State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 24 June 1914
• Citation: 26 Idaho 203,141 P. 565
• Parties: STATE, Appellant, v. J. C. JOHNSON, G. F. HARTLEY and JOSEPH IRVIN, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

141 P. 565

26 Idaho 203

STATE, Appellant, v. J. C. JOHNSON, G. F. HARTLEY and JOSEPH IRVIN, Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 24, 1914

EXTERMINATION OF PREDATORY ANIMALS-SECS. 1197 AND 1198, REV. CODES CONSTRUED-POWERS OF STATE SANITARY BOARD AND STATE VETERINARIAN UNDER-PAYMENT OF BOUNTIES NOT AUTHORIZED BY.

1 Secs. 1197 and 1198, Rev. Codes, provide for the extermination of predatory animals through the employment by the livestock sanitary board of "experienced, competent and skilful hunters and trappers" at a per diem compensation. Such method having been specified by the statute, the board and the state veterinarian acting with it are precluded from resorting to other methods of extermination not authorized by law, such as the payment of bounties for the destruction of such aminals by persons not in the employ of the sanitary board.

2. If a statute is found by experience to be unwise or impracticable relief must be sought through the legislature. Neither a state board in executing such statute, nor a court in construing it, has any authority to alter or amend it.

3. Held, that the trial court properly advised the jury to acquit the defendants.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. Hon. Carl A. Davis, Judge.

Defendants were prosecuted on information for conspiracy in attempting to collect predatory animal bounty on spurious and fraudulent claims. Defendants acquitted. State appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

J. H. Peterson, Atty. Gen., T. C. Coffin, J. J. Guheen and E. G. Davis, Assts., for Appellant.

"Conflict and repugnance in statutes should always be avoided by construction, if possible. Indeed, a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word should be superfluous, void or insignificant." (Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W.Va. 207, 12 S.E. 484.)

The narrow construction placed on this statute by the district court, has the effect of making the expression, "to devise and put into operation," equivalent to the expression, "exercise no independent judgment whatever, nor put into operation any method save what is hereafter set forth."

"A contemporaneous construction, after a lapse of time, without change of that construction by legislation or judicial decision, has been declared to be generally the best construction." (Sutherland, Stat. Const., sec. 472; Smith v. Bryan, 100 Va. 199, 40 S.E. 652.)

An extreme case of where courts followed the contemporaneous construction of officers charged with the enforcement of a statute is the case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 11 S.Ct. 699, 35 L.Ed. 363.

Karl Paine and Solon Orr, for Respondents.

A perusal of secs. 1197-1204, Rev. Codes, shows that in the enactment of this act, the legislature purposed that the destruction of predatory animals should be prosecuted systematically; and that the predatory animal fund is appropriated to bear the expenses of such destruction and not as a bounty fund. The intention is to be ascertained by considering the entire statute. (Sutherland, Stat. Const., sec. 239.)

Sec. 1199 imposes upon the hunters and trappers employed by the board the duty of exercising the greatest care in putting out poison. The section makes a violation of any of its provisions by any of the hunters or trappers employed by the board a misdemeanor. A bounty claimant who so baited out poison would not be guilty of a misdemeanor under this section, because he is not employed by the board. Thus sec. 1199 would remain without operation or effect, and out of harmony with the remainder of the statute.

Statutes must be so construed as to give effect to all their provisions, so that no part will be inoperative, and so that one part will not destroy another. (Sec. 380, Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Const.)

Secs. 1200, 1204, and indeed the major portions of section 1197 and all of sec. 1198, are in like manner rendered inoperative under appellant's construction, though they are serially related in subject matter.

"Where there are in an act specific provisions relating to a particular subject, they must govern in respect to that subject, as against general provisions in other parts of the statute, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provisions relate." (Ihmsen v. Monongahela Nav. Co., 32 Pa. 153; King v. Armstrong, 9 Cal.App. 368, 99 P. 527; Frandzen v. San Diego County, 101 Cal. 317, 35 P. 897; Nance v. Southern Ry., 149 N.C. 366, 63 S.E. 116.)

While section after section of this act teems with provisions governing the work of the hunters and trappers, not a syllable is expressed with respect to bounty claimants, nor the allowance of a bounty.

There can be no intent of a statute not expressed in its words. (Sec. 388, Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Const.)

AILSHIE, C. J. Sullivan, J., and Walters, District Judge, concur.

OPINION

AILSHIE, C. J.

The defendants were jointly informed against and charged with the crime of conspiracy.

It was alleged that the defendants presented to the state veterinarian for allowance certain claims on the bounty fund, claiming a bounty for the killing and destruction of certain animals, and that these claims were fictitious, fraudulent and false. Proofs were submitted in support of the allegations of the information, but upon request of counsel for the defendants the trial court advised the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendants, on the ground that the state livestock sanitary board and veterinary surgeon had no power or authority to allow claims for bounties for killing predatory animals, and that the only authority they had to pay for the killing of such animals was by employing hunters and trappers as authorized by sec. 1197 of the Rev. Codes. Defendants were acquitted and the state has appealed.

The only question presented for our consideration is "as to whether or not under the provisions of secs. 1197 and 1198 of the Rev. Codes, the livestock sanitary board and state veterinarian have the authority to provide for the allowance of bounties for the killing of predatory animals." It is quite clear to us that the board has no such authority. Secs. 1197 and 1198 of the Rev. Codes, known as the predatory animal act or livestock sanitary act, provide as follows:

Sec 1197. "It is hereby made the duty of the sanitary board to exercise a general supervision over the...