Myer v. Ada County, 5621
| Decision Date | 12 November 1930 |
| Docket Number | 5621 |
| Citation | 293 P. 322,50 Idaho 39 |
| Parties | JOHN H. MYER, Appellant, v. ADA COUNTY, IDAHO, and C. E. BULLOCK, Respondents |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
STATUTES-JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-FEES.
1. Statutes regulating fees of justice of peace are to be strictly construed, and only compensation expressly authorized may be allowed.
2. General terms in statute, especially word "all," are limited not only by qualifying words and phrases, but also by subject matter.
3. Statute held not to authorize fee for justice of peace where criminal action is dismissed without preliminary examination or trial (C. S., sec. 3710).
4. Rule that qualifying clause refers solely to last antecedent is of no great force, and may be overturned by slight indication of contrary legislative intent.
5. Justice held entitled to six dollar fee in criminal action only where there is examination or trial, and to three dollar fee where examination is waived (C. S., sec. 3710).
APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Dana E. Brinck, Judge.
Action to test the right of a justice of the peace to certain fees. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.
Affirmed.
Oppenheim & Lampert, for Appellant.
General words are to have a general operation, unless the manifest intention of the legislature affords grounds for qualifying or restraining them. (25 R. C. L. 970; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 196.)
Relative and qualifying words and phrases, grammatically and legally where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. (2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., sec. 420; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 223.)
Carl A Burke, Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and Thornton D Wyman, for Respondents.
The interpretation of section 3710 should not be "Legislation in disguise."
(State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 203, 141 P. 565.)
In a quarterly report presented to the county commissioners, John H. Myer asked for an allowance of a fee of six dollars in each of seventeen criminal actions and a fee of four dollars in one other action. All of the cases had been dismissed without a trial or preliminary examination.
The pertinent portion of C. S., sec. 3710, controlling herein, is:
Appellant contends that the words "all services and proceedings" were intended by the legislature as an omnibus clause and include cases dismissed without examination or trial. Statutes as herein are to be strictly construed and only compensation expressly provided for may be allowed. (35 C. J. 469.)
General terms are limited not only by qualifying words and phrases but also by the subject matter. This applies particularly to the use of the word "all." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., p. 197.)
The general words "all services and proceedings" are qualified by the phrase "on examination" and the phrase "(on) trial upon an issue of fact," and also by the clause "when an examination is waived or there is a plea of guilty." Not all services and proceedings are to be rewarded with a fee of six dollars but "all services and proceedings . . . . on examination or (on) trial upon an issue of fact." There is no provision for a fee of six dollars or any other fee where there is a dismissal without...
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