Myers v. State
| Decision Date | 04 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. D 2000-271.,D 2000-271. |
| Citation | 2006 OK CR 12,133 P.3d 312 |
| Parties | Karl Lee MYERS, Appellant v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
David Autry, Capital Trial Division, Indigent Defense System, Norman, OK, attorney for defendant at trial.
Gene Haynes, District Attorney, Ray Hasselman, Assistant District Attorney, Rogers County Courthouse, Claremore, OK, attorneys for the State at trial.
Emma Victoria Rolls, Appellate Defense Counsel, Lee Ann Jones Peters, Deputy Division Chief, Indigent Defense System, Norman, OK, attorneys for appellant on appeal.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, David M. Brockman, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for appellee on appeal.
¶ 1 Appellant, Karl Lee Myers, was tried in Rogers County District Court, Case No. CF 96-233, for First Degree Murder, with malice aforethought, and/or in the alternative, First Degree Murder, while in the commission of a felony based upon the underlying felony of rape by force or fear, in violation of 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(A) or § 701.7(B).1 Jury trial was held before the Honorable Dynda Post, District Judge, on January 25, 2000 through February 16, 2000. The jury found Appellant guilty of First Degree Murder while in the commission of a felony. The jury also found the existence of four (4) aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) the Defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (3) the existence of a probability that the Defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and, (4) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution. The jury set punishment at death. The trial court imposed Judgment and Sentence on March 7, 2000, in accordance with the jury's verdict. Thereafter, Myers perfected this appeal.2
¶ 2 On April 16, 1993, Shawn Williams's body was discovered at Rocky Point on the Port of Catoosa. Forensic examination of her body showed five gunshot wounds; a fatal gunshot wound to her chest ruptured her aorta and caused her death. Williams had other injuries, including abrasions to her chest and abdomen, a laceration on the back of her head, contusion and laceration to her left ear, abrasions to her knees, to her right hip and to her left buttocks. The laceration to the back of her head was consistent with falling and striking her head on the ground; the contusion over her left ear was consistent with being struck by an object. Sperm found in Williams's vagina suggested she was sexually assaulted before she died. DNA testing on the sperm linked Myers to the murder.3 Myers later confessed to the crime to an inmate in the county jail and also bragged about disposing of Williams's body to another witness prior to his arrest. Other relevant facts will be discussed as necessary.
¶ 3 Myers raises twenty-one (21) propositions of error.
¶ 4 In Proposition Eleven, Myers claims the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove prospective juror "S" for cause. Myers claims prospective juror "S" would not consider life imprisonment as a punishment option.
¶ 5 The decision whether to disqualify a prospective juror for cause rests in the trial court's sound discretion whose decision will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Humphreys v. State, 1997 OK CR 59, ¶ 6, 947 P.2d 565, 570. A venireman who is willing to consider all sentencing options and who is not "irrevocably committed" to one sentence before trial has begun is fit to serve and not vulnerable to removal for cause. Humphreys, 1997 OK CR 59, ¶ 6, 947 P.2d at 571; Miller v. State, 1998 OK CR 59, ¶ 21, 977 P.2d 1099, 1106; Hain v. State, 1996 OK CR 26, ¶ 21, 919 P.2d 1130, 1138.
¶ 6 When initially questioned by the trial court, juror "S" stated he would have no difficulty considering all three possible penalties for first degree murder. When the prosecutor asked what he thought of life imprisonment as a punishment for murder, juror "S" replied, "[n]ot much," but then stated he thought he could give fair consideration to all three potential punishments. When questioned by defense counsel, juror "S" indicated he believed a life sentence "doesn't mean a total life sentence," and he responded affirmatively to defense counsel's question that in "his opinion" a life sentence was not really an appropriate punishment for murder. He said "it probably would" be difficult for him to consider life imprisonment as a punishment. He admitted it was "true" that he could not realistically give a complete, fair, open and honest consideration to a life sentence.
¶ 7 The prosecutor rehabilitated prospective juror "S" by asking if he could consider a life sentence under any circumstances, and the juror responded that he thought he "could but I am not in favor of a life sentence." He stated he would listen to the evidence and "would try" to give fair consideration to a life sentence. The trial court then asked juror "S" whether he would be able to consider life imprisonment as a punishment and he said, "yes."
¶ 8 At this point, defense counsel's motion to remove the prospective juror for cause was denied. Counsel continued to question juror "S" and asked if he just answered that he could not give full consideration to a sentence of life imprisonment to someone who was convicted of first degree murder. The prospective juror responded "yes I did," and admitted that was his opinion. The trial court again denied a challenge for cause.
¶ 9 When this Court reviews the voir dire of potential jurors whose answers are unclear and who appear equivocal in their ability to consider all punishment options, we traditionally defer to the impressions of the trial court who can better assess whether a potential juror would be able to fulfill his or her oath. Douglas v. State, 1997 OK CR 79, ¶ 7, 951 P.2d 651, 659. The prospective juror said he would try to give fair consideration to all sentencing options, including a life sentence, and his admitted propensity to favor a sentence greater than life does not show he could not fairly consider the option. Gilbert v. State, 1997 OK CR 71, ¶¶ 27-29, 951 P.2d 98, 108-109. While we believe the question here is close, we cannot find the record shows the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to remove juror "S" for cause.
¶ 10 Myers argues in Proposition One that the trial court erred when it allowed Sydney Byrd to testify. Byrd was Myers's cellmate while Myers was in the Rogers County Jail. Byrd claimed Myers confessed to him that he had raped and killed a woman.
¶ 11 Prior to trial the State gave notice of its intent to produce Byrd as a witness. Upon defense counsel's request, Judge Post conducted an in camera hearing to determine whether Byrd's statements were reliable and admissible. At the conclusion of this hearing, Judge Post concluded Byrd's testimony was admissible. Defense counsel objected to the trial court's finding that Byrd was a credible witness, and on appeal, Myers contends the trial court erred because the record establishes Byrd was unreliable and untrustworthy. Myers submits the prejudicial effect of his testimony outweighed any probative value it might have had.
¶ 12 In Dodd v. State, 2000 OK CR 2, 993 P.2d 778, we examined the problems relating to jailhouse informant testimony. Noting that jailhouse informants often expect and receive a benefit in exchange for their testimony and that such exchanges may motivate an informant to lie, we set forth a procedure for trial courts to follow when the State seeks to admit evidence through a jailhouse witness whose testimony is not specifically excluded by the United States Constitution.
At least ten days before trial, the state is required to disclose in discovery: (1) the complete criminal history of the informant; (2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or may make in the future to the informant (emphasis added); (3) the specific statements made by the defendant and the time, place, and manner of their disclosure; (4) all other cases in which the informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; (5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such recantation; and (6) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility.
Dodd at ¶ 25, 993 P.2d at 784.
¶ 13 Here, Myers does not complain the mandatory Dodd procedures were not followed, but rather argues the trial court's determination that the jailhouse snitch's testimony was reliable and admissible was erroneous. Myers argues Byrd's testimony at the reliability hearing shows he sought a "favor" from the State for his testimony, lied several times during the hearing, and admitted he had previously worked as a confidential informant in California although denied he received any benefit from that service.
¶ 14 Nothing in Dodd requires the trial court to exclude a jailhouse informant's testimony because his or her testimony is inconsistent, unbelievable, or self-serving. The point of Dodd was to require more thorough examination of informant evidence and complete and full disclosure of information relating to an informant's motivation to fabricate testimony. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its...
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