Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Hunnicutt
| Decision Date | 02 June 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 26.,26. |
| Citation | 28 S.W.2d 703 |
| Parties | MUTUAL BEN. HEALTH & ACCIDENT ASS'N OF OMAHA v. HUNNICUTT. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Ouachita County; W. A. Speer, Judge.
Action by J. E. Hunnicutt against Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n of Omaha. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 27 S.W.(2d) 93.
Chas. Q. Kelley, Robinson, House & Moses, and Harry E. Meek, all of Little Rock, for appellant.
Saxon, Wade & Warren, of Camden, for appellee.
On February 28, 1927, appellant issued and delivered to appellee its policy of health and accident insurance which contained this paragraph: "The association will pay, for one day or more, at the rate of $100 per month for disability resulting from disease, the cause of which originates more than thirty days after the date of this policy, and which confines the insured continuously within doors and requires regular visits therein by legally qualified physician, provided said disease necessitates total disability and total loss of time."
The policy went into effect at noon of February 28, and for any disease originating between that date and noon March 30, 1927, the appellant was not liable. The principal question to be determined in this case is, Did the disease which caused appellee's total disability originate within that period of time? If it did, there is no liability. If it did not, appellant is liable. There was a verdict and judgment for appellee.
The question to be determined is one of fact, and appellant concedes the well-established rule of this court that, if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict, it must stand. But it contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict; that the undisputed evidence shows that the kidney affliction from which appellee was disabled originated prior to noon of March 30, 1927; and that, therefore, there should have been an instructed verdict in its favor. In determining this question we must consider the facts in the light most favorable to appellee. When considered in this light, and, giving them the strongest probative force of which they are reasonably susceptible and every reasonable inference deducible therefrom, as we must do under the rule of this court, we cannot say there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict in this case. The evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to appellee, is substantially as follows: Appellee had some trouble with varicocele which was relieved by an operation on April 4. On March 31, he began to have some trouble in the region of the left kidney. This was not considered serious on April 4, when he was operated on for varicocele, but on April 14 he went to the Baptist Hospital in Little Rock and was operated on to drain the kidney, the drain from the left kidney to the bladder being stopped, which caused a pressure on the kidney and great pain. This was an acute condition which necessitated an operation. Dr. Eubanks, one of the surgeons, testified that this is a disease that develops suddenly. In "Physician's Final Proof of Illness" Dr. Eubanks stated that the date of the on set of the disease was March 31. Appellee stated that it developed April 14, the date of the operation. While this evidence is meager and is contradicted by other evidence, yet it was submitted to the jury on instructions from the court that are not questioned, and we cannot say there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict.
It is finally...
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