Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

Decision Date11 April 1956
Citation86 So.2d 792
PartiesRandolph P. MYERS, Appellant, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and W. R. Davis,Appellees. Randolph P. MYERS, as Administrator of the Estate of Susan A. Myers, deceased, Appellant, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and W. R. Davis,Appellees. Harold B. BENDER, Appellant, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, and W. R. Davis,Appellees.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Wm. McHardy Berson of Sanders, McEwan & Berson, Orlando, for appellants.

LeRoy B. Giles, Edward K. Goethe and David W. Hedrick, Orlando, for appellees.

TERRELL, Justice.

These cases were the consummation of a railroad crossing accident within the corporate limits of Winter Park, Florida. Marsha C. Bender and Susan A. Myers, seniors in Edgewater High Schood, Orlando, were traveling in a Jeepster convertible sedan over Minnesota Avenue, their objective to visit friends at Winter Park High Schood, about four miles distant, during the noon recess. At the intersection of Minnesota Avenue and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, they collided with the Champion, one of the fast passenger trains of the railroad. The Jeepster was demolished and both girls were rendered unconscious; Susan A. Myers died in a few hours without regaining consciousness and Marsha C. Bender regained consciousness after several hours but received severe injuries.

Randolph P. Myers, father of Susan A. Myers, brought suit against Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and W. R. Davis, the engineer, for the wrongful death of his daughter and recovered a judgment for $47,500. He brought a second suit as administrator of the estate of Susan A. Myers and recovered a judgment for $5,300 against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, being the present value of her estate, had she lived her normal life expectancy of fifty years. Harold B. Bender brought suit against Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and W. R. Davis to recover damages for the value of his Jeepster, including doctors, hospital and other bills incurred by his daughter, Marsha C. Bender, as result of the accident and recovered a judgment of $2,000.

The three cases were tried together by order of the court and separate verdicts were entered in each case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court granted motion on the part of defendants for a new trial in each case pursuant to sec. 59.07(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., his order stating:

'The motion for new trial is herein granted on the ground that the verdict for the plaintiff is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The court is of the view that the statutory presumption of negligence of the defendant has been overcome by defendants' evidence, and the burden of showing negligence proximately contributing to the collision must rest on a preponderance of the evidence. The only evidence of negligence of defendants presenting a jury question concerns the conflict in the evidence respecting giving of appropriate warning of the approach of defendants' train. The evidence on this question, while legally sufficient to present a jury question, so preponderates in defendants' favor that the court is of the view that the manifest weight of the evidence in this cause establishes the negligence of the driver of the vehicle involved as the sole proximate cause of the collision, consequently, a verdict for the plaintiff is not approved by the Court and a retrial is ordered. It is the Court's view that this case is controlled by Covington v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co. (99 Fla. 1102), 128 So. 426. Being of this view, no other grounds assigned in motion for new trial are considered.'

These appeals are from the orders granting new trial in each case. Appellees filed cross-assignments of error in each case which were identical except that cross-assignment No. 9 was included only in the two Myers cases and not in the Harold B. Bender case. By stipulation of counsel and order of the court, a single transcript has been filed for all cases. Since it is agreed that the questions in each case are identical, a single brief for all cases has been filed. We approve this practice.

Appellants state their first question as follows:

'Where trial court, in order granting a new trial, finds that there is 'evidence of negligence of the defendants presenting a jury question' concerning 'the conflict in the evidence respecting giving of appropriate warning of approach of defendant's train,' and that the evidence on this question is 'legally sufficient to present a jury question,' but that it so preponderates in defendant's favor that the court is of the view that 'the manifest weight of the evidence-establishes the negligence of the driver of the vehicle as the sole proximate cause of the collision,' and where there was no finding that the jury was misled, motivated by prejudice, passion or any other improper cause, and no finding that the verdict was contrary to the probative force of the evidence or the justice of the cause, may the trial court grant a new trial?'

The orders denying motion for directed verdict and granting a new trial in each case are the same as the order quoted above. An examination of the first question shows that appellants challenge that part of the order of reversal reading, 'the verdict for the plaintiff is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The only evidence of negligence of the defendant presenting a jury question concerns the conflict in the evidence respecting the giving of appropriate warning of the approach of defendant's train. The evidence on this question so preponderates in defendant's favor that the court is of the view that the manifest weight of the evidence in this case establishes the negligence of the driver of the vehicle as the sole proximate cause of the collision, consequently a verdict for the plaintiff is not approved by the court and a retrial is ordered.'

Appellants contend that the quoted part of the order granting a new trial should be reversed because in finding that the 'verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,' said order should have further found that the 'jury was misled, motivated by prejudice, passion or any other improper cause,' or some equivalent finding. The statute, sec. 59.07(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides in substance that in every case where motion for new trial is granted, the trial court shall indicate...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Lerner v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • August 23, 1984
    ...it to a stop. See 43 Fla.Jur.2d §§ 114-125. Thompson had a duty to stop, look and listen at the crossing. See Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 86 So.2d 792, 796 (Fla.1956). Thompson was aware of the signal devices at the crossing, Thompson Dep. at 9-10, 13-14, 27-28, but had no recoll......
  • Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 30990
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1961
    ...outside the record, Martin v. Stone, supra [Fla., 51 So.2d 33], Turner v. Frey, supra [Fla., 81 So.2d 721, 722], Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792; Florida Publishing Co. v. Copeland, Fla., 89 So.2d 18. 'Inasmuch as such motions are granted in the exercise of a s......
  • Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Griffin
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 22, 1990
    ...for new trial. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So.2d 1341 (Fla.1981); Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959); Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 86 So.2d 792 (Fla.1956); Bullard v. Canale, 260 So.2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Department of Corrections v. Romero, 524 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 5......
  • Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 38810
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 22, 1970
    ...outside the record, Martin v. Stone, supra (Fla., 51 So.2d 33); Turner v. Frey, supra (Fla., 81 So.2d 721, 722); Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792; Florida Publishing Co. v. Copeland, Fla., 89 So.2d 18.'Inasmuch as such motions are granted in the exercise of a so......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT