Mva v. Illiano

Decision Date16 December 2005
Docket NumberNo. 28, September Term, 2005.,28, September Term, 2005.
Citation888 A.2d 329,390 Md. 265
PartiesMOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION v. Carmelina ILLIANO.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Leight D. Collins, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for petitioner.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

BATTAGLIA, J.

Following a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") on March 9, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Robert Barry suspended the driver's license of Respondent, Carmelina Illiano,1 for one year under Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(2)(B) of the Transportation Article,2 for refusing to submit to a chemical breath test.3 The Circuit Court for Carroll County subsequently found that the police officer who administered the breath test did not possess reasonable grounds to justify the detention of Illiano and reversed the decision to suspend her driver's license.4 Petitioner, the Motor Vehicle Administration, now presents us with the following question for review:

In determining the sufficiency of an officer's sworn certification of reasonable grounds to request a chemical breath test under Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(1) of the Transportation Article,[5] did the administrative law judge err in considering evidence obtained by the officer after the motorist was initially detained, where the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the motorist's automobile, the motorist told the officer that she had been drinking and she should not be driving, and, after the initial detention, her performance in field sobriety tests exhibited further evidence of impairment?

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano, 387 Md. 465, 875 A.2d 769 (2005). We hold that, pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article, the Administrative Law Judge's determination that the police officer had reasonable grounds to detain Illiano and request a breath test was supported by substantial evidence and was not premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court.

I. Background

At approximately two o'clock in the morning on October 30, 2003, Maryland Transportation Authority Police Officer J. Marll was in a marked patrol car parked on the shoulder of Route 170 in Anne Arundel County operating a stationary radar unit when a Saturn pulled up approximately ten feet behind him and sat idling for a few minutes. Officer Marll decided to check on the well-being of the driver and backed his car alongside the Saturn, at which time the driver, Carmelina Illiano, rolled down her window. Officer Marll detected the smell of alcohol coming from the Saturn and decided to park behind it. While Officer Marll was moving the police car, Ms. Illiano alighted from the Saturn and switched positions with the passenger. After approaching the passenger side window, Officer Marll asked Ms. Illiano why she had stopped on the shoulder to which she replied that she should not be driving because she had consumed one beer and one mixed drink. Observing that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that her speech was slurred, the officer requested Ms. Illiano's driver's license and asked her to perform various field sobriety tests. While she was getting out of her car, Ms. Illiano disclosed to Officer Marll that she was coming from Cancun Cantina and that her friend was taking over because Ms. Illiano realized that she should not be driving; Officer Marll further observed that Ms. Illiano leaned on the Saturn for balance while walking.

After Ms. Illiano failed the field sobriety tests,6 Officer Marll placed her under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and read to her from the DR-15 Form.7 Initially Ms. Illiano agreed to take a chemical breath test; she was taken to the Maryland State Police Barracks in Glen Burnie where the test was to be administered. When Ms. Illiano arrived, however, she changed her mind, refused to submit to the test and, thereafter, pursuant to Section 16-205.1(b)(3),8 Officer Marll confiscated Ms. Illiano's driver's license, served her with an order of suspension for one year,9 issued her a temporary license, and informed her of her right to a hearing and the required administrative sanctions.

At the administrative show cause hearing held on March 9, 2004, Ms. Illiano, represented by counsel, contended that the officer never drove abreast of her car, but instead made a U-turn and immediately parked behind her; that she never told Officer Marll that she should not have been driving; that her difficulty performing the field sobriety tests was due to her poor grasp of the English language and her inability to understand Officer Marll's directions and that she switched seats with the passenger because she was having difficulty driving due to a damaged tendon on the top of her foot. In his findings of fact, ALJ Barry stated:

