Mydlach v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 1-03-1402.,1-03-1402.
• Citation: 846 N.E.2d 126
• Parties: Lucy MYDLACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

846 N.E.2d 126

Lucy MYDLACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-03-1402.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

September 30, 2005.

As Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing March 31, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Chicago (Scott M. Cohen, of counsel), for Appellant.

Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman LLP, Chicago (Timothy V. Hoffman, Neal B. McQueeney, and Heather D. Erickson, of counsel), for Appellee.

MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

Justice FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Lucy Mydlach brought this action against defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Act or Magnuson-Moss Act) (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2000)) after she purchased a used car manufactured by defendant which was allegedly defective. Plaintiff's three-count complaint alleged breach of written warranty (count I), breach of implied warranty of merchantability (count II), and revocation of acceptance (count III). Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff's claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations included in section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code—Sales (Code or UCC) (810 ILCS 5/2-725 (West 2000)). The trial court granted defendant's motion, and plaintiff now appeals, contending the trial court erred in finding that her claims were time barred. She further contends that the trial court should have recognized her claim for revocation of acceptance because the Act permits consumers to recover equitable relief.

In a previously filed opinion, we affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment on count II and reversed its entry of summary judgment on counts I and III. Mydlach v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 1-03-1402, 2006 WL 845566, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 301 Ill.Dec. 164, 846 N.E.2d 126 (September 30, 2005). In a petition for rehearing, defendant contends that the trial court properly entered summary judgment on counts I and III and argues that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to the limited warranty at issue in the instant case. Upon consideration of defendant's petition for rehearing, we conclude that our previous decision reversing the trial court's entry of summary judgment on counts I and III was proper.

BACKGROUND

On June 20, 1998, plaintiff bought a used 1996 Dodge Neon, manufactured by defendant, from McGrath Buick Nissan (McGrath) in Elgin, Illinois. The car was put in service to its original buyer on June 24, 1996. At that time, the car carried a 3-year/36,000-mile warranty. When plaintiff bought the car on June 20, 1998, about one year or 10,000 miles remained on the warranty.

Within approximately 17 days of buying the car, plaintiff tendered it to an authorized dealer of defendant for repairs. On July 7, 1998, she brought in the car complaining of a squealing noise in the brakes. On July 15, 1998, she brought in the car for a fluid leak. On July 24, 1998, repairs were performed for a transmission leak, a creaking noise while shifting, failure of the transaxle, and failure of the engine mounts. On July 31, 1998, the car was repaired for a leak and the failure of the drive shaft. On August 6, 1998, repairs were performed for the same problems. Finally, on August 21, 1998, the car was repaired for a rattle in the front end due to a defective tire. At the time of this repair, the car's mileage was 31,103 miles.

On May 16, 2001, plaintiff filed her three-count complaint against defendant. In count I plaintiff alleged breach of written warranty based upon the limited written warranty provided by defendant. The warranty states in relevant part:

"WHAT'S COVERED

* * * The `Basic Warranty' covers the cost of all parts and labor needed to repair any item on your vehicle (except as noted below) that's defective in material, workmanship or factory preparation. You pay nothing for these repairs. The `Basic Warranty' covers every Chrysler supplied part of your vehicle, EXCEPT its tires and cellular telephone. * * * These warranty repairs or adjustments (parts and labor) will be made by your dealer at no charge using new or remanufactured parts."

Plaintiff alleged that as a result of ineffective repair attempts by defendant, she could not use the car as she had intended. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to properly diagnose a fluid leak despite seven repair attempts and alleged she was entitled to seek relief under section 2310(d)(1) of the Magnuson-Moss Act (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2000)).

In count II, plaintiff alleged that her car "was subject to an implied warranty of merchantability as defined in [section 2301(7) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (2000))] running from [defendant] to the intended consumer, plaintiff." Plaintiff alleged that defendant breached this warranty as the defect in her car rendered it "unmerchantable and thereby not fit for the ordinary and essential purpose for which [it] was intended and as represented by [defendant]."

In count III, which is styled "Revocation of Acceptance Pursuant to Section 2310(d) of the [Act] Manufacturer," plaintiff alleged that defendant's tender of her car "constitutes a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)."

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all three counts. In the motion, defendant contended that the express and implied warranty claims were subject to the four-year statute of limitations included in section 2-725 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/2-725 (West 2000)), that the statute had begun running upon purchase by the original buyer on June 24, 1996, and that counts I and II of plaintiff's May 2001 complaint were thus time barred. Defendant further contended the claim for revocation in count III should be dismissed because no privity existed between defendant and plaintiff and because plaintiff could not prove a breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff's complaint was untimely, and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 17, 30-31, 241 Ill.Dec. 627, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999). Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill.2d 28, 35, 257 Ill.Dec. 656, 754 N.E.2d 314 (2001). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if that ground was not relied on by the trial court. Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill.App.3d 969, 971, 266 Ill.Dec. 129, 773 N.E.2d 1199 (2002), citing Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill.2d 83, 97, 212 Ill.Dec. 968, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995).

The Magnuson-Moss Act was designed "to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products." 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2000). "Although the Act does not require any consumer product to be warranted [citation], if a manufacturer or supplier chooses to warrant a product, the Act imposes specific minimum federal standards for warranties [citation]." Nowalski v. Ford Motor Co., 335 Ill.App.3d 625, 628, 269 Ill.Dec. 781, 781 N.E.2d 578 (2002). The Magnuson-Moss Act "provides a statutory private right of action to consumers who are `damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.'" Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209 Ill.2d 376, 386, 283 Ill.Dec. 669, 808 N.E.2d 957 (2004), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1994). "A consumer who prevails [under the Act] may elect repair, replacement, or refund of defective parts." Cosman v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Ill.App.3d 250, 255, 220 Ill.Dec. 790, 674 N.E.2d 61 (1996), citing 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (1994).

I. Breach of Written Warranty (Count I)

Plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly dismissed her breach of express warranty claim based on its conclusion that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Count I of plaintiffs complaint seeks relief pursuant to section 2310(d)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C § 2310(d)(1) (2000)) and alleges that defendant issued a written warranty promising to repair defects in plaintiff's car and that it breached that warranty by failing to repair defects in plaintiff's car despite various attempts to do so.

We note as a preliminary matter that plaintiff filed all three of the counts in her complaint under the Act, a federal statute which does not provide a statute of limitations. See Nowalski, 335 Ill.App.3d at 626, 628, 269 Ill.Dec. 781, 781 N.E.2d 578. "Where a federal statute creates a cause of action but does not establish a limitations period for that action, state courts will apply the statute of limitations governing the state cause of action most closely analogous to the federal action." Nowalski, 335 Ill.App.3d at 628, 269 Ill. Dec. 781, 781 N.E.2d 578, citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-60, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287-89, 76 L.Ed.2d 476, 485-87 (1983). The Illinois action most analogous to plaintiff's warranty claims is an action for breach of warranty in a contract for sale. Cosman, 285 Ill.App.3d at 255, 220 Ill.Dec. 790, 674 N.E.2d 61. This state law action is subject to the four-year statute of limitations included in section 2-725 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/2-725 (West 2000)), and accordingly we conclude, and the parties agree, that this statute of limitations is applicable in the instant case. Cosman, 285 Ill.App.3d at 255, 220 Ill.Dec. 790, ...