MWL Enters. v. Mid-Miami Inv. Co.
Decision Date | 21 May 2021 |
Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 28915 |
Citation | 2021 Ohio 1742 |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Parties | MWL ENTERPRISES, LLC Plaintiff-Appellee v. MID-MIAMI INVESTMENT CO., et al. Defendant-Appellant |
(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
OPINIONRICHARD L. CARR, JR., Atty. Reg. No. 0003180 & DAVID M. RICKERT, Atty. Reg. No. 0010483, 110 North Main Street, Suite 1000, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee MWL Enterprises, LLC
TERRY W. POSEY, JR., Atty. Reg. No. 0078292, 109 North Main Street, Suite 500, Dayton, Ohio 45402 & KENNETH R. POHLMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0018884, 120 West Second Street, Suite 1300, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Mid-Miami Investment Co.
MICHAEL D. MEUTI, Atty. Reg. No. 0087233 & KELLY E. MULRANE, Atty. Reg. No. 0088133, 200 Public Square, Suite 2300, Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Store Master Funding IV, LLC
{¶ 1} Mid-Miami Investment Company appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to MWL Enterprises, LLC, and Store Master Funding IV, LLC, on their claims for a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction with respect to easements on Mid-Miami's property that provide driveway access to/from State Route 725. For the following reasons, the trial court's judgments will be affirmed.
{¶ 2} Mid-Miami, MWL, and Store Master each own commercial property at the intersection of Paragon Road and State Route 725 in Washington Township. In the 1970s, all of the land at issue originally was owned by John Wieland and his wife. In January 1977, the Wielands sold a parcel to Cassano Investments. Soon thereafter, the Wielands sold their remaining parcels to other purchasers, including Mid-Miami. Mid-Miami subsequently sold a portion of its parcel to First National Bank of Dayton. MWL now owns the former Cassano property; Store Master owns the property formerly owned by First National Bank.
{¶ 3} The sale from the Wielands to Cassano included a reciprocal easement, prepared by Attorney John Koverman, which currently applies to Mid-Miami and MWL. Koverman prepared a similar easement for the sale from Mid-Miami to First National Bank. The easements have been in effect since 1977. In essence, the easements allow Mid-Miami, MWL, and Store Master to use each other's driveways, ingresses and egresses, and parking lots. The easement at issue in this appeal is the easement encumbering Mid-Miami's property, which includes driveways that run east-west across the north of MWL's property and north-south along the east side of MWL's property. The north-south driveway provides access to State Route 725. (See diagram, below.)
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(Mid-Miami's App. Brief, at 1.)
{¶ 4} Except for references to the parties' names, paragraph four of the easements are identical. They read, in relevant part:
{¶ 5} Mid-Miami decided that it wanted to close its driveway along the east side of MWL's property, in large part due to maintenance costs and individuals' using the property to bypass the traffic signal at the intersection of Paragon Road and State Route 725. In February 2019, Mid-Miami offered to sell this portion of its property to MWL, indicating that it intended to close the driveway if the sale could not be completed.
{¶ 6} Two months later, MWL filed suit against Mid-Miami, alleging that Mid-Miami had expressed its intent to breach the easement. MWL named Store Master as a defendant due to its similar easement on Mid-Miami's property. MWL sought (1) a declaratory judgment that its right to access State Route 725 may not be impeded or terminated by Mid-Miami and (2) a permanent injunction preventing Mid-Miami from depriving MWL of access to State Route 725 and access across Mid-Miami's property. Store Master subsequently filed a cross-claim against Mid-Miami, also requesting a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
{¶ 7} In January 2020, Mid-Miami sought summary judgment on MWL's and Store Master's claims. Mid-Miami argued that it was entitled to close the driveway from State Route 725, because it no longer uses that driveway. Mid-Miami further contended that MWL and Store Master did not have an implied easement by necessity, because they have frontage on State Route 725 and have alternative access points to their properties.
{¶ 8} MWL also moved for partial summary judgment on its claims against Mid-Miami for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. MWL argued that the terms of the easement do not allow "one party by fiat to declare that it is no longer 'using' a portion of its property and therefore terminate the Easement * * *."
{¶ 9} On April 20, 2020, the trial court granted Mid-Miami's motion for summary judgment to the extent that MWL and Store Master claimed an implied easement by necessity. However, the court concluded that the disputed driveway "is still 'used' by Mid-Miami for driveway and ingress and egress purposes because that portion of Mid- Miami's property still consists of a driveway that exits onto a public road." The court further concluded that MWL would be irreparably harmed if Mid-Miami were permitted to cut off access to State Route 725 via the driveway. The court thus held that MWL was entitled to a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction as to the express easement, and it granted MWL's motion for partial summary judgment. Noting that the written easement between Mid-Miami and Store Master was identical to the written easement between Mid-Miami and MWL, the court stated that the "same findings apply to the written easement between Mid-Miami and Store Master." The court denied Mid-Miami's motion for summary judgment as to both MWL's and Store Master's claims.
{¶ 10} Store Master subsequently moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the express terms of the easement forbade Mid-Miami from unilaterally terminating the easement. It also sought a permanent injunction enjoining Mid-Miami from interfering with Store Master's use of Mid-Miami's property covered by the easement. In support of its motion, Store Master provided information about the actual use of the driveway. Mid-Miami argued that Store Master's data should not be considered, and it asked the trial court to reconsider its April 20, 2020 decision.
{¶ 11} On August 28, 2020, the trial court sustained Store Master's motion for partial summary judgment. The court declined to reconsider its prior decision, and reiterated that Mid-Miami "uses" its north-south and east-west driveways because they continue to exist and the north-south driveway continues to provide ingress and egress from Mid-Miami's property to State Route 725. The court noted that neither decision required Mid-Miami to maintain a driveway to State Route 725 in perpetuity. It explained that Mid-Miami was barred from depriving MWL and Store Master of access to State Route 725 only as long as there was a driveway on Mid-Miami's property that provided ingress and egress to State Route 725. The court further concluded that Mid-Miami's repeated threats to cut off access to State Route 725 via the north-south drive constituted a sufficient basis to grant a permanent injunction.
{¶ 12} Mid-Miami appeals from the trial court's judgments, raising two assignments of error. It claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and permanent injunctions in favor of MWL and Store Master, and that the court, instead, should have granted judgment in its favor.
{¶ 13} We review a trial court's ruling on a summary-judgment motion de novo. Schroeder v. Henness, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012-CA-18, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42. Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates "that there is no issue as to any material fact, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party." Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 617, 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998).
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