Myers v. Myers

• Decision Date: 10 July 2014
• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05228,989 N.Y.S.2d 537,119 A.D.3d 1114
• Parties: Christina A. MYERS, Appellant, v. Thomas E. MYERS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1114
989 N.Y.S.2d 537
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05228

Christina A. MYERS, Appellant,
v.
Thomas E. MYERS, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 10, 2014.

Cynthia Feathers, Glens Falls, for appellant.

Maxwell & Van Ryn, Delmar (Paul W. Van Ryn of counsel), for respondent.

Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., STEIN, EGAN JR., DEVINE and CLARK, JJ.

CLARK, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered June 6, 2013

[989 N.Y.S.2d 538]

in Albany County, ordering, among other things, equitable distribution of the parties' marital property, upon a decision of the court.

Six years before the parties' marriage in June 2000, plaintiff (hereinafter the wife) became the sole owner of real property, which would later become the parties' marital residence. At the time of marriage, the wife owned the property free and clear of any liens or encumbrances. In 2005, apparently in an effort to consolidate debt, defendant (hereinafter the husband) and the wife jointly applied for a mortgage on the property. To satisfy the requirements of the mortgage lender, the husband's name had to appear on the deed to the residence.¹ Thus, on March 31, 2005, the wife executed a deed conveying ownership of the residence from her alone to both her and the husband. A mortgage was issued jointly to the parties that same day.

In December 2011, the wife commenced this action for divorce on the basis that the parties' marriage was irretrievably broken. The parties executed an interim agreement, as well as a subsequent stipulation and opting out agreement, resolving all issues but the distribution of the marital residence and the debt attached thereto, which had amounted to approximately $160,000. Thereafter, the action proceeded to trial, following which Supreme Court issued a decision and order finding, among other things, that the marital residence and its accompanying debt should be equally divided between the parties. A judgment of divorce subsequently incorporated Supreme Court's earlier findings and this appeal by the wife ensued.

The wife contends that Supreme Court erred in denying her a separate property origination credit in the amount of $165,000 for the estimated value of the marital residence at the time that she transferred it to herself and the husband jointly. In denying such credit, Supreme Court indicated that it was bound by our prior decision in Campfield v. Campfield, 95 A.D.3d 1429, 944 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2012),lv. dismissed20 N.Y.3d 914, 956 N.Y.S.2d 479, 980 N.E.2d 528 (2012),lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 857, 2013 WL 2436267 (2013). Specifically, Supreme Court referred to the portion of Campfield that differentiated between a credit for marital property that is “acqui[red]” from separate property—i.e., by using the proceeds of the sale of separate property to purchase marital property—and marital property that originates...