Myhra v. Park
| Decision Date | 18 January 1935 |
| Docket Number | No. 30170.,30170. |
| Citation | 193 Minn. 290,258 N.W. 515 |
| Parties | MYHRA v. PARK et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Beltrami County; Graham M. Torrance, Judge.
Action by Hans M. Myhra against David J. M. Park and others. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Alexander Fosmark, of Crookston, and Olav E. Vaule, of Ada, for appellant.
Geo. L. Bargen, of Bemidji, for respondents.
Plaintiff while driving his car came into collision at an intersection of two highways with a truck driven by a servant and employee of defendant Park. Claiming that the accident was caused by the negligence of the truck driver, plaintiff brought action against the defendant Park, who was the only defendant in that action. Park duly answered, denying negligence on the part of his driver, alleged contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, and also pleaded a counterclaim charging plaintiff with being negligent and that this was the sole cause of collision and consequent damages to the truck. The reply denied the new matters pleaded by defendant. Trial was had and a general verdict rendered in favor of defendant Park, pursuant to which judgment was duly entered. In the action just mentioned plaintiff limited his claim for recovery to damages to his car and to his person. There was no claim made for damages plaintiff suffered by reason of injuries to his wife, who was riding with him when the accident occurred. The instant action was thereafter brought by him against the present defendants upon the same alleged negligent cause as that set forth in the first action, his present action being to recover moneys expended for medical and hospital treatment of his wife, for the loss of her services, and the comfort and happiness of her society and companionship. Each defendant answered separately, both denying negligence and alleging contributory negligence on plaintiff's part. As further defense they pleaded the former action and resulting verdict and judgment. Plaintiff replied, denying all new matter pleaded in the respective answers. Defendants thereupon moved the trial court to have the replies so interposed, in so far as the same denied the defense of estoppel by verdict and in bar by virtue of the former judgment, stricken as sham and frivolous, and that they have judgment notwithstanding the same. The court granted the relief thus sought, and judgment was entered against the plaintiff that he recover nothing from the defendants or either of them, and that they recover from plaintiff their costs and disbursements. Plaintiff thereupon perfected this appeal.
The questions submitted for determination are whether the court erred (1) in striking plaintiff's replies under the circumstances hereinbefore stated; (2) in ordering judgment in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff notwithstanding the same; and (3) in any event, whether such relief should be granted defendant Johnson, he not being a party to the first action. (Johnson was the servant and employee of defendant Park and was the driver of the truck involved in the accident.)
1 and 2. It is obvious that there is only one negligent act upon which plaintiff's cause or causes of action may be founded. So the only inquiry presented is whether a negligent act giving rise to several items of damage may be made the basis for several actions to recover therefor as against the tort-feasor on the part of the individual who has suffered these damages. In King v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113, 50 L. R. A. 161, 81 Am. St. Rep. 238, a question very similar to the present, if not identical, was presented for determination. There plaintiff brought an action to recover property damage after he had previously collected a judgment in his favor for injuries to his person arising out of the same accident and the same negligent act. The court said (pages 88, 89 of 80 Minn., 82 N. W. 1113, 1114):
If then the cause of action consists of or is founded upon the negligent act which produced the effect, rather than the effect of that act upon different primary rights, plaintiff never had more than one cause of action. That this is sound in law and logic cannot well be denied. There can be no logical justification for holding that an action for injuries to plaintiff's person bars a subsequent action for damages to his car but does not bar a subsequent action for damages flowing from and out of the same accident causing injuries to his wife. The damages are founded upon and are caused by the same negligent act or omission. If such negligent act or omission is not the cause, then there is no cause of action at all for any recovery.
Plaintiff cites and relies upon the case of Skoglund v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 330, 47 N. W. 1071, 11 L. R. A. 222, 22 Am. St. Rep. 733. That case harmonized with plaintiff's view. But it is out of alignment with the King Case, supra, also with the great weight of authority that counsel's research and our own have discovered. There should be "simplicity and directness in the determination of controversial rights:" Id., page 89 of 80 Minn., 82 N. W. 1113, 1114. The fact that the Skoglund Case has never been followed strongly indicates that the bar has never considered it as an authority for splitting causes of action. If plaintiff had prevailed in the first cause, assuming plaintiff's position tenable and the theory of the Skoglund Case applicable, the only question for fact determination in the instant case would be the amount of his damages. That is so because in Adams v. City of Duluth, 175 Minn. 247, 221 N. W. 8, it was held that all issues concerning defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence had been disposed of in a prior action where those issues were involved, thus leaving for determination only the amount and extent of plaintiff's damages in the later case. Any plaintiff could, under plaintiff's theory, be permitted to bring his first action for damages to his car. If he was successful therein, his next action would then be to recover damages to his person. Another action could be brought to recover damages for loss of services, medical expenses, and other items for injuries to his wife. If he had minor children also injured in the same accident, he could bring successive actions for the loss of services and expenses incurred for each of them. And if in any such action a plaintiff was defeated, as he was here, he could still proceed with as many actions as there were different items of injury flowing to him and issuing out of the accident. Such result is abhorrent to reason. It would clog our courts with needless and almost endless litigation. The absurdity of such situation and the evils flowing therefrom are apparent.
In Liimatainen v. St. Louis River Dam & Improvement Co., 119 Minn. 238, 243, 137 N. W. 1099, 1100, the court said: "In other words, a cause of action for a wrong is predicated upon the violation of an ultimate duty, and, though the performance of such duty may...
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