Myers v. Myers

• Decision Date: 13 June 2014
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: Teresa E. MYERS, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Bradley J. MYERS, Defendant–Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.).

118 A.D.3d 1315
987 N.Y.S.2d 766
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04319

Teresa E. MYERS, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
Bradley J. MYERS, Defendant–Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.).

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

June 13, 2014.

Lisa A. Sadinsky, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant.

Amdursky, Pelky, Fennell & Wallen, P.C., Oswego (Courtney S. Radick of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, and WHALEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment of divorce and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from a subsequent order requiring that he pay a portion of plaintiff's attorney's fees.

With respect to the judgment in appeal No. 1, we reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court abused its discretion in awarding maintenance for a 10–year period. It is well established that, “ ‘[a]s a general rule, the amount and duration of maintenance are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” ( Frost v. Frost, 49 A.D.3d 1150, 1150–1151, 854 N.Y.S.2d 621;see Gately v. Gately, 113 A.D.3d 1093, 1093, 978 N.Y.S.2d 550;Rooney v. Rooney [Appeal No. 3], 92 A.D.3d 1294, 1295, 938 N.Y.S.2d 724,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 810, 2012 WL 3743855), and we perceive no abuse of discretion here. As the court noted, there is a “vast discrepancy” in the incomes of the parties, with plaintiff's sole source of income consisting of Social Security Disability (SSD) payments ( see Gilliam v. Gilliam, 109 A.D.3d 871, 872, 971 N.Y.S.2d 541). During most of the 13–year marriage, plaintiff raised the parties' two children while defendant was the sole wage earner ( see Carpenter v. Carpenter, 202 A.D.2d 813, 814–815, 608 N.Y.S.2d 751). The parties enjoyed a relatively comfortable standard of living during the marriage. In setting the duration of maintenance, the court determined that, even if plaintiff were able to

[987 N.Y.S.2d 767]

find a job, she would never approach her pre-divorce standard of living, while defendant “clearly can.” Plaintiff testified at trial that she is permanently disabled as a result of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and a severed nerve in her left hand. Although plaintiff did not submit medical evidence or testimony concerning her disability, we conclude that the undisputed fact that the Social Security Administration determined that she was disabled as of 2000 and that she continues to receive SSD, coupled with her testimony, is sufficient to support the court's maintenance...