Neal v. Sem Ray Inc.
Citation | 68 So.3d 194 |
Decision Date | 11 February 2011 |
Docket Number | 2091068. |
Parties | Tina NEALv.SEM RAY, INC., and Ronder Stringer. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Anthony E. Ifediba and Adedapo T. Agboola of The Ifediba Law Group, Birmingham, for appellant.S. Anthony Higgins of Holtsford Gilliland Higgins Hitson & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for appellees.BRYAN, Judge.
Tina Neal, the plaintiff below, appeals from a partial summary judgment in favor of Sem Ray, Inc. (“Sem Ray”), and Ronder Stringer, two of the defendants below, with respect to Neal's claim of negligence in the operation of a dump truck. We affirm.
The following facts are undisputed. Stringer and Neal are cousins. Stringer is employed by Sem Ray as a dump-truck driver. On July 21, 2008, Stringer telephoned Neal's mother and asked her to ride with Stringer on a trip to deliver a load of gravel to a job site in Atmore; however, Neal's mother could not ride with Stringer due to a prior engagement. Consequently, Stringer asked Neal to ride with her and keep her company. Initially, Neal did not want to go; however, Neal's mother asked Neal to ride with Stringer because Neal's mother could not go, and Neal agreed to go. The next day, Stringer picked up Neal in Troy at 3:30 a.m., and they headed to Atmore. En route to Atmore, the dump truck turned over, and Neal was injured.
On December 19, 2008, Neal sued Stringer, Sem Ray, and First Continental Leasing,1 stating claims of negligence and wantonness in the operation of the dump truck against all the defendants; claims of negligence and wantonness in the hiring, training, and supervision of Stringer against Sem Ray and First Continental Leasing; claims of negligence and wantonness in the entrustment of the dump truck to Stringer against Sem Ray and First Continental Leasing; and claims of negligence and wantonness jointly and severally against Stringer, Sem Ray, First Continental Leasing, and fictitiously named parties.
Answering, Stringer, Sem Ray, and First Continental Leasing denied liability and, as an affirmative defense, asserted that they were not liable with respect to Neal's negligence claims because, they said, Neal was a guest in the dump truck within the meaning of the Alabama Guest Statute, § 32–1–2, Ala.Code 1975, when she was injured.2 Subsequently, Stringer, Sem Ray, and First Continental Leasing moved for a summary judgment, which Neal opposed.
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the summary-judgment motion with respect to the claim of wantonness in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer and granting the summary-judgment motion with respect to all Neal's other claims. The trial court did not certify the partial summary judgment as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and it subsequently conducted a jury trial with respect to Neal's claim of wantonness in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Stringer with respect to that claim, and the trial court entered a judgment on that jury verdict. Thereafter, Neal timely appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12–2–7(6), Ala.Code 1975.
In her brief to this court, Neal argues and cites authority only with respect to her claim of negligence in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer and Sem Ray. In Tucker v. Cullman–Jefferson Counties Gas District, 864 So.2d 317, 319 (Ala.2003), the supreme court stated:
Accordingly, in the case now before us, due to Neal's failure to present argument and to cite authority regarding any of her claims other than her claim of negligence in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer and Sem Ray, we treat all of her claims other than her claim of negligence in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer and Sem Ray as having been abandoned by Neal, and we affirm the judgments with respect to all of those claims. Thus, we will consider only the propriety of the partial summary judgment with respect to Neal's claim of negligence in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer and Sem Ray. See Tucker.
Our review of the partial summary judgment with respect to Neal's claim of negligence in the operation of the dump truck against Stringer and Sem Ray is governed by the following principles:
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038–39 (Ala.2004).
Citing Cash v. Caldwell, 603 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1992), Neal argues that the evidence established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she was a guest in the dump truck operated by Stringer within the meaning of the Alabama Guest Statute because, she says, the evidence established that she accompanied Stringer at the instance of Stringer for a purpose that benefited Stringer on a trip that was solely for the benefit of Stringer and Sem Ray. In Cash v. Caldwell, the supreme court summarized the facts and the procedural history pertinent to the Cashes' negligence claim against Caldwell:
603 So.2d at 1002. Reversing the summary judgment with respect to Evelyn and Richard's negligence claim, the supreme court stated:
“We must determine whether the trial court erred in holding that the Cashes were ‘guests' as a matter of law. The Cashes contend that they were ‘passengers,’ and thus are not barred from suing under the Alabama Guest Statute, § 32–1–2. They argue further that if the legislature had intended to limit liability in family relationships in all situations, it would have so provided in the Guest Statute.
“....
“The statute does not define the word ‘guest’; therefore, we must look to case law. In Wagnon v. Patterson, 260 Ala. 297, 303, 70 So.2d 244 (1954), this Court stated as follows:
“ ‘ “The general rule is that if the transportation of a rider confers a benefit only on the person to whom the...
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