Myers v. Moreno, 38822
Decision Date | 21 March 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 38822,38822 |
Parties | Malcolm MYERS, Appellant, v. Charles MORENO, Chairman, St. Louis Civil Service Commission, et al., Respondents. . Louis District, Division Two |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Ernest L. Keathley, Jr., St. Louis, for appellant.
James R. Hartung, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a decision of the circuit court affirming an order of the St. Louis Civil Service Commission dismissing appellant's case for failure to prosecute.
On May 24, 1974, appellant Malcolm Myers was dismissed from his employment as a photographer with the City of St. Louis. The dismissal followed a series of articles in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch which alleged that a number of full-time city employees, named in the articles, were devoting less than forty hours a week to their jobs. The city, in its notice of dismissal, charged that appellant was "unable or unwilling to perform the duties of his position in a satisfactory manner" and had "omitted to perform . . . acts it was his duty to perform."
On June 3, 1974, appellant, who is black, filed a notice of appeal to the St. Louis Civil Service Commission and stated his belief that the dismissal was ordered for "racial, religious or political reasons." A hearing date was set. On June 10, 1974, appellant filed a motion for discovery requesting certain items and information including every photographic film negative taken by appellant, the "date Log of each such negative . . . from the date his employment . . . began until May 24, 1974 . . . " The motion also asked for the name and address of each employee of the city against whom allegations "similar" to those against appellant had been made and the records showing disposition of each such case. The city voluntarily provided appellant with some of the information and documentation requested but not the foregoing. Upon appellant's request, a hearing was held before the commission on the city's refusal. As a result of that hearing, the commission denied appellant's request that the city be ordered to comply.
On January 20, 1975, appellant filed a motion for additional discovery requesting:
When the city indicated that it would not comply with the motion for additional discovery, appellant on January 28, 1975 requested another hearing before the commission and asked that the hearing on the merits set for February 7 be continued until this motion had been heard and decided.
On February 3, 1975, the commission notified appellant's attorney by letter that it was denying his request for a hearing on the motion for additional discovery. It then made an equivocal reference to the request for continuance, which will be discussed in detail below. Neither appellant nor his attorney appeared for the hearing before the commission on February 7, 1975. The letter of February 3 was read into the record, and the commission dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. In the petition for review filed in circuit court, appellant alleged that the commission's letter failed to advise that " . . . the hearing on the merits was still set for February 7, 1975 . . . " 1
Appellant's principal contentions here are: (1) that the failure of the commission to grant him a hearing on his motion for additional discovery deprived him of property rights without due process; (2) that the material requested in the second motion was properly discoverable; and (3) that the commission, in dismissing the case when appellant failed to appear for the hearing, "erred in setting aside the continuance it granted on February 3, 1975 without first notifying the appellant . . . "
We consider first the question of the dismissal by the commission of appellant's case which, for reasons hereinafter set out, we hold to have been improper. Our review is governed by Chapter 536, RSMo, and is limited by § 536.140 in this case to a determination of whether the commission's actions violated constitutional principles or statutory requirements, was arbitrary and capricious, or constituted an abuse of its discretion. The question, however, does not arise as appellant frames it. Had the commission dismissed the cause without a hearing after clearly granting a continuance in its letter of February 3, it would be a simple matter to find its order arbitrary and unreasonable. The question is, rather, whether the commission's action violated any of the standards of § 536.140 in view of the letter which may or may not be read to have granted a continuance of the hearing.
Initially, we note that Missouri law recognizes the "inherent right and power of a court, of its own motion and independently of statute or court rule, to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute . . . " Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 335 S.W.2d 64, 69(1) (Mo.1960); Salle v. Holland Furnace Co., 337 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.1960). In the absence of any express limitation in statute or regulation, an administrative body acting in a judicial capacity must be presumed to have the same power. It is also true, however, that as a matter of policy Missouri law favors the disposition of cases on their merit when possible. Human Development Corporation v. Wefel, 527 S.W.2d 652, 655(2) (Mo.App.1975). The reason is simply that " . . . the purpose of all courts is to do justice, . . . " and the end of justice is best served when all litigants have had a chance to be heard. Savings Finance Corporation v. Blair, 280 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo.App.1955). It follows from this principle that "an appellate court is less likely to interfere when the trial court has set aside a default judgment than when it has not . . . " Levee District No. 4 of Dunklin County v. Small, 281 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Mo.App.1955).
The commission's letter of February 3 was an attempt to notify the appellant of the date on which the hearing on the merits was to be held. We review the adequacy of that notice, for " . . . the first requirement of procedural due process is that adequate notice be given." Valter v. Orchard Farm School District, 541 S.W.2d 550, 557 (Mo.1976). Although § 536.067, RSMo prescribes the form and content of notices which institute administrative proceedings, there are no formal requirements relating to supplemental notifications concerning changes of time, location, etc. Consequently, adequacy of such notices must be measured by such general principles as " . . . due process of law is not satisfied unless the notice...
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