Myers v. State, Dept. of Revenue, M.V.D., No. 04CA2179.

Decision Date17 November 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04CA2179.
Citation126 P.3d 328
PartiesSteve MYERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE of Colorado DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Edwin J. Lobato, Alamosa, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Robert Dodd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

TAUBMAN, J.

Defendant, Colorado Department of Revenue, appeals the district court judgment reversing an order revoking the driver's license of plaintiff, Steve Myers, for a period of one year. We reverse and remand with directions that the district court enter a new order.

Based upon a traffic stop of plaintiff in October 2003, the Department initiated proceedings to revoke plaintiff's driving privileges. Following a hearing, the hearing officer revoked plaintiff's driving privileges for a period of one year based upon a determination that plaintiff "knowingly declined to provide a urine sample to law enforcement."

Thereafter, plaintiff sought judicial review of the revocation order in the district court. Although the Department filed an answer asserting that the revocation order was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed, it did not file a supporting brief.

The district court reversed the revocation order. The court specifically noted that the district attorney's office "did not file a[b]rief in this case" and that "no response brief has been filed and therefore the Complaint for Judicial Review should be GRANTED."

On appeal, the Department contends that the district court erred in granting the petition and reversing the revocation order based solely upon the Department's failure to file a brief. We agree.

Judicial review of driver's license revocation orders is governed by § 42-2-126(10)(b), C.R.S.2005. That statute provides that "review shall be on the record without taking additional testimony." It further provides that a court may reverse the Department's determination only if the Department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination which is unsupported by the evidence in the record. See Scherr v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 49 P.3d 1217 (Colo.App.2002).

Section 42-2-126(10)(b) requires specific findings based on the court's review of the record. See Cop v. Charnes, 738 P.2d 1200 (Colo.App.1987)(holding that, under the statutory criteria, the absence of a transcript, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis to reverse a determination by the Department).

In addition to the statutory standard of review requirements in § 42-2-126(10)(b), C.R.C.P. 55(e) specifically precludes the entry of a default judgment against a state agency "unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court."

In Norsworthy v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 197 Colo. 527, 594 P.2d 1055 (1979), the Department failed timely to answer a complaint for judicial review of a license revocation. However, the supreme court held that the district court properly denied the driver's motion for default judgment because the driver failed to establish his right to relief by satisfactory evidence as required under C.R.C.P. 55(e). See also Sauer v. Heckers, 34 Colo.App. 217, 524 P.2d 1387 (1974)(despite Department's failure timely to comply with order requiring it to file plaintiff's driving record and transcript of revocation hearing, plaintiff was not entitled to default judgment absent satisfactory showing that he was entitled to relief on the merits).

Thus, under both the standard of review contained in § 42-2-126(10)(b) and the restrictions imposed by C.R.C.P. 55(e), the district court should not have reversed the revocation order based solely upon the Department's failure to file a brief.

Plaintiff argues that the district court's decision was actually based upon the merits and a review of the administrative record. We are not persuaded. Nothing in the district...

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3 books & journal articles
  • ARTICLE 2 DRIVERS' LICENSES
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Rules and C.R.S. of Evidence Annotated (CBA)
    • Invalid date
    ...Without such findings, a court may not overturn a driver's license suspension on review on procedural grounds. Myers v. Dept. of Rev., 126 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005). Statute proscribing driving with a blood alcohol content in excess of set limit provides sufficient notice of proscribed con......
  • Chapter 9 - § 9.4 • PER SE AND REFUSAL HEARING PROCEDURES AND ISSUES
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado DUI Benchbook (CBA) Chapter 9 Driver's License Considerations and Collateral Consequences
    • Invalid date
    ...is never made, is lost, or is destroyed. See Cop v. Charnes, 738 P.2d 1200 (Colo. App. 1987); see also Myers v. Dep't of Revenue, 126 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2005). A series of regulations concerning the issuance, service, and enforcement of subpoenas for these hearings can be found in the Cod......
  • Chapter 22 - § 22.1 • GENERAL POWER TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Appellate Handbook (CBA) Chapter 22 Sanctions In the Appellate Courts
    • Invalid date
    ...with the oral argument if the appellee or cross-appellee fails to file a brief. Myers v. State Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 126 P.3d 328, 329 (Colo. App. 2005). See C.A.R. 34 (whether to allow oral argument is always at the discretion of the appellate...

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