N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Herring
| Decision Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | COA22-85 |
| Citation | 2022 NCCOA 456 |
| Parties | NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. Plaintiff, v. CASSIE HERRING and CURTIS LEE TURMAN and RUTH HERRING, Defendants |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2022.
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 15 October 2021 by Judge G Bryan Collins in Wake County No. 20 CVS 13570 Superior Court.
Haywood, Denny & Miller, L.L.P, by Robert E. Levin, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Martin & Jones, PLLC, by Huntington M. Willis, for Defendant-Appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiff North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., appeals from a summary judgment order finding Cassie Herring within the coverage of an underinsured motorist ("UIM") insurance policy issued by Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there is insufficient evidence to establish that Defendant is a "resident" of the household covered under the policy. We affirm the decision of the trial court and hold that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant is a resident of the household and is therefore covered under the UIM policy.
¶ 2 On 19 April 2019, Defendant was the front seat passenger in an automobile accident and was left injured by the crash. Defendant sought recovery under a UIM policy that was issued to Defendant's mother and stepfather by Plaintiff. Defendant's mother and stepfather are both named as insureds under the policy, while Defendant is named as a driver.
¶ 3 The policy issued by Plaintiff provides in part that Plaintiff "will pay compensatory damages which an Insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of . . . [b]odily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an accident." The policy defines "insured" to include "[y]ou or any family member." The term "family member" is defined by the policy as "a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of your household." Nowhere in the policy is the term "resident" or "residence" defined.
¶ 4 Plaintiff conducted an examination of Defendant under oath on 23 November 2020. Defendant stated that she lives with her mother for four months each year and with her father for the remainder of the year, an arrangement that she has "always" maintained. Defendant lists her father's address on her driver's license and vehicle registration, and is registered to vote in the county where her father resides. Although Defendant stated that she does not receive mail at her mother's address, she did receive a $5,000 payment from Plaintiff for medical coverage under the same policy at that location.
¶ 5 On 2 December 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint requesting declaratory relief to determine the rights of the parties under the UIM policy. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is not a resident of her mother's home and is thus not covered under the policy. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 25 August 2021, and Defendant filed her own motion for summary judgment on 31 August 2021.
¶ 6 In support of her motion for summary judgment, Defendant submitted affidavits from herself, her mother, her father, and her stepfather. These affidavits provide that Defendant maintains a permanent room in her mother's home and keeps personal belongings like toiletries and bedding there. They add that Defendant has been clinically diagnosed with severe depression and anxiety, conditions that she has suffered from for over twenty years, and, as a result, she has not maintained her own private residence in at least fifteen years. Contrary to Defendant's sworn statement, the affidavits claim that she does routinely receive and accept mail at her mother's residence. In addition, the affidavits submitted by Defendant's mother and stepfather indicate that it was their intent to include Defendant under the policy as a member of their household.
¶ 7 On 15 October 2021, the trial court filed an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff timely filed notice of appeal.
¶ 8 The sole question for review is whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant is not covered under the UIM insurance policy because she is not a "resident" of her mother's household. Because there is sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant maintains residency in her mother's household, we affirm the trial court's decision.
¶ 9 Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A ruling on a motion for summary judgment must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all inferences in the non-movant's favor." Morrell v. Hardin Creek, Inc., 371 N.C. 672, 680, 821 S.E.2d 360, 366 (2018). We review de novo an appeal of a summary judgment order. In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008).
¶ 10 "The meaning of specific language used in an insurance policy is a question of law." N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Briley, 127 N.C.App. 442, 445, 491 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1997). "As with all contracts, the goal of construction is to arrive at the intent of the parties when the policy was issued." Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 505, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978). "Insurance policies must be given a reasonable interpretation and where there is no ambiguity they are to be construed according to their terms." Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 435, 146 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1966). However, "[w]here there is ambiguity and the policy provision is susceptible of two interpretations, of which one imposes liability upon the company and the other does not, the provision will be construed in favor of coverage and against the company." Id.
¶ 11 Id. The meaning of the word "resident" is thus "flexible, elastic, slippery, and somewhat ambiguous." Great American Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 N.C.App. 653, 656, 338 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1986).
¶ 12 Our Supreme Court interpreted a similar insurance policy in Jamestown, noting that "[w]hen an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a 'slippery' word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term." Jamestown, 266 N.C. at 437, 146 S.E.2d at 416. Instead, "[a]ll who may, by any reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage afforded by the policy should be given its protection." Id. at 437-38, 146 S.E.2d at 416.
¶ 13 "Determinations of whether a particular person is a resident of the household of a named insured are individualized and fact-specific." N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Paschal, 231 N.C.App. 558, 565, 752 S.E.2d. 775, 780 (2014). "[O]ne basic prerequisite exists when a party seeks coverage under this type of provision contained within a relative's insurance policy-namely, the party must show that they actually lived in the same dwelling as the insured relative for a meaningful period of time." N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., v. Martin, 376 N.C. 280, 291, 851 S.E.2d 891, 898 (2020). However, residence in the insured's dwelling need not be exclusive to merit coverage, as "it is generally recognized that a person may be a resident of more than one household for insurance purposes." Davis by Davis v. Md. Cas. Co., 76 N.C.App. 102, 106, 331 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1985).
¶ 14 Here, we evaluate whether Defendant is properly defined as a resident for the purposes of the UIM policy. We therefore examine the record to determine if, under any reasonable construction of the term, Defendant may be considered a "resident" of her mother's household. If so, our inquiry ends and Defendant should be afforded coverage under the policy. See Jamestown, 266 N.C. at 437-38, 146 S.E.2d at 416 ().
¶ 15 The record provides ample evidence that Defendant maintains residence in her mother's household. The sworn statement of the Defendant reveals that Defendant lives in her mother's home for "four months out of the year," an arrangement that she has "always" had. Defendant's residence in the home need not be continuous nor must it be without interruption. See Davis, 76 N.C. App at 106, 331 S.E.2d at 746. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that this constitutes no more than family visits, the "basic prerequisite" that the insured must live in the dwelling for a "meaningful period of time" is surely met here. See Newcomb v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 N.C. 402, 403, 133 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1963) (); Jamestown, 266 N.C. at 439, 146 S.E.2d at 417 ().
¶ 16 Defendant added that she retains a permanent room in her mother's home and keeps clothing that she shares with her mother. Affidavits submitted by Defendant's mother and stepfather explain that she keeps personal belongings at the mother's home, including items of daily living like toiletries...
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