I do find by a preponderance of the evidence in this record that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while impaired by alcohol. . . . I don't have any problems finding Ms. Illiano in violation of Section 16-205.1. Frankly, I find Ms. Illiano's version of events to be totally not credible, not even a close call in this matter. There's a total — I mean as far as basically from the beginning, she admits that she's out with her friend at a club. She's indicated she only had this half a glass of bitter wine and a rum and Coke, and wants me to believe that all the problems here were not — the problems with the test didn't have to do with the consumption of alcohol, but with this foot problem. The evidence that I have on the foot problem is that the injury actually goes back to August of 2002, and the podiatrist, Dr. Seider, has indicated the nerve damage and [sic] may cause difficulty with ambulation and balance. But the evidence of the impairment in this case goes beyond that. We have the bloodshot, glassy eyes, the slurred speech, and I believe the licensee made the admissions to the officer. People driving up behind police when they're intoxicated doesn't shock me. I've had cases where people have driven into the police station drunk to pick up their friend, who had been arrested earlier in the night, drunk. People do things when they're intoxicated they wouldn't ordinarily do when sober. I believe that Ms. Illiano was quite intoxicated that night, pulled over, decided not to drive for whatever reason, performed — couldn't even stand up, basically. I believe very little of what Ms. Illiano said here today, so I do find her in violation of Section 16-205.1.

Accordingly, ALJ Barry upheld the one-year suspension of Ms. Illiano's driver's license.

Ms. Illiano filed a Petition for Judicial Review of ALJ Barry's decision in the Circuit Court for Carroll County pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), Section 10-222 of the State Government Article. Finding that Section 16-205.1(b)(2) "clearly requires that an officer have reasonable grounds for detaining someone for driving under the influence of alcohol," the judge held that "any results of the field sobriety tests would be irrelevant in determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to detain Petitioner to perform these tests," and concluded:

In reviewing the record, the transcript, and specifically the ALJ's decision, the . . . decision was arbitrary and capricious. The fact that Petitioner admitted to attending a club and that she had one or two drinks is not sufficient to conclude that she was driving under the influence. Nor is the fact that there was a strong odor of alcohol being emitted from the car, not any particular passenger, conclusive. . . . The Court further finds that there was no substantial evidence to conclude that the officer had reasonable grounds to detain Petitioner. The issue is not fairly debatable and must be reversed.

In so doing, the court reversed ALJ Barry's decision to suspend Ms. Illiano's license and remanded the matter to the Motor Vehicle Administration for further proceedings in compliance with the order.

II. Standard of Review

Section 10-222 of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Md.Code (1984, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article, delineates that a court, upon judicial review of an administrative agency's decision, may decide to:10

(1) remand the case for further proceedings;

(2) affirm the final decision; or

(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision:

(i) is unconstitutional;

(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision-maker;

(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;

(iv) is affected by any other error of law (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or

(vi) is arbitrary and capricious.

In Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005), Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court, thoroughly examined the standard of review of an adjudicatory decision by an administrative agency, stating:

A court's role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow, United Parcel v. People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); it "is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law." United Parcel, 336 Md. at 577, 650 A.2d at 230. See also Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article; District Council v. Brandywine Enterprises, Inc., 350 Md. 339, 349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1998); Catonsville...

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  • Mva v. Delawter, 63, September Term, 2007.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 13 Febrero 2008
    ...field should be respected. Id. at 571-72, 873 A.2d at 1154-55 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). See also MVA v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 273-75, 888 A.2d 329, 332-33 (2005). The issue itself of whether notice of a potential MAB referral must be included in the DR-15 Advice of Rights form......
  • Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shepard, No. 88, September Term, 2006 (Md. App. 5/15/2007)
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 15 Mayo 2007
    ...from that evidence." Id. at 67-68, 729 A.2d at 380-81 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also MVA v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 274-75, 888 A.2d 329, 335 (2005). A court may set aside an agency's factual finding only when the finding is "unsupported by competent, material, and subs......
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    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 16 Agosto 2012
    ...(2012).6 The MVA retorted that, based on this Court's interpretation of the Implied Consent Statute in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 281, 888 A.2d 329, 340 (2005), the Deputy's duty to document and prove the driver's intoxication began after making the initial traffi......
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    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 15 Mayo 2007
    ...from that evidence." Id. at 67-68, 729 A.2d at 380-81 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also MVA v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 274-75, 888 A.2d 329, 335 (2005). A court may set aside an agency's factual finding only when the finding is "unsupported by competent, material, and subs......
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