McHARGH, MAG. JUDGE
The petitioner James Myers1 ("Myers") has filed a petition pro se for a writ of habeas corpus, arising out of his 2010 convictions for three counts of rape, with firearm specifications, one count of kidnapping, and other crimes, in the Summit County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 1.) In his petition, Myers raises three grounds for relief:
1. The trial court committed reversible error or an abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of the Wisconsin conviction over defense objections.
2. The trial court denied the defendant the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him.
3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which was prejudicial to the defendant.
(Doc. 1.) The respondent has filed a Return of Writ. (Doc. 7.) The petitioner did not file a Traverse.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The court of appeals set forth the following factual and procedural background:
On the evening of July 1, 2010, A.Y., the victim in the underlying action, went to a local bar called DeeCob's. The appellant, James D. Myers, was at the bar at the same time. The victim testified that she returned home around midnight. From her bedroom, she heard a noise from a motor vehicle outside her house and found that Myers was stuck in a ditch. She assisted Myers in towing his vehicle from the ditch near her home, and then returned to her home. She subsequently heard a noise, and when she looked outside of her bedroom window, she observed Myers' vehicle in her driveway. She opened her gun safe, loaded her handgun, and fired a shot over the vehicle in an effort to "scare" him off. In response, Myers "peeled out" of her driveway. The victim then went to the bathroom to prepare for bed. When she returned, she found Myers sitting on her bed. She testified that she dove for her gun and struggled with Myers, but that he subsequently took the gun from her and laughed at her. She testified that Myers repeatedly raped her at gunpoint with his mouth and fingers, forced her to consume cocaine, and held her against her will. She testified that she watched Myers leave early the next morning. Feeling unclean, she took a hot shower. She also stripped the sheets off of her bed and washed them because she wanted to erase the incident from her mind. She attempted to go about her normal routine. She testified that she did not immediately call the police because she was afraid that he might come back and hurt her. She also had sexual relations with her boyfriend in an attempt to "give [her]self back to him." She also testified that she returned home from church a couple of days later and found that her front door had been kicked in.
On July 3, 2010, Myers was stopped for a DUI in a driveway adjacent to the victim's home. The officer testified that he was "polite, and cordial, and cooperative." He was released from custody a few hours later. On July 4, 2010, the victim reported the rape to the police. Myers was questioned about the rape. Initially, he denied knowing the victim or ever being present in the victim's home.
At trial, Myers testified that he saw the victim at DeeCob's bar. He had purchased cocaine from an individual at the bar and planned to "whoop it up for the next four or five days over the holidays" and his birthday. Myers testified that he and the victim made plans to do cocaine together later that night. However, he kept his distance from her at the bar because she appeared to be with her boyfriend. In accordance with their plan, Myers followed the victim home later that evening. He backed into what he thought was a dead-end road, and ended up stuck in the pasture. The victim pulled his vehicle out of the pasture with her truck and instructed him to park on the other side of the house. The two proceeded to talk, drink beer, and use cocaine. Myers denied ever seeing the victim naked or touching her. Evidence was introduced by the State revealing a DNA profile matching Myers on a cigarette lighter and a drinking glass.
On July 27, 2010, Myers was charged with rape, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. Each charge carried firearm specifications. Myers was also charged with having a weapon while under disability, menacing by stalking, and operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. On August 30, 2010, a supplemental indictment was filed and Myers was charged with two additional counts of rape, a sexually violent offender specification, a repeat violent offender specification, and corrupting another with drugs.
On September 27, 2010, the case proceeded to a jury trial on all charges except the sexually violent offender specification. The trial court granted Myers' motion for acquittal with regard to the repeat violent offender specification. On October 1, 2010, the jury returned a verdict of guilty for all offenses considered. On October 18, 2010, the jury returned a guilty verdict for the sexually violent predator charge. On November 23, 2010, Myers was sentenced to an indefinite term of life in prison with parole eligibility after 40 years.
State v. Myers, No. CA-25737, 2012 WL 1419104 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012).
Myers filed a timely appeal of his convictions, and raised the following three assignments of error on direct appeal:
1. Evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to prove conformity therewith. It may, however, be introduced to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. Evid.R. 404(B). The trial court committed reversible error and/or abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of the Wisconsin conviction over defense objections.
2. The trial court denied Myers the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which was prejudicial to Myers.
Myers, 2012 WL 1419104. at *2, *5, *7. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Myers, 2012 WL 1419104, at *9.
Myers next filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and set for the following three propositions of law:
1. Evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to prove conformity therewith. It may, however, be introduced to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. Evid.R. 404(B). Did the trial court commit reversible error or commit an abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of the Wisconsin conviction over defense objections?
2. [Petitioner] contends that the trial court's decision to limit cross-examination of the complaining witness denied him the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. Did the trial court commit error in limiting the cross-examination of the complaining witness?
3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which was prejudicial to the defendant.
(Doc. 7, at 6.) On Sept. 5, 2012, the state supreme court denied jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal as not involving any substantial constitutional question. State v. Myers, 132 Ohio St.3d 1516, 974 N.E.2d 113 (2012).
Myers filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
This case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides the standard of review that federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Under the AEDPA, federal courts have limited power to issue a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim which was adjudicated on the merits by a state court. The Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, provided the following guidance:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied -- the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2002). See also Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 421-422 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 947 (2003).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. See also Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003).
A state court decision is not unreasonable simply because the federal court considers the state decision to be erroneous or incorrect. Rather, the federal court must determine that the state court decision is an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-12; Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 422.
The respondent contends that the first, and part of the third, grounds of the petition are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 7, at 10-13.)
A habeas claim may be procedurally defaulted in two distinct ways. First, by failing to comply...
