Mutter v. Burgess
| Citation | 290 P. 269,87 Colo. 580 |
| Decision Date | 23 June 1930 |
| Docket Number | 12577. |
| Parties | MUTTER v. BURGESS et al. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
In Department.
Error to District Court, Mesa County; Straud M. Logan, Judge.
Action by L. W. Burgess and another, partners, doing business under the firm name and style of Burgess & Adams, against A. M Mutter. To review a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
A. A Clements, of Paonia, and C. H. Stewart, of Delta, for plaintiff in error.
Burgess & Adams, of Grand Junction, pro se.
L. W Burgess and E. B. Adams, engaged in the practice of law under the firm name of Burgess & Adams, herein called the plaintiffs, sued A. M. Mutter, herein called the defendant, for the balance of a fee claimed to be due them under a contract. They recovered a judgment for $800, the full amount demanded, which judgment Mutter seeks to reverse.
The question presented for our decision concerns the right of lawyers to recover for their services when they withdraw from a case before the full performance of the services they agreed to perform. On March 21, 1929, the defendant employed the plaintiffs as his attorneys in an action brought against him by one Lynch for alienating the affections of Lynch's wife. The contract was in writing. The defendant agreed to pay a retainer of $1,000 at once. If a judgment should be rendered against the defendant for less than $1,500 the defendant was to pay an additional sum of $500. In the event of a dismissal of the action or a verdict in favor of the defendant, he was to pay $1,500 in addition to the $1,000. He paid only $200 on account. The plaintiffs had numerous conferences with the defendant concerning the case; briefed the law on the subject; prepared, filed, and argued a motion; prepared and filed an answer; examined documentary evidence; and did what they could to prepare for trial. They repeatedly, though ineffectually, urged the defendant to bring in his witnesses so that the plaintiffs could ascertain what their testimony would be. On August 29 the defendant went to the office of the plaintiffs and accused them of having sold him out in the Lynch case; said that they and Hinman (Lynch's lawyer) had 'framed' the case and fixed it all up before the defendant signed the contract; that they had 'double-crossed' him or 'crooked' him; that they were 'as bad as the Lynches in trying to get money out of' him, and that that is all they were after. After this conversation the plaintiffs withdrew from the Lynch case, and the defendant employed other lawyers. Later the plaintiffs brought this action to recover $800, the balance claimed to be due under the contract.
1. In withdrawing, they did what any self-respecting lawyers would have done. The relation between lawyer and client is of a confidential and delicate nature. Within ethical limits, the lawyer owes entire devotion to his client's interest. The accusations made by the defendant are of the most serious nature. If the plaintiffs were guilty of the misconduct charged, they would be unfit to practice the profession of the law, and should be, and no doubt would be, disbarred. The accusations, however, were utterly false. At the trial, the defendant did not claim, or even intimate, that they were true. The conduct of the defendant made it practically impossible for his attorneys to continue the performance of their contract. It was equivalent to a discharge of the plaintiffs as his attorneys. In Genrow v. Flynn, 166 Mich 564, 131 N.W. 1115, 1116, 35 L.R.A. (N. S.) 960, Ann.Cas. 1912D, 638, a client sent to his attorneys a telegram falsely charging them with deceiving, lying, and neglecting him, and stating that he did not intend to stand their abuse any longer. The court held that this was equivalent to a discharge of the attorneys and said, inter alia: ...
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Olsen and Brown v. City of Englewood
...of his position that he has a right to prove and be awarded breach of contract damages, Olsen relies primarily on Mutter v. Burgess, 87 Colo. 580, 290 P. 269 (1930). Mutter involved a $1,000 fixed retainer agreement between an attorney and his client with an additional amount due, contingen......
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International Materials Corp. v. Sun Corp., Inc.
...State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136, 142 (1970); when a client accuses the attorney of dishonesty, Mutter v. Burgess, 87 Colo. 580, 290 P. 269, 270 (1930); when the client reports the attorney to a bar disciplinary board, Reed Yates Farms, Inc., v. Yates, 172 Ill.App.3d 519, 122 ......
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Elliott v. Joyce, 93SC528
...contingent fee agreement], based upon a quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory." Relying solely upon two cases, Mutter v. Burgess, 87 Colo. 580, 290 P. 269 (1930), and Ownbey v. Silverstein, 69 Colo. 325, 194 P. 607 (1920), the trial court ruled that Elliott "has an enforceable attorney......
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Olsen and Brown v. City of Englewood
...must be resolved against the moving party. Mancuso v. United Bank, 818 P.2d 732 (Colo.1991). I. Plaintiffs argue that Mutter v. Burgess, 87 Colo. 580, 290 P. 269 (1930) is controlling on the breach of contract claim. We In Mutter, the client contracted to pay a $1,000 retainer fee and then ......
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On Retainers, Flat Fees, and Commingling
...agreement as impermissibly interfering with the client's right to terminate representation with or without cause). 12. Id. 13. 87 Colo. 580, 290 P. 269 14. Olsen and Brown, supra, note 11 at 676, n. 3. 15. Attorney A, 26 The Colorado Lawyer 202 (June 1997). 16. Id. 17. Attorney B, 26 The Co......