Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Daniels
Decision Date | 05 May 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 16592,16592 |
Citation | 125 Colo. 451,244 P.2d 1064 |
Parties | MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. DANIELS. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Pershing, Bosworth, Dick & Dawson, Winston S. Howard, Robert M. Johnson, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
H. T. McGarry, Colorado Springs, Ivor O. Wingren, Denver, for defendant in error.
This case involves the interpretation of a policy of life insurance issued by the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, hereinafter called the insurer, on the life of Cady L. Daniels, Jr., hereinafter called the insured, in the face amount of $10,000. At the time of the death of insured, plaintiff in the trial court, defendant in error here, was named as the beneficiary and will be so designated herein.
Insured died April 11, 1945, as a result of a crash resulting from the left engine burning out and falling from a military plane which he was piloting as an officer in the United States Air Force.
Under date of February 5, 1940, insured had filled out an aviation form of questionnaire for the insurer as a supplement to his application. This questionnaire related generally to the applicant's activities in the field of aeronautics. Neither party is asserting that this questionnaire was endorsed on the face of the policy, but that it merely accompanied insured's application. Subsequently, on March 29, 1940, insured had signed a statement, witnessed by an agent for the insurer, reading as follows:
This same clause, quoted above, was endorsed on the face of the policy itself under date of April 2, 1940.
One of the printed paragraphs of the policy is the incontestable clause, reading as follows:
'Except for non-payment of premiums, this Policy shall be incontestable after two years from its date of issue, but if the age of the Insured shall have been misstated, the amount payable by the Company shall be such as the premium paid would have purchased at the correct age.'
This clause was inserted in compliance with the provisions of section 57, chapter 87, '35 C.S.A., which reads in part as follows:
'It shall be unlawful for any foreign or domestic life insurance company to issue or deliver in this state any life insurance policy unless the same shall contain the following provisions:
* * *
* * *
'2. A provision that the policy shall constitute the entire contract between the parties and shall be incontestable after it shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for two years from its date, except for nonpayment of premiums and except for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to naval and military service in time of war, or other prohibited risks, and at the option of the company provisions relative to benefits in the event of total and permanent disability and provisions which grant additional insurance specifically against death by accident may also be excepted.
* * *
* * *
* * *'
The trial was to a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, counsel for defendant moved for a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff for $1,371.64, being the amount of premiums paid on the policy less dividends paid, plus interest; and counsel for plaintiff moved for a directed verdict for the full face of the policy plus any additions to which plaintiff would be entitled as a death claim. The trial court denied the motion of defendant and granted plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict in the amount of $12,958.30, and formal judgment was entered accordingly.
Counsel for the insurer argue their six specifications of error under three headings: (1) Insured's policy specifically excluded risk of death from aviation; (2) Colorado's incontestability statute does not concern or restrict the insurer's right to limit the risk assumed, but merely prohibits contesting the policy's validity; and (3) the aviation rider is not limited to civilian aviation.
The points raised in this case make it one of first impression in this jurisdiction. The trial court referred to this in its remarks, and also noted a difference in the authorities in other jurisdictions. Counsel for the beneficiary take the position, which the trial court adopted: (1) That, if the insurer intended to relieve itself of any liability under the policy from death caused from aviation, such a provision or limitation should have been included in the incontestable clause of the policy; and (2) that there was an inference that any exclusion of risk concerning aviation was limited to civilian aviation and that the exclusion did not cover so-called military or naval aviation.
We are of the opinion that the great weight of authority is contrary to these two contentions. It is argued that because the aviation rider was not included as an exception in the incontestable clause, it ceases to apply after the policy has been in effect for more than two years. We believe that counsel by this argument overlooks the purpose of an incontestable clause in a policy. The relation of the incontestable clause to the policy has been set forth by Williston on Contracts (revised edition), volume 3, page 2280, as follows:
Italics supplied.
This discussion by Williston has been either quoted or referred to in numerous opinions. Chief Judge Cardozo in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 452, 169 N.E. 642, expressed the same situation in the following words:
(Numerous cases are then cited.)
Reference is made in plaintiff's brief to the fact that the Conway case, supra, may later have been overruled by a New York statute (1939). For two reasons we are not inclined to agree with plaintiff in this diagnosis: (1) a reading of the statute does not seem to confirm this, and (2) the case of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Veit, 1944, 294 N.Y. 222, 62 N.E.2d 45, quotes with approval a portion of the opinion in the Conway case which we have already quoted in our opinion.
In 17 A.L.R.2d 1051 an annotation, which had not been published at the time of the trial of this case, on the subject of construction and provision of life or accident policy relating to areonautics, reads:
'Accordingly, it has been held in all the later cases that a clause in an insurance contract excepting or limiting liability where the injury or death of the insured results from his connection in some manner at the time thereof with aviation or aeronautics is not affected by an incontestability clause appearing in the same policy, and therefore an insurer is not, by reason of the presence of the latter clause, barred from urging the liability exception or limitation clause as a defense to a suit upon the policy.'
Although our opinion in Union Mutual Life Company of Iowa v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 570, 575, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Trahan
...of Virginia, 148 Ohio St. 598, 76 N.W.2d 284. The majority view, which we shall follow, is expressed in Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064, 1068, by these words: 'Nor does the fact that the policy did not have a war-risk clause give support to any impl......
-
Wilmington Trust Company v. Travelers Insurance Co.
...be entered for the defendant insurance company as a matter of law — "There can be no recovery in this suit." In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064, there was a jury trial. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence counsel for defendant moved for a directed verdict......
-
Pappageorge v. Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co.
...provision represents a limitation on the general right of contract, it is to be strictly construed. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064 (1952). Nevertheless, an insurance company cannot place a more onerous incontestability clause in the policy than the one pr......
-
Daman v. New York Life Ins. Co.
...occupation, or due to the insured's engaging in crime. (Emphasis added.) (Footnotes omitted.)See also Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064 (1952), expressing the thought that the Smrha case had been in effect overruled by subsequent legislation; Metropolitan Li......
-
GENERAL
...such statutes are strictly construed. In case of doubt they are resolved in favor of the contract right. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 125 Colo. 451, 244 P.2d 1064, (1952). In case of an ambiguity, the matter is to be construed most strongly against the insurer. Coxen v. W. Empire Life Ins......
-
Consistency in Statutory Interpretation
...354, 356 (Colo. 1979) (statute in derogation of common law, penal statute, and rule of lenity); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Daniels, 244 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Colo. 1952) (limiting right of contract); People v. Thoro Products Co., 45 P.3d 737, 743 (Colo.App. 2001) (penal statute and rule of ......