Myers v. Mobil Oil Corp.
Decision Date | 02 October 1985 |
Citation | 172 Cal.App.3d 1059,218 Cal.Rptr. 630 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1352 Donald L. MYERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, West Coast Independent Union, Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants and Respondents. B 009501. |
Frank Sanes, Jr., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.
Hanna & Morton, Bela G. Lugosi and J. Nile Kinney, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.
On May 21, 1979, appellant Donald Myers filed a charge of race discrimination with the California Division of Fair Employment practices (now the Department of Fair Employment & Housing; "the Department"), alleging that his then employer, respondent Mobil Oil Corporation, had committed acts of discrimination against him based on his race, in violation of the provisions of the Fair Employment Practice Act ( ). Appellant's administrative action resulted in a Settlement Agreement entered into in May 1980, which provided in pertinent part that:
1. Remove specified derogatory materials from the personnel file of Complainant.
2. Guarantee Complainant equal terms and conditions of employment.
3. Submit a copy of Respondent's affirmative action plan and progress statement to Department of Fair Employment & Housing within 60 days of execution of this agreement.
"...
On November 5, 1980, appellant was discharged by respondent. On December 17, 1980, he filed a second charge of race discrimination with the Department, again alleging that respondent had committed various acts of discrimination against him. On September 28, 1981, the Department issued a notice to Myers informing him that it would not issue an accusation against respondent because of insufficient evidence to prove a violation of the Act, and that Myers had one year from the date of the notice to bring an action in Superior Court on his discrimination claim.
The present action was filed on November 19, 1982, alleging that respondent discriminated against appellant because of his race and thereby breached the Settlement Agreement. When respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted, appellant brought this appeal. We affirm.
The Fair Employment and Housing Act in providing a comprehensive legislated means for the prevention and elimination of unlawful employment practices specifies that "Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice may file with the department a verified complaint ..." (Gov.Code, § 12970), which the Department is required to investigate promptly. (Gov.Code, § 12963.) Based upon its determination following investigation that the complaint is valid, the Department must "immediately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practice complained of by conference, conciliation, and persuasion" (Gov.Code, § 12963.7), which, if successful, may result in an agreement like the one involved here. (Gov.Code, § 12964.) Failure of these methods to produce the desired result, on the other hand, may occasion the issuance of an accusation which shall "set forth the nature of the charges ... and shall require the respondent to answer the charges at a hearing." (Gov.Code, § 12965.)
In any instance where an agreement has been entered into or an accusation has produced a final order or decision against a respondent, the Department within one year "shall conduct a compliance review to determine whether such [agreement,] order or decision has been fully obeyed and implemented." (Gov.Code §§ 12964, 12973.)
Additionally, "Whenever the department believes, on the basis of evidence presented to it, that any person is violating or is about to violate any [agreement,] final order or decision issued pursuant to this part, the department may bring an action in the Superior Court of the State of California against such person to enjoin him from continuing the violation or engaging therein or in doing anything in furtherance thereof...." (Ibid.)
In those cases where (Gov.Code § 12965.)
From the foregoing it seems clear that, to the extent...
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