Mylnar v. Hall, 35060
| Decision Date | 17 March 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 35060,35060 |
| Citation | 350 P.2d 440,55 Wn.2d 739 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Mary Ann MYLNAR, a single woman, Appellant, v. James C. HALL and Jane Doe Hall, husband and wife, and James A. Hall, Jr., Respondents. |
Edwin R. Johnson, Tacoma, for appellant.
Carnahan, Gordon & Goodwin, Tacoma, Harry Sager, Tacoma, of counsel, for respondents.
Appellant seeks to recover for personal injuries and property damage arising from an automobile accident which occurred at approximately five o'clock p. m. on January 9, 1958, at the intersection of Van Tassel road and East Main street, located near the east city limits of Sumner, Washington.
East Main is a county road which is blacktopped and is approximately eighteen feet wide. Generally, it runs in an eastwest direction, and just west of the intersection with Van Tassel road it merges with state highway No. 410 which continues into Summer.
Van Tassel road is a county road which also is blacktopped and is approximately sixteen feet wide. It runs in a northsouth direction.
State highway No. 410 connects the two cities of Sumner and Buckley and approaches Sumner in a winding fashion from the southeast. At the location of the accident, state highway No. 410 curves to the left from a northerly direction to a westerly direction. Van Tassel road has its beginning at the start of this curve and continues in a northerly direction. East Main merges with state highway No. 410 at the westerly end of the curve. Thus, the three highways form a triangle. It is approximately one hundred forty feet from the beginning of Van Tassel road to where it intersects with East Main.
It was dusk at the time of the accident and a light rain had just started to fall. Appellant was driving her 1953 Ford pickup truck west on East Main, approaching its intersection with Van Tassel road. Respondent James A. Hall, Jr., was driving a 1953 Ford, registered to his father, respondent James C. Hall, northward on Van Tassel road. As appellant proceeded in a westerly direction toward the intersection, she had a relatively clear view to her left across an open field. However, the view to her right was obstructed by a house at the northeast corner of the intersection, and it was therefore necessary for her to continue looking in that direction until she was nearly into the intersection. As appellant approached the intersection, at approximately twenty miles per hour, she looked first to her left and saw nothing, and then she looked to her right and saw that not vehicles were approaching from that direction. As she entered the intersection, she looked left again and, for the first time, saw the Hall vehicle, which was then about to enter the intersection.
Respondent James A. Hall, Jr., was proceeding north on Van Tassel road at approximately thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. He did not observe appellant approaching from his right until both vehicles were in the middle of the intersection. Before he could apply his brakes, the collision occurred, and his vehicle then continued on about one hundred feet beyond the intersection. The impact from the collision turned appellant's vehicle completely around so that it was left standing headed in the opposite direction from that in which it had been proceeding.
Appellant brought this action against respondents and the county of Pierce. The complaint alleged several grounds of negligence against respondents, and further alleged that the car was a family car being used for a family purpose. It was alleged that the county was negligent in failing to maintain a stop sign as required by law. Respondents answered and denied the affirmative allegations of the complaint and, as an affirmative defense and cross complaint, then alleged negligence on the part of appellant with a prayer for the recovery of damages to their vehicle. The county of Pierce, by answer, alleged that Van Tassel road was not an arterial highway and thus the county had no duty to maintain a stop sign at the intersection, and prayed that the action be dismissed as to it.
The case was tried to the court sitting with a jury. The court dismissed the action as to the county of Pierce, and, since no appeal was taken from the judgment of dismissal, the county is no longer involved in this case. The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondents. Appellant then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion was denied, and the court entered judgment upon the verdict for respondents from which this appeal is taken.
Although there are seventeen assignments of error, the principal question is whether respondent James A. Hall, Jr. was negligent as a matter of law.
The collision occurred in the intersection and appellant's car had approached from the right of respondent James A. Hall, Jr. Thus, unless Van Tassel road was an arterial, respondent had the primary duty of avoiding this accident by looking out for, and yielding the right of way to, appellant as required by RCW 46.60.150. Smith v. Laughlin, 1958, 51 Wash.2d 740, 321 P.2d 907.
Van Tassel road was not an 'arterial highway' as that term is defined in RCW 46.04.030, since Pierce county had never passed a formal resolution designating it as such. However, the county commissioners had erected a stop sing on each side of Van Tassel road at the intersection where this collision occurred to control traffic entering the intersection from East Main. The stop signs were installed in the spring of 1956, after residents in the area had requested them. However, on Hallowe'en night, October 31, 1957, the stop sign in the northeast corner of the intersection, which controlled traffic entering the intersection westward on East Main, had been removed (presumably by pranksters) and had not been replaced at the time of this accident. The stop sign on the opposite side of Van Tassel road, on the southwest corner of the intersection, was still standing at the time of the accident.
Respondents take the position that, even though Van Tassel road had never been...
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Lemke v. Mueller
...did not change the right-of-way rule and the driver who failed to obey the stop sign still had the statutory right-of-way. Mylnar v. Hall, 55 Wash.2d 739, 350 P.2d 440, involved an intersectional collision where a party urged that a road be classified as a de facto arterial (through) highwa......
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Shryock v. Madrid
...of his family. This conclusion is in accord with Smith v. Simpson, 260 N.C. 601, 133 S.E.2d 474 (1963), and Mylnar v. Hall, 55 Wash.2d 739, 350 P.2d 440 (1960), which are similar cases where the father's only participation was in securing financing for the vehicle purchase. See also Durrett......
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Kaynor v. Farline
...of the members or a member of his immediate family." Pflugmacher, 34 Wash.2d at 690, 209 P.2d 443. In Coffman and Mylnar v. Hall, 55 Wash.2d 739, 350 P.2d 440 (1960), the Supreme Court described the second element as requiring a showing that the vehicle was "for the general use, pleasure, a......
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Madrid v. Shryock
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