Myles v. Screentech, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 June 2012
• Docket Number: 2101050.
• Citation: 98 So.3d 563
• Parties: Latonya MYLES v. SCREENTECH, INC., et al.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

98 So.3d 563

Latonya MYLES

v.SCREENTECH, INC., et al.

2101050.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 1, 2012.

Tiffany Johnson Cole and Robert Simms Thompson of Law Offices of Robert Simms Thompson, PC, Tuskegee, for appellant.

R. Larry Bradford and Evan P. Baggett of Johnstone, Adams, Bailey, Gordon & Harris, LLC, Birmingham, for appellees.

PITTMAN, Judge.

Latonya Myles appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Houston Circuit Court in favor of Screentech, Inc., Terry Collins, and Randall Williams (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the Screentech defendants”).

In November 2010, Myles filed a lawsuit asserting claims of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and the tort of outrage against Screentech, Inc. Screentech answered Myles's complaint in December 2010. In February 2011, Myles filed an amended complaint naming Collins and Williams as additional defendants and asserting the same claims against them that she had asserted against Screentech. In May 2011, the Screentech defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, to which Myles responded in opposition. Following a hearing on that motion, the trial court entered a summary judgment as to all claims in favor of the Screentech defendants.

The record reveals the following facts. Screentech is a screen-printing business owned by Collins and Williams. In January 2009, Myles entered into a business relationship with Screentech. At that time, Myles stated, she operated a nonprofit organization called “Milk and Honey Multicultural” and placed an order for 1,000 t-shirts that the organization planned to sell at the presidential inauguration. The order totaled $4,000. Upon placing the order, Myles stated that she would not be able to pay the entire balance owed, but she asked if she could pay a portion of that balance and receive 100 t-shirts to sell at an event before the time she needed all 1,000 t-shirts. The next day, Myles went to Screentech's place of business and paid a $300 deposit and gave Screentech the artwork for the t-shirts. The parties did not enter into a written contract at that time; however, Myles provided a post office box number, a telephone number, and a federal tax-identification number for the organization. Myles also provided a physical address for the organization. Approximately one week later, Myles picked up the first 100 t-shirts she had requested; however, Screentech had gone ahead and issued 300 t-shirts to her, leaving 700 t-shirts to complete the order. Two days after picking up the 300 t-shirts, Myles picked up 1,000 t-shirts; Myles claimed that she had telephoned Screentech when she realized that she had initially picked up 300 t-shirts, rather than 100 t-shirts, and that Screentech had agreed to give her the 300 t-shirts for free, making her outstanding balance at that point $3,700. On the other hand, Screentech treated the additional 1,000 shirts as a second order.

As of April 1, 2009, the organization had an outstanding balance of $4,056 with Screentech, and, after the account was 90 days overdue, Screentech began attempting to contact Myles and the organization at the telephone number and addresses Myles had previously provided. Neither Myles nor any other representative of the organization responded to any of Screentech's attempts to contact them, not even to a certified letter that was confirmed to have been delivered to the physical address provided by Myles. All communication sent to the organization at that time informed it that its account was in default.

Because its attempts to contact Myles and/or the organization had been unsuccessful, Collins instructed a Screentech employee to perform an Internet search regarding the organization to see if they could retrieve additional information regarding the organization or, possibly, about a representative of the organization other than Myles. The search produced information about another nonprofit organization, also named Milk and Honey, headquartered in Florida. Believing that organization to be the same organization as Myles's, Screentech contacted that organization and was told that Myles was not employed there. Thereafter, Collins contacted the Houston County District Attorney's Office and informed the district attorney that Screentech had not been able to locate correct contact information on its customer, who had claimed to be a nonprofit organization. The district attorney advised Collins to file a police report, which he did.

