” Akins I, 332 F.Supp.3d at 11, “even when those proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge,” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F.Supp.3d 186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F.Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009)). This avoids “the formality of having that evidence reproduced.” Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Oveissi II”), 879 F.Supp.2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding courts permitted “in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation”); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F.Supp.2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (taking “judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases”). Taking judicial notice of prior findings “does not conclusively establish the facts found in those cases” in the later FSIA case. Foley, 249 F.Supp.3d at 191. Rather, “based on judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases[,] . . . courts may reach their own independent findings of fact.” Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F.Supp.2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Rimkus, 750 F.Supp.2d at 172. In fact, “courts in FSIA litigation have adopted a middle-ground approach that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation-without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced-to reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them.” Rimkus, 750 F.Supp.2d at 172.^[3]

This Court is persuaded that this approach is both “efficient and sufficiently protective of the absent defendant['s] interests,” Akins I, 332 F.Supp.3d at 11, and will therefore grant plaintiffs' request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Ackley, 2022 WL 3354720, Blank, 2021 WL 3021450, Akins II, 549 F.Supp.3d 104, Christie, 2020 WL 3606273, Aceto, 2020 WL 619925, Schooley, 2019 WL 2717888, Akins I, 332 F.Supp.3d 1, Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.), Rimkus, 750 F.Supp.2d 163, Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d 229, and Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d 40. See Akins I, 332 F.Supp.3d at 11 (stating that factual evidence developed in other cases “involving the same conduct by the same defendants is admissible and may be relied upon in this case”). The evidence regarding the Khobar Towers bombing is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.

A. The Attack on Khobar Towards

The Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia “housed the coalition forces,” including the U.S. military forces, “charged with monitoring compliance with [United Nations] security council resolutions.” Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 47. About 10 minutes before 10:00 p.m. on June 25, 1996, “a large gasoline tanker truck pulled up” and parked “alongside the perimeter wall of the Khobar Towers complex.” Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d at 252; see also Compl. ¶ 40. Security guards near the top of one of the towers, Building 131, “started to give warnings about the unusual vehicle location,” but the truck exploded “within about 15 minutes.” Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d at 252; see also Compl. ¶ 40. The blast “sheared off the face of Building 131,” Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d at 252, and “shattered windows up to a half mile away,” Compl. at 1. Subsequent “investigation determined that the force of the explosion was the equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT. The [U.S. Department of Defense] said that it was the largest non-nuclear explosion ever up to that time.” Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d at 252.

B. Defendant Iran's Role

Iran “has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism” by the U.S. Department of State “since January 19, 1984.” Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 47; see, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F.Supp.3d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2018); U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gOv/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2023). Prior proceedings have found that Iran planned and supported the Khobar Towers bombing.^[4] Both the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran at the time, and the Minister of Intelligence and Security “approved” the attack. Heiser I, 466 F.Supp.2d at 252. The truck bomb used was “assembled” at a base in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley “jointly operated by the [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (‘IRGC')] and by the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah,” with the individuals who carried out the bombing calling themselves “Saudi Hezbollah.” Id.

These conclusions are based in part on the testimony of four key expert witnesses in Blais and Heiser I Louis Freeh, who was director of the FBI at the time of the bombing, and Dale Watson, then deputy counterterrorism chief of the FBI, testified in Heiser I based on their oversight of the FBI's “massive and thorough investigation of the attack, using over 250 agents.” Id.; see also id. at 260-62. “Based on that investigation, an Alexandria, Virginia, grand jury returned an indictment . . . against 13 identified members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hezbollah organization.” Id. at 252. During its investigation, the FBI interviewed six members of Saudi Hezbollah who “admitted to the FBI their complicity in the attack on Khobar Towers, and admitted that senior officials in the Iranian government provided them with funding, planning, training, sponsorship, and travel necessary to carry out the attack on Khobar Towers.” Id. at 253. Both Freeh and Watson testified to their conclusions, based on information gathered in their investigations, that “Iran, [the Ministry of Information and...