Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist.

Decision Date02 September 1987
Docket Number86-1629,Nos. 86-1629,87-1159,87-1134 and 87-1159,Nos. 86-1610,Nos. 86-1605,87-1134,86-1610,87-1130,s. 86-1605,s. 86-1610,s. 86-1629
Citation839 F.2d 113
Parties, 44 Ed. Law Rep. 1037 MUTH, Jr., Russell A., Individually and as Next Friend of Muth, Robert Alexander v. CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT, Dr. Newman, Thomas L., Superintendent of the Central Bucks School District and Margaret A. Smith, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Appeal of Russell A. MUTH, Jr., inAppeal of Margaret A. SMITH, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Education, inAppeal of Thomas L. NEWMAN and Central Bucks School District, in . Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Russell A. Muth, Jr., pro se.

LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Atty. Gen., Maria Parisi Vickers, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., John G. Knorr, Sr. Deputy Atty. Gen., Andrew S. Gordon, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Chief, Litigation Section, Office of Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for Pennsylvania Secretary of Educ.

Joanne D. Sommer, Eastburn and Gray, Doylestown, Pa., for Central Bucks School District and Dr. Thomas L. Newman.

Leonard Rieser, Philadelphia, Pa., for amicus curiae Pennsylvania Ass'n for Children and Adults with Learning Disabilities.

Before WEIS, STAPLETON, and VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this appeal are alleged procedural and substantive violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401-1415 (1982) (EHA or the Act), as amended by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.L. No. 94-142. The district court held that the procedures devised by the State of Pennsylvania for complying with the conditions on which the EHA provides federal funding for the education of handicapped children available to states did not meet EHA requirements. The court then held plaintiff entitled to reimbursement for expenditures he made for his handicapped son's tuition at a private school for the 1983-84 academic year. The court did not, however, grant plaintiff an order directing defendants to place plaintiff's son in a private school for the academic year 1986-87 and thereafter. Plaintiff was awarded partial reimbursement of the attorneys' fees he incurred in connection with this lawsuit. As the district court found that the EHA abrogated eleventh amendment state immunity, the State of Pennsylvania was held jointly and severally liable for the awards to plaintiff. We will affirm the judgment of the district court on every issue except its determination of the amount of attorneys' fees to which plaintiff is entitled. On that issue, we will remand for further proceedings.

I.

Plaintiff, Russell A. Muth, Jr., is the parent of Robert Alexander Muth ("Alexander"), a bright child with a language learning disability and associated emotional problems. There is no dispute that Alexander is "handicapped" within the meaning of the EHA, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a)(1) (1976 & 1987 Supp.) and is an "exceptional" child under 22 Pa.Code Secs. 13.1 and 341.1. Accordingly, the EHA requires that Pennsylvania, in return for its receipt of federal funding under the Act, provide Alexander with a free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1). Alexander's education must be tailored to his unique needs by means of an individualized educational program (IEP). 1 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401(18), 1414(a)(5).

The EHA also requires that Pennsylvania establish procedural safeguards to protect the interest of a child such as Alexander in receiving a free appropriate public education. Not only does the parent of such a child have the right to participate in developing the child's IEPs, but the parent may challenge in administrative hearings and in court a proposed IEP which he or she believes provides the child with a lesser education than appropriate. Furthermore, the parent of a handicapped child may challenge conduct of the educational agency which the parent feels has infringed his or her procedural rights. In this case, Muth has claimed both that Alexander was denied an appropriate education and that Pennsylvania's procedures violate rights guaranteed by the EHA and the federal regulations promulgated to supplement the Act, 34 C.F.R. Secs. 300 et seq. (1987). In addition to pursuing these claims in administrative hearings pursuant to the Pennsylvania procedures that implement the EHA, 22 Pa.Code Secs. 13.31 et seq., Muth has brought this suit against the Central Bucks School District (the "School District") and the Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the "Secretary"). 2