Screentech filed a police report on April 22, 2009. At that time, Screentech gave investigators its file on the “Milk and Honey Multicultural” account and a copy of a letter it had sent Myles questioning the status of her organization. In summary, it is undisputed that Screentech told investigators that Myles had not paid for the t-shirts she had ordered on behalf of an organization called “Milk and Honey Multicultural,” which she claimed was a nonprofit organization; that Screentech had received no response from its attempts to contact Myles with the contact information she had provided; that Screentech had searched for additional contact information and, in doing so, had located an entity also named “Milk and Honey” in Pensacola, which had informed Screentech that Myles was not employed by that entity; and that there was no agreement with Myles to pay for the t-shirts at a later date. An independent investigation of Myles subsequently revealed that she had previously used approximately six different aliases, two different Social Security numbers, and had given multiple addresses as her own.

Myles was charged with and convicted of first-degree theft of property on December 10, 2009. Williams testified during that trial regarding his dealings with Myles. That conviction was thereafter set aside in April 2010. Myles was again indicted for first-degree theft. Screentech took no part in that investigation or trial. The case was eventually settled with the district attorney's office.

On appeal, Myles asserts that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Screentech defendants because, she asserts, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding her claims of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and the tort of outrage.

It is well settled that an appellate court reviews a summary judgment de novo, using the same standard applied by the trial court. Neal v. Sem Ray, Inc., 68 So.3d 194, 196 (Ala.Civ.App.2011). Under Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., we must review the evidence to determine whether the movant established that no genuine issue of material fact existed, thereby entitling the movant to a judgment as a matter of law. If the movant makes that showing, the nonmovant thereafter bears the burden to adduce “substantial evidence” to rebut the movant's contention that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin Cnty., 538 So.2d 794, 797–98 (Ala.1989). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). We apply the de novo standard of review to each issue raised in the present appeal.

We begin by discussing Myles's claim of abuse of process. To establish a prima facie case of abuse of process, the evidence must show that an ulterior purpose motivated the use of process, that the use of process was wrongful, and that the defendant acted with malice. Moon v. Pillion, 2 So.3d 842, 846 (Ala.2008). Myles contends that the evidence she presented is sufficient to establish a prima facie case as to her abuse-of-process claim. First, she argues that Screentech was improperly motivated to initiate Myles's prosecution by its desire to collect the debt owed to it, which, she claims, was its ulterior purpose. In support of her argument, Myles relies on Shoney's, Inc. v. Barnett, 773 So.2d 1015 (Ala.Civ.App.1999), in which we explained:

“Abuse of process has been defined as ‘the malicious perversion of a regularly issued process to accomplish a purpose whereby a result not lawfully or properly obtainable under it is secured.’ Duncan v. Kent, 370 So.2d 288, 290 (Ala.1979). As our supreme court has explained, a defendant cannot be liable for the tort of abuse of process ‘ “[i]f the action is confined to its regular and legitimate function in relation to the cause of action stated in the complaint.” ’ Duncan, 370 So.2d at 290 (quoting 1 Am.Jur.2d Abuse of Process, § 13 (1962)). However, liability attaches ‘ “if the suit is brought, not to recover on the cause of action stated in the complaint, but for a collateral purpose.” ’ Id.”

Shoney's, 773 So.2d at 1025.

In particular, in her brief, Myles points to our reference in Shoney's, used for illustrative purposes, to a debt-collection scenario where a potentially viable abuse-of-process claim might arise, stating that anyone who initiates prosecution to collect a debt abuses process. However, in Shoney's, we stated that it would be an abuse of process for a creditor to garnish (thereby, use the judicial process) a debtor's exempt wages in order to coerce the debtor into paying his or her balance. We thereafter summarized that “ ‘if a defendant prosecutes an innocent plaintiff for a crime without reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, it is malicious prosecution; if he prosecutes him with such grounds to extort payment of a debt, it is abuse of process.’ ” Shoney's, 773 So.2d at 1025 (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 121, at 857 (4th ed.1971)).¹

We reject Myles's argument that the fact that Screentech wanted to collect a debt from Myles satisfied the ulterior-purpose element of...