N.C. Private Protective Services Bd. v. Gray, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 8710SC31,8710SC31
• Citation: 360 S.E.2d 135,87 N.C.App. 143
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: N.C. PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICES BOARD v. GRAY, INC., d/b/a Superior Security.

Page 135

360 S.E.2d 135

87 N.C.App. 143

N.C. PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICES BOARD v.GRAY, INC., d/b/a Superior Security.

No. 8710SC31.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Sept. 15, 1987.

Atty. Gen. Lacy H. Thornburg by Sp. Deputies Atty. Gen. Reginald L. Watkins and Daniel F. McLawhorn, and Associate Atty. Gen. Teresa L. White, Raleigh, for the State, appellant.

Max G. Mahaffee, Raleigh, for respondent-appellee.

COZORT, Judge.

Gray, Inc., formerly d/b/a Superior Security, is a guard and patrol company that was, at all times relevant to this appeal, licensed by the North Carolina Private Protective Services Board(the Board).On 26 August 1985 Gray was notified by letter from the Board that a hearing was scheduled for 4 October 1985 to look into allegations that Gray had failed to register unarmed guards and armed guards in accordance with Chapter 74C of the North Carolina General Statutes and regulations adopted pursuant to those statutes.The hearing was rescheduled for 18 December 1985.On 18 December 1985 the Board and Gray entered into a stipulation agreement which stated, among other things, that, in 1983, Gray employed six armed guards and twenty-two unarmed guards which were not registered with the Board; and, in 1984, Gray employed twenty-seven armed guards and twenty unarmed guards which were not registered with the Board.Gray and the Board had agreed to all terms of a settlement except for a $2,000.00 "reimbursement" to which Gray objected.On 21 March 1986 the Board issued its final agency decision which, among other things, assessed a civil penalty of $2,000.00 and an order for Gray to submit $1,071.36 in back registration fees and interest for the unregistered guards.

On 28 April 1986 Gray petitioned for judicial review asking that the $2,000.00 assessment be reversed and the matter remanded to the Board for entry of a modified decision.On 17 November 1986, Superior Court Judge Donald L. Smith granted the relief requested by Gray and remanded the case to the Board, ordering that the $2,000.00 civil penalty be stricken, and that the Board reconsider "its final agency decision in light of State, ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161(1968)."The Board appeals.We reverse.

The trial court did not state its reasons for modifying the decision of the agency, as is required under the last sentence of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 150A-51(1983), which provides: "If the court reverses or modifies the decision of the agency, the judge shall set out in writing, which writing shall become a part of the record, the reasons for such reversal or modification."¹By the trial court's reference to Lanier, id, and by the briefs submitted by the Board and Gray, it is evident that the trial court based its decision on a legal conclusion that the authority of the Board to assess a civil penalty, under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 74C-17(c), violated Art. IV, § 3 of the North Carolina Constitution.

That section provides:

The General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies established pursuant to law such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created.Appeals from administrative agencies shall be to the General Court of Justice.

In Lanier, our Supreme Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of statutes which empowered the Commissioner of Insurance to assess a civil penalty of up to $25,000.00, in addition to, or in lieu of, license revocation, against those found in violation of certain insurance laws.In an opinion by Justice Lake, the court found the statute to be in violation of Art. IV, § 3:

The power to revoke a license granted to an insurance agent by the Commissioner, pursuant to chapter 58 of the General Statutes, is "reasonably necessary" to the effective policing of the activities of such agents so as to protect the public from fraud and imposition, one of the purposes for which the Department of Insurance was established.The power to hold hearings and determine facts relating to the conduct of such agent is "reasonably necessary" to the effective and just exercise of the power to grant and revoke such license.The grant of such judicial power to the Commissioner for that purpose is clearly within the authority conferred upon the Legislature by Art. IV, § 3, of the Constitution.

We find, however, no reasonable necessity for conferring upon the Commissioner the judicial power to impose upon an agent a monetary penalty, varying, in the Commissioner's discretion, from a nominal sum to $25,000 for each violation.

Whether a judicial power is "reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of a purpose for which" an administrative office or agency was created must be determined in each instance in the light of the purpose for which the agency was established and in the light of the nature and extent of the judicial power undertaken to be conferred.We have before us only the attempted grant to the Commissioner of Insurance of the judicial power to impose upon an insurance agent, for one or more of the violations of law specified in G.S. 58-44.6, a penalty, varying in the Commissioner's discretion from a nominal sum to $25,000.We hold such power cannot be granted to him under Art. IV, § 3, of the Constitution of North Carolina.

Lanier, Comr. of Insurance v. Vines, 274 N.C. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 167-68.

Our review of Lanier leads us to the conclusion that the trial court...