Alexander first attended Central Bucks schools in 1980. 3 By this time, Alexander's learning disability had already been diagnosed; consequently, when Alexander was enrolled in elementary school for the 1980-81 school year, the School District formulated an IEP for him. Under this IEP, Alexander was placed in a learning disability resource room class, where he received small group and one-on-one instruction and speech and language therapy. He was mainstreamed, or placed in regular classes, for art, music, physical education, library, lunch, and recess. Muth approved this initial IEP, as well as revisions made in it in February of 1981. The School District and Muth were also able to agree on an IEP for Alexander for his final year in elementary school, academic year 1981-82, and his first year of junior high school, academic year 1982-83. Improvements in Alexander's scores on various tests indicate that he made considerable educational progress during this time.

At this point, however, Alexander began expressing a desire to be placed in regular classes rather than in classes for learning disabled students. At Muth's request, the School District agreed to mainstream Alexander for English and science, on a trial basis, beginning in March of 1983. During that month, the School District prepared a proposed IEP for the 1983-84 school year that retained Alexander's placement in the district and included mainstreaming in English and science.

Mainstreaming was not very successful, and on June 17, 1983 an IEP conference was held by the School District to consider various changes in Alexander's program. Muth was in attendance. The main recommendation which emerged from this conference was that Alexander be returned for all substantive subjects to the more restrictive setting of a learning disabled classroom. The School District's proposal was to be embodied in a new IEP to be developed over the summer and implemented in the 1983-84 school year.

Muth, dissatisfied with the School District's planned program for Alexander, requested that a due process hearing be held on the question of whether the School District was providing an appropriate education to Alexander. The School District received this request on June 20, 1983. Muth further requested that no change be made in Alexander's current program until such a hearing had been held. 4

Before the fall of 1983, Muth decided to enroll Alexander at the Landmark School, a private school in Massachusetts for learning disabled children. Alexander started at Landmark in September of 1983, and spent the 1983-84 academic year there. Alexander also spent most of the 1984-85 academic year at Landmark, but transferred in April of 1985 to Wyncote Academy, 5 for reasons which are not entirely clear. Alexander returned from Wyncote to the Central Bucks school system at the start of academic year 1986-87.

Muth's due process hearing was held on September 30, 1983 before Hearing Officer Vernard Trent. 6 At this hearing, the School District presented its March, 1983 IEP. While the School District's June recommendations were placed into evidence, they apparently had never been incorporated into a new IEP. Muth, acting as his own attorney, made various objections to the School District's proposed programs.

Trent handed down his decision on October 31, 1983; he held that the School District's current 1983-84 IEP, which still included the mainstreaming for English and science, was inappropriate. Trent also made a set of recommendations: that the School District should consider whether Alexander should be in a more restrictive placement; that the School District should address Alexander's auditory disability; and that the School District, considering Alexander's giftedness, should provide Alexander with additional special activities and services. Trent did not order that Alexander be placed in a private school offering a program similar to Landmark's, as Muth had requested, nor did he find that the School District was unable to provide Alexander with an appropriate education.

Both Muth and the School District appealed from Trent's decision. Pursuant to 22 Pa.Code Sec. 13.32(24), the appeal was submitted to the Secretary. On January 23, 1984, the Secretary decided to remand the case to Hearing Officer Trent, with instructions to the School District to revise the IEP for Alexander to include, inter alia, the June, 1983 recommendations and to then present the revised IEP to Trent. The School District, working with Muth, proceeded to revise the IEP.

On June 7, 1984, the School District presented to Trent its revised IEP, dated May 1, 1984, and Muth presented his objections to it. On July 25, 1984, Trent issued his decision that this modified IEP was an appropriate program of special education for Alexander, and that the School District was capable of implementing it. Muth again appealed to the Secretary, and on October 24, 1984, the Secretary affirmed Trent's decision.

During the course of the above proceedings, on April 28, 1984, Muth filed suit in federal district court. 7 He claimed that the School District's IEP for Alexander was inappropriate under the EHA, and sought tuition reimbursement for 1983-84 and an order that the School...

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