Myatt v. Myatt

• Citation: 62 S.E. 887,149 N.C. 137
• Parties: MYATT. v. MYATT.
• Decision Date: 19 November 1908
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

62 S.E. 887

149 N.C. 137

MYATT.

v.MYATT.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 19, 1908.

1. Witnesses (§ 267^*)—Cross-Examination of One's Own Witness—Discretion.

Witness having testified on direct that he did not know the mental condition of another, subsequent questions on direct as to whether such person was sane could be excluded in the trial court's discretion, as an effort to cross-examine one's own witness.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Dec. Dig. § 267.*]

2. Evidence (§ 474*)—Nonexpert Testimony —Sanity.

While nonexpert opinions as to one's sanity may be received, they must be deduced from personal observation, and not from circumstances detailed by others; and, witness having stated that he did not know the condition of another's mind, subsequent questions calling for witness' opinion as to whether such person was sane were properly excluded.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2198; Dec. Dig. § 474.*]

3. Cancellation of Instruments (§ 51*)— "Undue Influence"—Instructions.

In an action to avoid a deed for undue influence in its procurement, an instruction that "undue influence" is a fraudulent influence, controlling the mind of him operated upon, by which the will is perverted from its free exercise, and submitting as issues whether defendant possessed undue influence over grantor, and, if so, whether he fraudulently used it to procure the deed, and whether he exerted a fraudulent influence over grantor sufficient to destroy free agency, etc., was not objectionable as laying too much stress on the element of fraud as part of the definition of undue influence.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Cancellation of Instruments, Dec. Dig. § 51.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7166-7172, 7823, 7824.]

4. Deeds (§ 72*)—Execution—"Undue Influence"—Element.

To constitute "undue influence, " it is unnecessary that moral turpitude or improper motive should exist, and if one, from the best of motives, having obtained a dominant influence over a grantor's mind, induces him to execute a deed or other instrument materially affecting his rights, which he would not have otherwise executed, so exercising the influence obtained that the grantor's will is effaced or supplanted, the instrument is fraudulent.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 190; Dec. Dig. § 72.*]

5. New Trial (§ 104*)—Newly Discovered Evidence—Cumulative Evidence.

Cumulative newly discovered evidence is no ground for new trial.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 218-220, 228; Dec. Dig. § 104.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Biggs, Judge.

Action by Nannie J. Myatt against W. A. Myatt. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

On the trial it was shown, among other things, that on November 10, 1906, Alfred R. Myatt, husband of feme plaintiff, executed and delivered to his brother, W. A. Myatt, a deed for a certain tract of land, ly ing in Wake county, for the sum of $1,000, which had been paid, and said deed was duly acknowledged and filed for registration on the day of its execution; that prior to that time, to wit, on August 21, 1906, said Alfred R. Myatt had executed a deed for the same tract of land to his wife, the feme plaintiff, acknowledged the day of its execution before Chas. Adams, Esq., a justice of the peace of Wake county, and registered February 20, 1907. Plaintiff complained and alleged that the deed to defendant had been procured by fraud and undue influence on the part of defendant, and issues were submitted and responded to by the jury as follows: "(1) Was the deed of November 10, 1906, from Alfred R. Myatt to the defendant, W. A. Myatt, obtained through undue influence by the defendant, W. A. Myatt? Answer. No. (2) Was the deed of November 10, 1906, from Alfred R. Myatt to the defendant, W. A. Myatt, obtained through fraud by the defendant, W. A. Myatt? Answer. No." There was judgment on the verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff excepted and appealed. Motion was further made in the court for a new trial on account of newly discovered evidence.

B. C. Beckwith, for appellant.

Walter Clark, Jr., and Holding & Bunn, for appellee.

HOKE, J. We have given this cause and the exceptions made by appellant—all of them—full and careful consideration, and are of opinion that there has been no error committed in the trial, certainly none that could give the plaintiff any just ground of complaint; nor do we find, in the record or case on appeal, testimony that would justify a verdict either of incapacity in grantor, or of fraud or undue influence, on the part of the grantee, as to the deed in question. True there is evidence tending to show that the grantor, Alfred R. Myatt, was not a provident or a very industrious man; that he had the drinking habit, and was at times incapable of attending properly to his business, but this last was not at all his usual condition. On the contrary, he could, and did as a rule, manage his own affairs, made contracts, executed deeds, including that to feme plaintiff herself, and under which she claims, and transacted business generally on the part of himself and his wife right up to the transaction involved in the litigation. Further, the great weight of the testimony is to the effect that said Alfred R. Myatt was sober and clothed in his right mind at the time he executed the deed in question; and there is very little, if any, evidence that defendant had especial influence over him, and none at all that he exercised, or endeavored to exercise, it on this occasion.

An exception especially urged for error was to the refusal of the court to allow the plaintiff to...